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PREFACE 
 
While drafting my bachelor's thesis I remember being “fascinated” by the correlation between the 
principle of entropy (postulated in the second law of thermodynamics) and the idea of temporal 
flow. This link fascinated me and led me to pursue my interest in psychological time, as I realized 
that time directedness dictates the life of organisms, from their physiological functions to the higher 
and more complex biological and cognitive ones. I wrote that thesis more than twelve years ago 
and, since then, my interest in psychological time has not vanished. During the last few years I have 
been working on the topic from different perspectives, trying to develop the hypothesis that if a 
‘sense’ of temporal flow is present at any stage of our life, then an ‘internal time’ system has to 
exist in our minds from birth.  
In this dissertation I attempt to advance an account of psychological time in relation to an 
examination of two topics which are central to philosophical and psychological literature: 
intentionality and modularity. The concept of intentionality is most often associated with the theory 
proposed at the end of the nineteenth century by Franz Brentano, in which it is argued that all 
intentionality, and in particular the intentionality of linguistic expressions, is derived from the 
intentionality of mental states. Brentano regarded that kind of intentionality as a primitive, 
irreducible mental phenomenon. Then, intentionality is what divides the mental from the physical: 
no description or explanation of it can be given using the terms in which physical phenomena are 
described or explained. Brentano's thesis was discussed in the influential writings of the physicalist 
Quine, in terms of the possibility of finding a place for intentional idiom in the natural order. 
However, perhaps the most influential discussion of the intentional thesis is that offered by Jerry 
Fodor, whose work could indeed be described as a sustained effort to provide the sort of 
examination of intentional idiom that Brentano and Quine argued was not possible. Fodor's theory 
of intentionality can be seen as composed of two parts. First, he proposed a theory of propositional 
attitudes, in which they are interpreted as attitudes towards sentences of a 'language of thought'. 
More recently, Fodor developed a theory of the content, or meaning, of the expressions that figure 
in mental language; the nature of Fodor's theory of content is determined by the implications of his 
theory of propositional attitudes. On the other hand, the concept of modularity is referred to in 
Fodor's theory of modularity of mind. The theory of modularity of mind has important theoretical 
and methodological implications for the study of mental architecture. There is a sense in which the 
theory of modularity of mind can be seen as linking Fodor's previous positions, insofar as it shares 
the functional level of psychological explanation,
1
 endorses the perspective of intentional realism of 
propositional attitudes,
2
 and maintains the characterization of the cognitive systems in symbolic and 
computational terms.
3
 A principal aim of this theory was to explore the problem of intentionality 
(understood as the basic property of the mental) and computation from a perspective that establishes 
                                                          
1
 Fodor: 1968. 
2
 Fodor: 1981. 
3
 Fodor: 1975. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
XII 
 
the limitations of the different components that compose the mental architecture. Whereas, a second 
aim was to lay the foundations for the development of alternative experimental methodologies in 
psychology on the basis of data and results obtained in other important research fields, such as 
neuroscience. Regarding the second aim, from its first  appearance the theory of modularity of mind 
was destined to challenge views on the fundamental features of our mental architecture, since it 
posited a sharp distinction between modular systems and the central system. This distinction had 
important theoretical and epistemological implications not only for the methodology used in 
psychology, but also for scientific methodology in general. Therefore, the central tenet of Fodor's 
modularity theory is that human mental architecture is heterogeneous, since it is composed of two 
distinct kinds of components - modular and non-modular - which both process information via 
representations. Concerning the question of how such information is processed through 
representations, Fodor thinks that the classic framework of computational processing does not offer 
an adequate explanation for the functioning of non-modular systems. As García-Albea
4
 has pointed 
out, despite the fact that the two aims of the modularity thesis are driven by different motivations 
and represent different questions (the former is laid out as a philosophical argumentation of the 
problem of intentionality, while the latter is presented as an empirical question subject to the 
judgment of psychological investigation), they often converge in the integrative theory of mind 
proposed by Fodor.  
Therefore, my thesis is committed to examining the general concepts of intentionality and 
modularity in order to then advance an account of experienced time. Essentially, this thesis adopts 
the following argumentative structure. The first part is concerned with a general introduction to the 
theory of intentionality in light of the cognitive revolution and the consequent rise of functionalism 
and cognitive psychology. The positions advanced in these two fields of study are embedded within 
a common theory of mind, which will be examined in detail with regards to the project of 
naturalizing the intentionality of mental states. After this, I focus on two general issues tied to the 
problem of intentionality: mental representation and mental causation, and attempt to set out the 
theoretical and conceptual groundwork for the perspectives and theories that apply to these issues. 
In concluding the first part of this thesis, I allude to the link between the concepts of intentionality 
and modularity, which introduces the topic for the second part of the thesis. The second part 
attempts to build on Fodor's modularity thesis in order to take further steps towards a general 
account of mental architecture for time processing. After examining Fodor's modularity thesis, I 
describe different ways in which it applies to the study of perception in general. Then, I turn to the 
discussion of time perception, taking up the object of enquiry in relation to recent debates in 
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. At this stage, I focus on two general issues 
concerning, respectively, the questions of how and where time is processed in the brain. I thus 
suggest adopting a general account of time perception based on the framework of modularity theory 
in order to capture what scientific theories in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy have in 
common. I connect these psychological and scientific theories to the hypothesis that the mind 
includes a module for time processing. In particular, the theories of Paul Fraisse and other 
psychologists will be considered in order to discover the manner in which the time module is likely 
to work. After this, I describe the working of time processing within an integrative and larger 
                                                          
4
 Garcia-Albea: 2003. 
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cognitive architecture, arguing that the proposed mental architecture for time processing captures 
the typical properties of modular organizations. The plausibility of a module for temporal 
processing rests essentially on the analysis of timing-related deficits in neurologically impaired 
individuals, and to support my hypothesis I report empirical evidence from psychological and 
neuroscientific research. Finally, I conclude with some observations about the interrelationship 
between time perception and spatial perception, which may be examined in future studies. Although 
temporal perception might effectively facilitate the perceptual processing of the spatio-sensory 
world around us, on the other hand, the representation of time in the conceptual system is often 
accomplished by spatial correlates, as findings in linguistics demonstrate. Despite the fact that our 
experiences of time and space are distinct and distinguishable at perceptual and neurological level, 
it seems that at the representational level, time processing and spatial processing stand in an 
asymmetrical relation to each other. This suggests that there is an asymmetrical dependence 
between time and space at the perceptual and representational levels. 
Therefore, the scope of this thesis is to provide an explanation of psychological time which adheres 
to the concept of modularity of cognitive functions as formulated by Fodor. This account seeks to 
demonstrate that our ‘sense’ of time (and the related ability to manage time information) is the 
cognitive result of a series of processes carried out by two independent and neutrally isolable 
processing components which are part of the portion of mental architecture dedicated to modular 
systems. These sub-systems can themselves be referred to as modules, as each has the potential to 
specialize in time processing. Using the reference of 'module' for the notion of specious present my 
argument proceeds to arrange time processing into a hierarchy, in order to represent time 
information from the early stages of perception to higher stages of cognition, and drafts a functional 
architecture in which delimitations between different processing methods are organised according 
to principles which have their basis in Fodor's modularity thesis. If such a hypothesis is correct, it 
could offer useful guidelines for exploring timing ability in humans, and provide a plausible 
framework for future investigation of the psychological and neuronal mechanisms responsible for 
time processing. 
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1 
 
Introduction: Intentionality from Philosophy to 
Psychology 
 
 
      1. 1 The concept of Intentionality 
Reflection on intentionality has a long history, not all of which is relevant to our concerns in this 
discussion. In the first part of my dissertation I want to introduce the issue by giving an overview of 
the conceptual scenario that laid the foundations for scientific psychology, explaining how the 
question of the intentionality of mental states and mental processes began determinant to the current 
development of philosophical theories of mind and psychological research. 
Linguistically, the term intentionality is bounded up with the Latin noun ‘intentio’, which derives 
from the verb intendere, which literally means to stretch. The verb ‘intendere’ must be taken in the 
figurative sense of stretching one’s mind (or aiming one’s mind) at some object in thought (which is 
before the mind). From this point of view, intentio indicates the object of a state of mind, while 
intentionality reflects the basic idea that the mind is directed upon its ‘mental’ objects. In the last 
two centuries the issue of intentionality has been central to social cognition; it has been fundamental 
to the understanding of how people develop their ‘folk’ theory of mind. Psychologists and 
philosophers have often agreed that intentionality provides the conceptual groundwork for folk 
psychology. As we shall see, the term folk psychology indicates the cognitive apparatus engaged 
with connecting people’s behaviour to the mind in virtue of the functional role played by intentional 
states. Folk psychology is sometimes defined in terms of the body of ‘tacit knowledge’ (which is 
supposed to be structured into people’s perception of behaviour from infancy) to which people 
return to explain and predict behaviour. Before examining the fundamental aspects of intentionality 
tied to behaviour, I want to allude to the origins of the concept ‘intentionality’ in philosophical 
reflections. 
Historically, reflection on the concept of intentionality originates from Aristotelian and medieval 
philosophy. Following Aristotle, the Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages were interested in 
the logical structure of concepts. They used the noun intentio in the technical sense of ‘concept’ or 
‘notion’, remarking on the fundamental distinction between prima intentio and secunda intentio. 
The prima intentio is understood in terms of a concept that applies to particular objects, whereas the 
secunda intentio in terms of a concept that applies to the prima intention. Then, for the Scholastics, 
the term intention was applied to either logical items or psychological items. In its logical sense, 
intentio is the abstract entity that exists between logical relations; conversely, from a psychological 
point of view it is a component of states of mind. Whether intentio is intended in its logical or 
psychological sense, it is nevertheless something that might exist in our mind but not in the external 
world. This is a central idea of the Scholastic theory of intentionality: the Scholastics held that 
concepts are true of things, or properties, lying both outside and inside the mind. Most famously, St. 
Thomas Aquinas pointed out this fundamental feature of abstract objects. In particular, Aquinas 
(who was more interested in the psychological aspect of concepts than the abstract logical relations 
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they hold with each other) developed his theory of intentionality on the basis of Aristotle’s famous 
doctrine of sense-perception. According to the Aristotelian doctrine, the mind takes on the form of 
its perceived objects. This means that the environment has a continuous impact on people’s 
perception, so that when people interact with their environment this interaction is instantiated into 
their mind. Central to Aristotelian philosophy is the assumption that the mind has no innate 
categories through which it organizes the information that comes from external reality. This idea 
was developed into an account of thinking in general by Aquinas, who argued that every set of 
sensorial stimuli arising from our perception of reality causes mental images in the “imagination”. 
Aquinas defined mental images in terms of phantasma, which are unique and ephemeral as any 
sensorial impact. Note that this view does not take perception as the passive result of the impact of 
external objects (or events) on our senses. In Aquinas' view, perception plays an active role in our 
cognitive processes, because it is the active pre-condition for the occurrence of mental images in the 
mind. Since every mental image is oriented toward a mental object that is first in the mind, 
intentionality can be considered the fundamental feature of mental images. However, after the 
Middle Ages, most of the terms which derived from Aristotelian and Scholastic terminology, 
including the term ‘intentio’, were disowned. Then, with the rise of Cartesian philosophy in the 
Renaissance, philosophers shifted their focus from perception to reasoning. 
 
      1. 2  Cartesian Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem 
Descartes is one of the most important intellectual figures of all time; he is considered the father of 
modern philosophy. Not only do his Meditations represents a milestone in the history of Western 
philosophy but his work also played a key role in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century. It is well-known that Descartes endorsed the Platonic view that the world is structured in 
mathematical terms. Following Plato, Descartes developed a philosophical system based on the 
fundamental principles of algebra and geometry; consequently, he refused to accept Scholastic and 
Aristotelian physics and suggested replacing them with causal explanations based on mechanistic 
models. Descartes proposed one of the most influential philosophical perspectives of all time, so-
called Cartesian dualism, but this perspective gives rise to an important problem concerning the 
causal relationship between mental and physical: the mind-body problem. I will introduce the 
problem below. 
The philosophical system developed by Descartes has strong intuitive appeal since it endorses the 
basic idea that the universe is composed of two fundamental and opposite types of substances: 
physical substances (which are extended and non-thinking things) and mental substances (which are 
thinking and non-extended things). Descartes (and philosophers in general) used the term 
‘substance’ to denote a thing that does not require any creature in order to exist (something that 
exists with only the help of God’s concurrence), whereas, the term mode refers to a ‘quality’ or 
affection of that substance. Qualities like ‘size’ or ‘shape’ are modes of physical and extended 
objects as they are shared by every object belonging to this three-dimensional universe. In contrast, 
no mental substance has shape or size; and this is because a mind or a thought is supposed to be a 
non-extended thing which is purely spiritual in nature and radically non-spatial. According to 
Descartes, the mind is wholly distinct from the body that engages it or from physical objects of any 
sort: it is something with no proper place and space (so we might easily imagine it existing 
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disembodied or in the absence of any physical world whatsoever). On this view, every person can 
be thought of in terms of a ‘duality’, that is, in terms of a pair of one mind, the subject, and one 
body, the object. These two kinds of substances are ontologically independent, in the sense that they 
do not require each other in order to exist (Descartes called the distinction between two or more 
substances “real distinction”). So thinking and consciousness represent the essence of mental 
substances, whereas space and extension represent the essence of physical substances. Descartes 
introduced his perspective of Cartesian dualism in his Sixth Meditation, where he argues that from 
the inside our minds do not feel physical at all. Although this idea might be seen as very 
compelling, it involves the problem of the interaction between mental and physical substances. 
Problems with Cartesian dualism arise as Descartes infers that ontologically distinct and 
independent substances can causally interact with each other. For example, we can think of our 
mind as causing the movement of our bodily limbs, and we also take external objects or bodily 
happenings to cause thoughts and sensations connected to experiences into our minds. But, if such 
interaction occurs, it does so in a three-dimensional universe. How then could mental states/events 
cause physical states/events in the brain or in the body? Descartes tried to solve the mind-body 
problem by suggesting that spiritual and material substances are ontologically distinct entities that 
can exist separately, despite being joined in a substantial union. Each mind is a separate entity of 
the same kind, whereas there is just one extended substance of the second kind, that is matter. 
Therefore, the solution suggested by Descartes is that the mind is metaphysically, but not 
physically, placed in the body’s driving seat. 
Thus far I have introduced the problem of the relationship between the mental and physical, but I 
have not said how it is related to the issue of intentionality. It must be recalled that Descartes did 
not make reference to the concept of intentionality, because his philosophical system was clearly 
opposed to both Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. First of all, the idea of Cartesian dualism 
did not integrate the fundamental Aristotelian dichotomy between the living and the non-living. 
According to Descartes, the mind can survive the destruction of the material body that engages it, 
thus, it can exist disembodied or in absence of physical reality (this entails that mental substances 
are indestructible, indivisible and eternal). In Descartes' view, the dichotomy between the living and 
the non-living was transcended by the even more fundamental dichotomy between those things that 
have a mind and those that do not. In fact, one of the chief goals of the Meditations was to define 
what it is to have a mind and what kind of relation the mind has with bodily or physical reality. In 
assuming that a ‘substance’ is a unified entity with properties (such as attributes, characteristics and 
qualities which belong to and inhere within it), which is wholly present at each moment of its 
existence and persists through changes in its properties (whereas particular ‘things’ that are not 
substances but ‘events’ consist of changes to other things), Descartes inferred that a mind is capable 
of independent existence only if it is independent of all other minds and bodies (this view was 
challenged by Spinoza who took dependence on God to its logical conclusion regarding the 
existence of only one sort of substance, both numerically and in kind, to exclude the possibility of a 
world where minds and bodies can exist separately). From this point of view, Cartesian dualism is 
nothing more than substance dualism. Conversely, the ‘substance’ dichotomy between the mind and 
the body was not considered by the Scholastic philosophers, who were only interested in the 
Aristotelian dichotomy between living and non-living. 
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A second aspect of Descartes' rejection of Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy concerns his 
denial of the Aristotelian view that the mind takes on the form of its perceived objects. Following 
Aristotle, Aquinas had argued that this very thing -the occurrence of the form of an object- is what 
permits a thought to be a thought of an object and that object to be the object it is. For example, 
what makes a ‘goat’ a goat is the form of the goat, and that is what makes your thought of a goat a 
thought of a goat. From this, Aquinas concluded that there are different instantiations of the form 
esse naturale, namely, the ‘thing’, and esse intentionale, that is, the thought of such a ‘thing’. But 
this view was attacked by Descartes in his Third Meditation, where he argued that the cause must 
have as much reality as its effect. For Descartes, we must distinguish the formal reality of the cause 
of an idea from the objective reality of that the idea. While the ‘formal’ reality is just reality, the 
‘objective’ reality is confusingly the content of an idea but considered as if it were the idea itself, 
and this is the case of intentionality. With the affirmation of Cartesian dualism, philosophers 
abandoned the concept of intentionality along with Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. Leibniz 
replaced the term intention with the more general terms intension and extension (this logical 
distinction was later endorsed by proponents of Port Royal Logic, who distinguished between the 
extension of a term (the class to which that term applies), and the comprehension of a term (one’s 
understanding of that term). Those logical philosophers maintained the logical term ‘intension’, 
assuming that this has fewer degrees of reality than the psychological the term ‘intention’). Only at 
the end of the nineteenth century did the issue of intentionality come to the fore in light of the work 
of the psychologist Franz Brentano. However, Brentano’s account of intentionality endorsed the 
view of substance dualism, and it therefore involved the mind-body problem. 
 
1. 3 Brentano’s account of Intentionality 
At the end of the nineteenth century the psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano tried to lay 
the foundations of the new science of psychology. On Brentano’s view, if the ‘body’ is the subject-
matter of physiology, and philosophy is engaged with metaphysical questions about the immortality 
of the soul, psychology is the study of mental phenomena. Brentano had the merit of rehabilitating 
the Scholastic term of intentionality in modern times, even if he maintained the classic Cartesian 
dichotomy between the mental and the physical. His account of intentionality endorses the kind of 
substantial dualism postulated by Descartes. Like Descartes, Brentano believed that mental and 
physical substances do indeed interact with one other, and thus that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are 
distinct entities that bear causal relations between physical objects and mental phenomena. In his 
lecture Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
5
 he aimed to explore the characteristic features of 
mental phenomena that allow us to bear relations between mental acts and the external world. 
Brentano followed Aquinas' theory of intentionality, assuming that intentionality is the 
distinguishing mark of mental phenomena because no physical substance can exhibit it. How did he 
reach this conclusion? 
Following the Scholastic philosophers, Brentano asserted that every intentional state is directed at 
the intentional object it is about (e.g. the ‘believed’ for a belief). The property of being directed 
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upon something (either an individual or a state of affairs) would be an exclusive peculiarity of 
mental phenomena because physical phenomena do not generate original intentionality, that is, an 
intentional relationship defined in a first-hand manner: 
 “(it) is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena, since no physical phenomenon
 manifests anything like it.” 
The view that all mental phenomena are intentional phenomena is known as intentionalism. In 
defending this view Brentano said that all intentional phenomena share the following distinctive 
features: relation to a concept, direction upon an object and immanent objectivity. However, the 
most distinctive characteristic of intentionality is its so-called intentional in-existence. This term 
was used by the Scholastic philosophers to indicate the ontological status of indifference to the 
reality of the content of intentional states. Brentano argued that the object of an intentional state 
does need to apply to reality, since it might exist in that state of mind but not necessarily in the 
physical world: 
“every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called 
the intentional (or mental) in existence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly 
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be 
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In 
presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic 
exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, 
therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an 
object intentionally within themselves.”6  
Then, we can summarise Brentano’s theory of intentionality as follows:  
 it is constitutive of the phenomenon of intentionality that mental states are directed upon 
things different from themselves; 
 it is characteristic of the objects upon which the mind is directed by virtue of intentionality 
to exist either in reality or in a state of mind; 
 as all and only mental states exhibit intentionality,  the phenomenon of intentionality is then 
the mark of the mental. 
Note that the first and the second statements can hardly be divorced, given that the intentional 
object in virtue of which one can exemplify the mental activity of thinking, desiring or believing is 
not required to actually exist or be obtained. The third statement establishes that everything that is 
‘mental’ is equally intentional and, consequently, that intentionality unifies all mental phenomena. 
If taken together the statements above form the following argument: 
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 A) the reality-neutral feature of intentionality makes it the distinguishing mark of the 
mental, in that all and only mental phenomena are intentional in this sense; 
 B) purely physical states and events cannot have intentional properties. 
Now, theses A) and B) together imply Cartesian dualism, even if each thesis is controversial in its 
own right. Thesis A) is controversial in the respect that it takes only mental states and events to 
exhibit intentionality, despite there being things other than mental states that ‘aim at’ possibly non-
existent objects. Linguistic items, such as the name Santa Claus, may be an example of this. On the 
other hand, thesis B) entails that purely physical phenomena do not exhibit intentionality, but this 
claim is controversial if we consider the case of human digestion or that of plants’ disposition to 
move towards the source of light. How could we deny that these natural phenomena generate a form 
of goal-directed behaviour? Some might dismiss this objection by asserting that, although there are 
physical phenomena that exhibit some degree of intentionality, we should distinguish original 
intentionality from derived intentionality. The intentionality present in those natural processes is 
merely derived intentionality: it is derived from the thoughts of those who observe and explain 
those phenomena. Whereas, our minds have original intentionality, in that their intentionality does 
not depend on, or derive from, the intentionality of anything else. In other words, the plant’s 
movement towards the light source does not intrinsically have intentionality, but only has it because 
this behaviour is interpreted by the observed. However, the interpretations provided by the states of 
mind of the observer do have intrinsic intentionality. Philosophers sometimes mark the distinction 
between minds and physical objects in this respect by talking about ‘original’ and ‘derived’ 
intentionality, but this seems to suggest that if something exhibits intentionality, then it is, or has, a 
mind. So, is mentality necessary for intentionality? This question is very tricky. One problem is that 
if we were to encounter something that exhibited original intentionality, it is hard to see how it 
could be a further question as to whether that thing had a mind. The difficulty with this line of 
thought is that, if it is false that something can have original intentionality without having a mind 
(that is, if only minds, as we know them, can exhibit original intentionality), then we encounter the 
same kind of problem as we found with Cartesian dualism. In particular, it is the second part of 
Brentano’s thesis, that mentality is a necessary condition of intentionality, which brings us back to 
the mind-body problem, because this claim involves the Cartesian dichotomy between beings with a 
mind and beings without a mind. 
 
1.  4 After Brentano: Intentionality, Representation and Understanding of Minds 
Brentano’s thesis that all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality has been very 
influential in recent philosophy and cognitive sciences. To summarise the question of intentionality, 
let us reformulate Brentano’s argument by dividing it into two sub-questions: 
 Do all mental states exhibit intentionality? 
 Do only mental states exhibit intentionality? 
The first sub-question may be recast as so: is mentality sufficient for intentionality? And the 
second: is mentality necessary for intentionality? In Brentano’s view, to say that all mental states 
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exhibit intentionality is to say that all mental states are representational; and to say that minds are 
the only things in the world that have intentionality is to say that only minds generate 
representations. Hence, the main implication of Brentano’s thesis concerns the ‘representational 
character’ of intentionality. The idea of a state which represents the world and causes its possessor 
to behave in a certain way, entails that interpretation is necessary for representation or 
intentionality. The question of interpretation brings the nature of mental representation into focus: 
how do we know about the mind? The most plausible answer to this question is that people apply 
conjectures about people’s minds in order to explain their behaviour. According to folk psychology, 
our understanding of why other thinkers do what they do is derived from knowledge of their 
observable behaviour. This is the reason why philosophers often say that the purpose of folk-
psychology is the explanation of behaviour, in the sense that people explain other minds by 
attributing mental states to make sense of their behaviour. 
However, still in the first half of the twentieth century, behaviourists in psychology and materialists 
in philosophy rejected the idea that people have intentional states. Behaviourism made the question 
of how we know our own minds very problematic, because it considered the knowledge of our own 
minds in terms of observation of our behaviour. The behaviourist denied that there is anything 
psychological lying behind behaviour and was not interested in the psychological facts that organize 
and underlie the behaviour. Even if he could accept, just as a basic fact, that certain interpretations 
of behaviour are more natural to us than others, the behaviourist would reject the description of how 
people’s thoughts lead to their behaviour. This aspect of behaviourism ran parallel with its 
deliberate disregard of subjective, conscious experience and what it is like, from the inside, to have 
a mind. Conversely, the cognitive revolution inspired a new point of view of human agents, 
splitting off from the picture that they respond ‘reflexively’ to their environment. By the 1960s, the 
idea that we describe the assumptions and hypotheses we adopt when understanding other minds as 
a sort of theory of mind, known as folk psychology, became customary among philosophers of 
mind and cognitive psychologists. Those philosophers and psychologists subscribed to the view that 
intentionality is at bottom mental representation (and thus that mental states and propositional 
attitudes really possess Brentano’s feature), although they had strong motives for rejecting 
Brentano’s thesis B. Their chief aim was to offer a coherent theory of intentionality able to explain 
how humans take in information via the senses and, in the very process of understanding, make 
subsequent use of it to guide their behaviour. This project laid the groundwork for computational 
theories of mind, which are engaged with the very general notion of mental representation and the 
functional role a representation plays in containing information about the world, and combining to 
guide people’s behaviour The focus on functional organization brought with it the possibility of 
multiple realizations: the general idea that irreducible mental kinds like properties, states or events, 
can be functionally realized or instantiated by distinct physical kinds (Putnam
7
, Fodor
8
, and Block
9
). 
According to the functionalist, all that is essential to mental states is the role they play within a 
system. 
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9
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Hence, after the cognitive revolution, the question of intentionality became the question of finding a 
way to explain how a purely physical system - either a brain or a computer - can have functional 
intentional states which processes appropriate information about external entities, events and 
matters of fact; and how such a system can interpret that information. In the next chapter, I will give 
an overview of the cognitive revolution by examining recent debates in philosophy and psychology 
regarding the concepts of mental representation, computation, and nativism. After introducing 
functionalism, I will report the principal affinities of this philosophical theory with cognitive 
psychology, and then focus on two underlying commitments of functionalism: folk psychology and 
physicalism. After this, computational theories of mind will be discussed. In particular, here I focus 
on the project to vindicate the truth of folk psychology and maintain the physicalist ontology. 
Successively, I will stress the two most thoroughly canvassed problems tied to intentionality: the 
problem of mental representation (the general problem of how the mind obtains a mental 
representation) and the problem of mental causation (the problem of determining the nature of 
content of mental representations). Here I will outline some of the most influential attempts to 
overcome the effects of these philosophical problems. Finally, I will conclude this first section by 
highlighting the relationship between the issues of intentionality and modularity, which introduces 
the topic of the next section. 
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2 
 
Toward the cognitive approach 
 
  
 1  From Academic Psychology to Cognitive Psychology 
The foundation of psychology as a separate field of study is traditionally associated with the 
development of its own methods and questions. Although psychology is a separate science from 
philosophy it was built upon philosophical foundations. Like many other sciences, psychology had 
its origins in philosophy, and much work in the psychological field still explicitly positions itself in 
relation to claims made by philosophers. To a great extent modern psychology originated in the 
reflections offered by Descartes and his work on mental-physical interaction and the first-person 
perspective, which laid the ground for real scientific progress in the experimental research carried 
out by those that followed him. Concerning mental-physical interaction, it is important to remember 
that Descartes was not the first to talk about this subject (the philosophical distinction between mind 
and body can be traced back to the ancient Greeks); nevertheless, he revisited this problem in a 
completely new way that profoundly affected psychological history and caught the attention of 
other thinkers. In principle, Cartesian dualism
10
 can be summed up in the following claims: 
 one’s own mind can be better known than one’s body, 
 the mind is metaphysically in the body’s driving seat, 
 there is a theoretical problem: how do minded individuals know that “external” and 
everyday objects exist at all? 
In addition to the claim that the body can influence the mind and the mind can affect the body, 
Descartes made the claim that consciousness is innate. His Second Meditations were conduced to 
show how anyone can intuitively grasp the truth of the claim “I exist”. Here Descartes attempts to 
reach that truth by recurring to the first-person perspective, that is, the view that human subjects are 
immured within the movie theatre of their mind, although they can infer what goes on outside it. 
From the view of ourselves from the inside, Descartes tried to meditate and establish absolutely 
certainty through the famous reasoning “cogito, ergo sum”. But, how did he reach the conclusion I 
think, therefore I am? Though in the First Meditations Descartes had doubts about all sensory 
beliefs, in the Second Meditation such beliefs are now considered false. Descartes started his 
argument by considering the falsehood of the belief “‘I’ do not exist”. Suppose I have to convince 
myself that all my beliefs are false, including the belief “‘I’ have a body endowed with sense 
organs”. Although I convince myself that my beliefs are false, there is still an ‘I’ to convince. But 
even if an evil demon had deceived me to believe this there is an ‘I’ to deceive. According to 
Descartes, the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not what I am thinking is true 
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or false, entails that there must be a thinking individual, namely the ‘I’, who is engaged in such 
mental activity. Consequently, whatever the case we hold the proposition ‘I’ results ontologically 
necessary: 
“I must finally conclude that the proposition, ‘I am,’ ‘I exist,’ is necessarily true whenever it is 
put forward by me or conceived in my mind (AT VII 25: CSM II 16-17).” 
From these considerations Descartes concluded that, the claim ‘I exist’ is an indubitable and 
absolutely certain belief that serves as an axiom from which stem other and absolutely certain 
truths, and that it can be deduced exclusively from the first-person perspective (that is, the view that 
from the inside of our minds we are immured despite having some defensible ways of inferring 
what goes on outside them). 
Starting from the perspective of Cartesian dualism and the thesis of the innateness of consciousness, 
Descartes laid the foundations for early scientific psychology. But, going beyond ideas of how 
consciousness and the interaction of mind and body really function, it was due to the scientific 
works of psychologists such as Ernst Heinrich Weber, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt 
and William James that psychology developed its own methods and experimental research. From 
the second half of the nineteenth century psychologists began to conduct experiments designed to 
test conscious experiences. If Weber can be considered the pioneering sensory physiologist, and 
Fechner the father of psychophysics, Wundt is instead the father of experimental psychology. It is 
important to remember that Fechner paved the way for Wundt and experimental psychology by 
demonstrating how to measure and carry out experiments on psychological processes (even if 
Heidelberg
11
 has argued that Wundt himself came to realize that experimental psychology does not 
have its origins in the narrow method of psychophysics, but rather in the broader interests of 
sensory physiology). Wundt and the other experimental psychologists used the method of 
introspection, which mainly relied on subjective observation of one’s own experience. This method 
aimed to analyse individual sensory experiences through the self-observation of conscious 
experiences, looking inward at pieces of information passing through consciousness. 
Nonetheless, by the second decade of the twentieth century scientific psychology had dismissed the 
introspection method, as well as its interest in conscious experiences. In the same period in which 
behaviourism dominated the scenario in scientific psychology, the debate in philosophy of mind 
witnessed the dispute between two general and opposite approaches: dualism and materialism. If the 
dualistic approach considers the mind a non-physical substance, conversely, the materialistic 
approach takes the mental as not distinct from the physical, and assumes that all mental events, 
states and processes are in principle identical with physical events, states and processes. The 
materialistic view is fully consistent with the principles of Newtonian mechanics but stands in sharp 
contrast to the principles of Cartesian metaphysics. As a result of the affirmation of materialism in 
the philosophy of the early twentieth century, Cartesian dualism and the first-person perspective 
gradually fell into disrepute. The appearance of the verification theory of meaning convinced 
philosophers to abandon the first-person perspective in favour of an inter-subjective verification 
criterion, according to which science must adopt an inter-subjective third-person perspective on 
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everything observed. According to the inter-subjective third-person perspective, one can imagine 
being oneself the subject of certain mental states, in a case in which certain other things are true, 
and ask what this shows about the relation of body to mind. This criterion entails that the meaning 
of a sentence is just the method of its verification, therefore mental ascriptions should be 
scientifically and meaningfully describable in terms of physically testable verification conditions. 
On the other hand, behaviourists followed materialists as they argued that all talk of mental causes 
should be eliminated from the language of psychology in favour of environmental stimuli and 
behavioural responses. Conversely, other materialists called type-identity theorists contended that 
there are mental causes which are identical with neurophysiological events in the brain. These type-
identity theorists also subscribed to the doctrine of physicalism, which mainly transfers the success 
of naturalism in science to social sciences such as philosophy and psychology. 
With the rise of physicalism in the mid-twentieth century, philosophers of mind took a deeper 
‘naturalistic’ turn. Before the advent of this philosophical doctrine, philosophy and science were 
seen as two opposite descriptions of reality (and not as a ‘continuum’ of the same description). 
Philosophy dealt exclusively with mere ontological and conceptual issues, but over the previous 
five decades most of the prominent attempts to solve the traditional philosophical issues had been 
integrated with the scientifically evaluable evidence of the natural sciences. Throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century, philosophers of mind continued to make connections with 
developmental psychology, carrying out a considerable number of pressing theoretical and scientific 
researches. Not only has twentieth century philosophy of mind explored the empirical side of 
developmental psychology in extended ways, but the works of philosophers of mind have had a 
great impact on developmental psychology. The scientific framework within which psychology and 
philosophy of mind have operated in the past fifty years was characterized by the results achieved 
through the theory of mind known as functionalism. Functionalism, which is neither a dualist nor a 
materialist approach, emerged from philosophical reflection on the developments that emerged from 
cognitive sciences: the interdisciplinary area in which different fields of study, such as artificial 
intelligence, cybernetics, linguistics, psychology and computational theory, converge. Each of these 
fields is committed to the cognitive approach for the investigation of the mind and cognition, having 
in common a certain level of abstraction and a concern with systems that process information. 
Functionalism provided a philosophical account of this level of abstraction, admitting the logical 
possibility that systems as diverse as human beings (including intelligent/programmed machines 
and disembodied spirits) can all have mental states. According to this viewpoint, the psychology of 
a system depends not on what it is made of but on how it is put together. The functionalist insists on 
arguing that scientific psychology must seek to build a theory of mind capable of resolving the 
traditional philosophical issues, such as the mind-body problem, the nature of intentional states and 
whether or not we have innate knowledge. Much of the work in this theory of mind draws upon the 
observations made by thinkers like Searle, Dretske and Fodor, according to whom scientific 
psychology needs a naturalized theory able to account for the intentionality of mental states and 
mental processes. 
I earlier concluded chapter 1 by alluding to the implications of Brentano’s thesis, according to 
which intentionality alone marks out the subject matter of psychology (and thus, that intentionality 
is the exclusive characteristic of mental phenomena). I said that, despite Brentano's revival  of 
intentional terminology and placement of the concept of intentionality once again at the centre of 
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philosophy and psychology, he did not solve the problem of mental-physical interaction (for 
example, his approach did not explain how mental phenomena can causally interact with physical 
ones). However, Brentano’s theory of intentionality has been taken as a starting-point in 
contemporary psychological and philosophical reflection. Many theorists (especially those 
influenced by cognitive sciences) concur with Fodor that intentionality is at bottom mental 
representation, and that propositional attitudes really do have Brentano’s feature. Fodor believes 
that internal physical states and events realize mental states; in turn, mental states represent actual 
or possible states of affairs whose existent or non-existent intentional objects are representational 
contents akin to the meanings of sentences. For Fodor, the brain contains a whole representational 
system through which people understand the external world; in this way he tried to give a coherent 
explanation of how mental properties, along with more familiar special science properties, are 
constituted by physical properties. Before examining the solution to the mind-body problem that he 
suggested, I first want to talk about the scientific and conceptual developments that led to the 
cognitive revolution of the mid-twentieth century. 
 
 2 The dominance of Behaviourism in Scientific Psychology 
In the early years of the twentieth century experimental psychology witnessed the affirmation of an 
emerging doctrine called behaviourism. Behaviourism had a great impact on the development of 
psychology as a rigorous science grounded in empirical evidence, and it was thus destined to 
dominate academic debate throughout the English-speaking world during the early to mid- 
twentieth century. To a large extent, behaviourism endorsed the principles of materialism, as both 
rejected either Cartesian dualism or Brentano’s account of intentionality. The behaviourist  
dispensed with immaterial Cartesian egos, ghostly non-physical events and every metaphysical 
excrescence (such, as thoughts and beliefs) which makes no reference to physical reality. He 
eschews the mentalist notions of intentionality and mental states, and refuses to accept every 
psychological theory which make reference of unobservable phenomena that cannot be settled by 
observable data over behaviour. According to the behaviourist, there is nothing more to behaviour, 
nothing internal to the mind but simply ‘observable’ data over behaviour expressing physical 
events. All mental states are thereby reduced to behavioural states, which bear causal relations 
between stimuli and response, whereas the psychological practices of explaining and predicting 
behaviour are seen in terms of controlling stimuli and rewarding appropriate responses to them. On 
this view, whatever psychology that postulates immaterial and non-spatial causes of physical 
behaviour has to be dismissed since it has no explanatory import, nor legitimate role in explanation, 
prediction or control of directly observable behaviour. What is more, the methodology proposed by 
the behaviourist completely differs from that used by Wundt. 
To describe the dominance of behaviourism in the scientific psychology of the first half of the 
twentieth century it is useful to distinguish between two distinct phases. Behaviourism was founded 
by the psychologist John Watson, but it came to fruition in the research carried out by the 
psychologist Skinner in the middle of the twentieth century. Here I want to look at the version of 
behaviourism proposed by the psychologist John Watson, which is generally known as radical 
behaviourism The following paragraph will be dedicated to the version most famously associated 
with Skinner, which is known as neo-behaviourism. Concerning radical behaviourism, Watson 
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advanced this perspective in his paper Psychology as the Behaviorist views it,
12
 where he stressed 
the role of scientific psychology which must be scrupulously objective and search for rigor and 
reduction. Watson thought of consciousness as something deeply problematic. Hence, instead of 
disputing how the conscious mind should be studied, he defined the domain of psychology as a 
relatively narrow field of interest: behaviour. On Watson’s view, Wundt's approach lacks any trace 
of objectivity demonstrable on the basis of empirical facts, since it instances a class of mysterious 
and inaccessible phenomena which might not exist. Watson rejected the method of introspection in 
favour of the method of measurement of observable actions limited to observation and objective 
testing/experimentation. Radical behaviourism rejects any individual interior mental activities, as 
well as the mentalist notions of ‘mind’, ‘mental states’ or ‘consciousness’, which are not directly 
observable. 
For the behaviourist, the objective observation of behaviour is the only fit subject for psychological 
study, and psychology is therefore a system that studies directly observable events, namely, the 
study of objectively observable behaviour described in terms of physiological responses to stimuli. 
All thoughts and psychological processes can be controlled and explained through association of 
irreducible elements defined in terms of stimuli and responses, which are also adequate to explain 
creative thought and verbal behaviour. For any given stimulus there is an associated response; in 
turn, any response can be associated with another response and one’s stimulus-response 
combination can also be associated with someone else's stimulus-response combination. The entire 
process of ‘learning’ would then consist of learned responses made to stimuli which signaled 
reward. Adopting a pure scientific approach restricted to observation of behaviour, Watson argued 
for extreme environmentalism: the idea that the situations and the context in which a person grows 
up completely shape the way that person behaves. Accordingly, the environment is what greatly 
controls our behaviour, so that psychology is no more than the understanding of how a certain 
environmental stimulus elicits a particular behavioral response. Watson tried to investigate the 
causal effect of behavioral mechanisms through a series of experiments on animal psychology. 
While dictating that all mentalist concepts are useless, he argued for the continuity between humans 
and animals. Watson placed special emphasis on experiments on nonhuman animals rather than 
human research participants because animals represented, for him, an appropriate avenue of study 
to understand humans. Watson preferred the study of animal subjects because he believed that the 
simpler the organism’s emotional and physiological makeup, the less the researcher needed to 
worry about the interference that can plague psychological research with humans as participants. 
According to him, the empirical results of experiments conducted on animal psychology are all 
applicable to human psychology. 
 
 3 From Behaviourism to Neo-behaviourism   
In the third decade of the twentieth century the behaviorist agenda faced some fundamental 
challenges which led to the affirmation of so-called neobehaviorism. Neobehaviorism continued 
much of the rigor of behaviourism while widening the scope of acceptable behaviours for study. 
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The second phase of behaviourism in psychology is famously associated with the works carried out 
by the psychologists E. C. Tolman, C. Hull, and B. F. Skinner. Like thinkers including Thorndike, 
Watson, and Pavlov, the neobehaviorists believed that the study of learning and a focus on 
rigorously objective observational methods were central to scientific psychology. Unlike their 
predecessors, the neo-behaviourists were more self-consciously attempting to formalise the laws of 
behaviour. It must be said that neo-behaviourism was influenced by the perspective endorsed by the 
group of philosophers such as Rudolph Carnap, Otto Neurath and Herbert Feigl called logical 
positivists. In principle, logical positivism held the position that meaningful statements about the 
world had to be cast as statements about physical observations; anything else was metaphysics or 
nonsense, not science, and had to be rejected. According to this philosophical perspective, 
knowledge has to be built on an observational basis, and can be verified to the extent that it is in 
keeping with observation. As knowledge must be based on the presence of something which 
physically exists, then it must be objective and undebateable. In logical positivism, hypothetical 
constructs and ideas must be defined so that they can be logically inferred, so any topic studied 
from this perspective has to be operationally defined in observable, measurable terms. Similarly, 
neo-behaviourists were interested in studying only phenomena that are directly observable and 
undebateable. Like the logical positivists (who hastened the need for operational definitions with 
their assertion that theoretical concepts that are not directly observable may be nevertheless studied 
if defined in terms of directly observable behaviours), the neo-behaviourists argued that every 
theoretical construct, including those whose results are not directly observable, can be studied as 
long as the actual behavior measured was observable. Hence, the neobehaviorists widened the focus 
of behaviours acceptable for study in psychology. 
Now I want to examine neobehaviorism in relation to the major contributions designed to define 
this new phase of academic psychology. In 1932, Tolman published Purposive Behavior in Animals 
and Men,
13
 in which he focused his experimental work largely on rats learning their way through 
mazes, by illustrating examples of learning which could not be explained by simple behavioural 
principles theorized by Watson (that is to say by simple rewarded stimulus-response habits). While 
technically a behaviorist, Tolman differed from his behaviourist predecessors since he took a more 
holistic approach to behaviour than they had. Rather than talking in terms of atomistic, isolated 
stimuli and responses, Tolman emphasized their integration with the environment, referring to them 
in terms of stimulating agencies and behavior acts. With the notion of the intervening variable, he 
intended the link between stimulus and response that helps us to determine behaviour, arguing that 
intervening variables could exist between a stimulating agency and a rat’s decision to move in a 
certain direction at a choice-point in a maze. Tolman’s experimental research led him to conclude 
that even rats form expectations and mental representations (or ‘cognitive maps’) of their spatial 
surroundings. For Tolman, purpose and cognition play an important role in behaviour, but instead 
of interpreting them in terms of ‘mental entities’, he assumed that they are rather outwardly 
observable features of behaviour which are describable in objective language. 
The second figure of neobehaviorism is Hull, who is probably the most ambitious neobehaviorist in 
terms of the construction of a formal theory of behaviour. Inspired by the certainty of scientific 
knowledge achieved by the natural philosopher Isaac Newton, Hull proposed a method which 
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applied mathematical rigor to the observation of behaviour, insisting that psychology must be based 
on its own hypothetic-deductive method. According to this method, the psychologist must begin 
with the observation of behaviour, then derive axioms from that observation and deduce 
consequences from the axioms. He then tests the consequences through experiment and finally 
refines the axioms, establishing the laws of behaviour on a firm observational and experimental 
footing. Hull’s rigorous scientific method became central to his formulation of laws of behaviour. 
These are expressed in mathematical terms, filling his Principles of Behavior: An Introduction to 
Behavior Theory
14
 with complex equations. Hull believed that he had found the fundamental law of 
learning or habit-formation: the law of stimulus generalization. According to Hull, not only is this 
the underlying law of all behaviour in animals and humans, but this principle was also basic enough 
to unify all the social sciences. Hull attempted to connect the involuntary learning studied by Pavlov 
with the voluntary learning studied by Watson and Thorndike. He was particularly influential for 
his claim that the laws of behaviour can be quantified and expressed in terms of numerical 
quantities, like the laws of other scientific disciplines. According to the law of effect, a response 
could be called forth by an unconventional stimulus as long as that stimulus was associated, either 
temporally or in character, with the stimulus that usually called forth the response. As long as the 
unconventional stimulus was similar enough to the usual one it could elicit the response. Pavlov had 
noted this effect when his dogs salivated at the ringing of a bell. Following Pavlov, Hull theorized 
that, when an animal is trained to respond to a particular positive stimulus (or to avoid a negative 
stimulus), the aspects of that stimulus that impinge on the animal’s senses are gradually associated 
with a specific response. This means that the animal learns in an incremental way (not in an all-or-
nothing burst); thus, the appearance of stimuli could precisely control the animal’s ability to form 
habits. According to Hull, these laws of behaviour can explain how all learning takes place without 
resorting to immaterial notions like soul or free will, in order to exclude any reference to 
nonmaterial entities. 
The third and perhaps most important neobehaviorist is Skinner, who reinvigorated behaviorism by 
rejecting Hull’s formal theory and returning to Watson’s project to develop psychology on the 
exclusive basis of observation of behaviour. In 1938 Skinner carried out an intense experimental 
research study that led to the publication of Behavior of Organisms.
15
 Skinner contributed to 
scientific psychology with a series of experiments on the conditioning of simple animal behaviour 
like that of rats and pigeons. Skinner’s development of automated chambers for animal testing 
allowed for great experimentation, as well as control and consistency over stimuli and procedures. 
In an early experiment Skinner devised an experimental set-up, known as the 'Skinner box', in 
which a pigeon or a rat was rewarded for accomplishing a specific act, such as raising its head 
above a certain line, or pressing a lever, by the release of food pellets. The experiment principally 
consisted of placing the creature into a box which was set up in a special way. A bar-level was 
attached to one of the box’s internal walls, and if it was pressed, a food pellet was then released. 
Skinner observed that the rat’s behaviour to press the bar-level was conditioned and reinforced by 
the presence of food into the box. Thus, the presence of food makes the rat reinforce its external 
responses conditionally, in virtue of which, the rat will respond to analogous situations by engaging 
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in the same behaviour. This experiment was extended to demonstrate that the way a creature 
behaves in response to certain stimuli is conditioned by means of reinforcement: the behaviour to 
press the bar-level increases the rat’s likelihood of obtaining food, and this has a real effect on its 
subsequent behaviour. According to Skinner, given that behaviour is made conditional by factors 
tied to the external environment, all simple-intelligent animal behaviour is governed by the law of 
effect (which was originally formulated by Thorndike). So, explanations and predictions of 
behaviour would be ensured by knowledge of the animal’s current stimulus plus the history of its 
reinforcement. But Skinner went a step further, as he assumed that the law of effect also applies to 
human psychology; and that even though human behaviour is more complex than simple animal 
behaviour, it can be equally controlled and predicted by analogous means of reinforcements. 
Skinner had argued for his radically inductivist and empiricist approach in his Science and Human 
Behavior,
16
 where he introduced the principles underlying his psychology. Skinner’s understanding 
of psychology brings us to a model of science entirely based on and restricted by the level of 
behavioral observation, in which theories and hypotheses that apply to physiology play a limited 
role. According to Skinner, psychology does not need to be reduced to physiology, and physiology 
is no more fundamental than psychology. On the other hand, Skinner argued that knowledge, 
imagery and other such mentalistic entities are to be dismissed as metaphors or fictions. In his view, 
since only past consequences of behaviour can motivate future actions, mental states and mental 
events should be interpreted as behaviour-memory. In a successive work titled Verbal Behavior
17
 
Skinner clearly attempted to define thoughts and language in terms of reinforced movements. Here 
he argued that verbal behaviour, and behaviour in general, can be shaped by controlling the rewards 
or reinforcements meted out in response to them. According to his theory of language-learning, the 
human capacity to learn a language is a process whereby the language learner is conditioned by 
means of reinforcement to executive behavioural responses to environmental stimuli. Skinner's 
linguistic account considers only immediate and non-intentional effects on language users to be 
explanatorily relevant to the analysis of linguistic phenomena. Skinner stated that linguistic 
phenomena are identical to behavioural phenomena, and thus they are directly observable and 
classifiable on the basis of their immediate (and non-intentional) effects on language users. So, 
questions like what is a desire? or what is it to be in pain? should be formulated in terms of the 
linguistic usages, or the criteria, that allow competent speakers to decide how to use the linguistic 
rules that govern language. For example, learning the word cat just is a matter of being conditioned 
to utter cat when confronted by the particular physical thing defined ‘cat’. Skinner used the term 
“controlling relation” to indicate the relationship between the speaker’s current motivational state, 
his current stimulus circumstances, his past reinforcements and his genetic constitution. Note that 
the reference to the term control here relates to the concept of ‘causation’ understood in its purely 
functional sense. Since Skinner takes verbal behaviour to be an orderly and controlled datum that is 
sensitive to the circumstances of the speaker, his analytical apparatus only includes terms that are 
empirically acceptable to explanations of objective dimensions of verbal behaviour. 
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 4 The Cognitive Revolution and the birth of Cognitive Psychology  
Although it remained dominant for the first half of the twentieth century, in the end of the 1950s 
behaviorism fell into disrepute. Psychology witnessed the decline of this doctrine and the 
consequent challenge to the focus of mental investigation; returning to the earlier interest in 
consciousness and inner mental states and processes, psychologists endorsed a perspective called 
cognitivism. Cognitivism is the view that emphasizes the importance of thinking for understanding 
much of human behaviour, it holds the basic claim that how we think is the key for understanding 
how we behave. The cognitive movement began with the event of cognitive revolution, which gave 
rise to an ongoing research programme known as cognitive sciences, in which different disciplines 
converged, including: cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, anthropology, linguistics, 
neuroscience and AI. The topics of study of cognitive sciences are wide-ranging; subjects such as 
attention, memory, problem-solving, reasoning, logic, decision-making, creativity, language, 
cognitive development and intelligence represent some of the many areas of interest within this 
discipline. Although each discipline operates in an independent field of research and employs its 
own theoretical or empirical methodologies, they all are committed to the explanatory role of 
intentional states and intentional processes. In turn, the advancements in those research fields have 
permitted the emerging field of cognitive psychology to operate with different research agendas 
while assuming an intentional view regarding the characteristic cognitive capacities relating to 
mental states and processes. 
Cognitive psychology is not quite yet a system of psychology, but rather an approach in 
experimental psychology. In the field of experimental psychology it has been applied in a variety of 
areas of study, including those concerning thinking, emotion, daydreaming and imagination. Its 
principal focus remains the study of how people perceive, learn, remember, and think about 
information, and therefore how people use language, think, solve problems and make decisions. 
Cognitive psychologists are particularly interested in the study of how mental processes work, and 
how knowledge is formed and used, rather than in the study of external behaviour defined in terms 
of pairs of stimuli/responses. Although in the field of experimental psychology cognitive 
psychology is currently the dominant area, success in construing a model of experimental 
psychology able to account for intentional phenomena depends on its capacity to overcome 
Brentano’s problem and the mind-body problem. Furthermore, since cognitive psychology is a form 
of experimental psychology that grew out of and as a reaction to neobehaviorism, it also has to 
respond to the classic materialistic objections to mentalist psychology. 
The first formidable attack on neobehaviorism was launched by the famous linguist Noam 
Chomsky. Chomsky inspired the cognitive revolution of the 1960s and the major shift in the 
orientation of psychology from behavioural to cognitive inner states. In 1957 Chomsky published a 
revolutionary work on linguistics titled Syntactic Structures,
18
 in which he asserted that language 
and grammar are innate capacities of the human brain and not mechanisms learned by simple 
behavioural habit. In his Review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior19 Chomsky launched a powerful 
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criticism of behaviourism concerning the inapplicability of its scientific methods to the study of 
human psychology. A central insight contained in Chomsky’s criticism regarded the behaviourist 
claim that human behaviour is stimulus-dependent. According to Chomsky, when an intelligent 
agent produces a behaviour in response to a specific stimulus, this behaviour depends upon the kind 
of mental state the agent is in at the time of the stimulation, and not upon the nature of the stimulus 
plus the history of reinforcement. Chomsky’s argument stems from considerations about language 
learning: when a child learns a language, he does so too quickly for this process to be wholly 
dependent on such straight-forward learning. Language seems to be too complex to be learned one 
sentence at a time; furthermore, children can utter sentences never heard before, hence, language 
learning cannot arise just from repeated stimuli and imitation. Chomsky’s analysis of linguistic 
phenomena provided significant evidence for the assumption that human behaviour is stimulus-
independent. Chomsky argued that individuals are able to generate an endless number of novel 
sentences that make sense, or to identify sentences that are ungrammatical, since they possess an 
innate cognitive apparatus consisting of a collection of rules for sentence construction. According to 
Chomsky, all natural languages share common grammatical building blocks, such as nouns and 
verbs. Then, he stated that there must be an “universal grammar” consisting of a large collection of 
“linguistic universals” that governs linguistic usage in natural languages. For Chomsky, universal 
grammar is innate as it is automatically acquired by minded individuals at birth due to the anatomic 
structure of the human brain.  
If Chomsky’s non-behavioristic point of view began the shift away from behaviourism and towards 
more cognitively based models of psychology, a further attack on behaviourism emerged from the 
developments in the field of digital computers. In the mid-twentieth century the early success of 
artificial intelligence had inspired the view that the mind is like a computer. This picture entails that 
a computer engages in an activity that very much resembles cognition, and that mental states and 
mental processes can therefore be compared to computational states and computational processes. 
Technically, a computer is an artificial device that mechanically manipulates symbols by means of 
the application of certain symbol-manipulating rules. The symbols manipulated are interpreted by 
appropriate programming through which the machine processes information and solves complex 
information-processing problems. Thus, on the basis of such results, cognitive psychologists 
entertained the idea that cognition is a sort of computation, and that computational states and 
processes can be mechanically executed by an appropriately programmed and interpreted computer. 
Cognitive psychologists used the mind-computer analogy to uncover the computational processing 
underlying the human mind, assuming that the exercise of cognitive capacities (including those of 
perceiving and categorizing objects and features of external world, remembering and recalling past 
events, understanding utterances of our fellow human beings, expressing our own thoughts by 
means of language, coordinating our behaviour in such a way that we fulfill our goals, solving 
problems and developing reason in general) involves the recourse of intentional states and 
intentional processes. The view subscribed to by cognitive psychologists echoes that of a group of 
philosophers called functionalists. Before discussing the theory of functionalism, I want to say a 
little more on the materialistic theories of mind that dominated philosophy of mind until the 1960s.   
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In the same period that academic psychology was dominated by behaviourism a parallel theory 
about the nature of mental states came out of the debate in philosophy of mind. Behaviourism had 
evident hostility to the practice of explaining behaviour by means of inner mental states. The 
behaviourist tends to deny inner mental states, or to reduce them to behavioural states that mediate 
the causal link between external stimuli and behaviour. Analogously, proponents of the materialistic 
theory known as logical behaviourism disregard the idea that intentional phenomena are accessible 
to scientific observation. Logical behaviourism, which was formulated by the philosopher Gilbert 
Ryle,
20
 represented one of the first worked-out materialist views about the mind inspired by logical 
positivism and the empirical methods used in natural sciences. This materialist theory of mind does 
not appeal to the souls or the independent realm of mental properties, but tries to explain everything 
in terms of ordinary physical properties, such as behaviour and dispositions to behave. Logical 
behaviourism had the merit of preserving some positive aspects of empirical investigation in the 
field of philosophy of mind, so it might appear attractive to thinkers who want to reject dualism. 
The principal aim of the logical behaviourist is to reduce every state, whether physical or mental, to 
a dispositional state. A dispositional state is a relational notion. Generally, dispositions include 
properties like being crushable, being fragile, being soluble and so on. Consider the property of 
being highly-flammable. An object is highly-flammable only if it bears an implicit relation between 
the ‘disposition’ to be highly-flammable and the behaviour to burn under certain conditions. 
However, something can have a disposition even if it has never happened to manifest it. For 
example, something can be crushable even though it is never crushed. It merely has to be such that 
it would be crushed if certain sorts of gentle forces were applied to it. The events of being 
flammable, being crushed, and so on, would then be the manifestations of the relevant dispositions. 
According to the logical behaviourist, to be causally responsible for a particular disposition is not to 
be per se causally responsible for the manifestation of that disposition. In general, having a 
disposition does not require that a thing actually undergo any changes, it only requires that the 
thing would undergo those changes if it were placed in the appropriate circumstances. Usually, there 
are some underlying facts about the object in virtue of which it has the dispositions it does: these 
underlying facts are the categorical basis of the disposition. For instance, the sugar cube is disposed 
to dissolve in water, and the categorical basis of this disposition is a certain kind of molecular and 
crystalline structure, due to which the sugar will dissolve when placed in water.  
Hence, logical behaviourists hold the claim that mental states are just dispositional attitudes. Even 
properties like having toothache are defined in terms of how a subject is disposed to behave in 
response to specific kinds of stimulation. Accordingly, all there is to having toothache is to be 
disposed to behave so that the toothache is relieved. But this strategy does not seem to be a very 
plausible view of toothache; after all, there is a real difference between having toothache and acting 
as if  I have toothache. Certainly, when I have toothache, there is a lot more going on than just my 
external behaviour. In fact, there is also something pretty awful going on inside me that causes me 
to behave in those ways. Problems with the dispositional approach arise because mental states can 
hardly be identified with the internal physical state that causes behaviour. This difficulty marks out 
the explanatory gap between dispositional explanations of physical states and dispositional 
explanations of mental states. Even if we consider another kind of mental state, like a belief or 
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desire, the problem remains insoluble. Consider the belief that Santa Claus is in Rome. Concerning 
this belief, the logical behaviorist would say that it corresponds to a disposition that causes us to 
give a certain answer to the question: “Where is Santa Claus located?”. So, all there is to believe 
that Santa Claus is in Rome is to be disposed to give that answer if asked “Where is Santa Claus 
located?”. Similarly, regarding intelligence the behaviourist would say that being intelligent is 
simply to be disposed to give sophisticated, sensible answers to arbitrary questions (that is, to be 
disposed to behave so that the thing in question appears as genuinely intelligent). Following this 
line of thought, to pass the Turing test means that a thing has the property of being intelligent. 
However, the behaviour in question is not merely evidence that a thing is intelligent, thus, causal 
explanations of mental states in terms of dispositional attitudes do not seem to be genuine causal 
explanations. 
 
 6  After Logical Behaviourism: Type-Identity Theory 
The popularity of logical behaviourism in philosophy of mind waned in the early 1960s when an 
alternative materialist theory of mind called type-identity theory (or central state identity theory) 
was proposed by the philosophers Smart
21
 and Place.
22
 These philosophers took very seriously the 
project of explaining behaviour by appealing to inner mental causes, and they assumed that the 
concept of mental causation is as rich as the concept of physical causation. Basically, type-identity 
theory shares with logical behaviourism the spirit of scientific speculation, together with a 
materialistic view of mind that contrasts sharply with Cartesian dualism. But, at the same time, it 
reintegrates the idea of the inner mind repudiated by behaviourists. If the behaviourist maintains 
that mental terms refer to nothing or to the parameters of stimulus-responses relations, conversely, 
the type-identity theorist identifies mental states and processes with neurophysiologic events in the 
brain, and properties of mental states with ‘causal’ properties of neurophysiological states. 
According to this view, if we had to pick something in the behaviourist’s picture to be my 
toothache, it seems that some C-fibres firing in my brain would be better candidates than the 
disposition itself. After all, that would be what causes me to behave as I do when I have toothache, 
and this would be proof that behavioral effects might sometimes have a chain of mental causes. 
The type-identity theorists were inspired by the ontological doctrine of physicalism, that is, the view 
that all natural sciences are hierarchically structured on the basis of physics (which is per se the 
most basic and ‘complete’ science). The physicalist says that physics needs no reduction nor 
recourse to any other science, whilst all natural sciences have branches in which physical laws and 
measurements receive special emphasis. Generally, the term special science indicates a science that 
studies phenomena which come under the laws and generalisations of physics. From this point of 
view, every special science is said to govern a mere sub-component of the very general physical 
realm. According to the physicalist, the most important achievements in sciences depend on the 
capacity to discover identity relations between special sciences states/events and physical 
states/events. The physicalist holds that all special sciences properties must figure into physical 
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properties, and all special sciences laws must be deductible from laws of physics. Following the 
principles of physicalism, type-identity theory tries to discover the identity relations between 
mental types and physical types, and to uncover the essence of psychological laws by reducing these 
to laws of neurophysiology. For the type-identity theorist, neurophysiology is the most likely 
candidate for defining the causal identity-relations between mental types and physical types. Hence, 
psychology is a science that reduces to neurophysiology, and neurophysiology is a science that 
reduces to chemistry, which in turn is a science that reduces to physics. Types of mental states are 
supposed to be physical since they are identical to types of brain states. Then, for any intelligent 
agent I, to be in the mental state type m  is just to be in a specific neuronal state n, which is defined 
in terms of C-fibres firing, which is directly connected to the bodily agent’s responses. In turn, 
mental properties are supposed to be identical to neuronal properties. According to the type-identity 
theorist, the identity relations between mental properties and neuronal properties belong to the same 
kind of identity relations as those between the property of being ‘water’ and the property of being 
composed of ‘H2O’ molecules. 
 
2.  7 The rise of Functionalism 
The influence of type-identity theory was short-lived, as in the late 1960s it was pushed aside by the 
work carried out in the ongoing research programme called functionalism. Functionalism is a theory 
about the nature of mental states and mental processes that makes use of specific causal relations 
amongst a rich network of sensory inputs, mental states and types of behaviour; it was the result of 
the work of a group of physicalist philosophers such as Hilary Putnam,
23
 Donald Davidson
24
 and 
Jerry Fodor.
25
 While operating under the influence of physicalism (the view that science is 
hierarchically organized on the ground of more fine-grained categories corresponding to specific 
disciplines, all underpinned under the domain of physics), functionalists took a naturalistic turn, 
shaping the dichotomy which was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues and issues 
specific to particular kinds of natural sciences. Thus, after the appearance of functionalism the 
traditional issues of philosophy of mind were discussed in a completely new way. 
Functionalism was destined to dominate the debate of philosophy of mind in the second half of the 
twentieth century; it was designed to solve the dilemma for the materialistic programme in the 
philosophy of mind. Both logical behaviourism and type-identity theory involved several problems. 
On the one hand, logical behaviourism had correctly identified the relation between the 
environmental circumstances and the agent’s behavioral responses, but it was unable to account for 
the relational character of the mind and the body. On the other hand, type-identity theory had 
correctly described the relational character of mental properties and the causal powers of mental 
states, but it endorsed the deeply anthropocentric view that radically different physical systems 
cannot share the same mental states. As opposed to materialistic views that appeal either to 
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eliminativism or reductionism, functionalism does not foresee the elimination of intentional states 
and concepts from the explanatory apparatus of psychological theories. On the contrary, it makes 
sense of the causal nature of the mental. Although this approach superseded the fundamentals of 
behaviourism and type-identity theory, it integrated a delightful synthesis of both these views. To a 
certain extent, functionalism presents a similarity with behaviourism in respect to the claim that 
behaviour bears causal relations between environmental inputs and predictable outputs 
(corresponding, for the behaviourist, to stimuli and responses respectively). Conversely, 
functionalism and the type-identity theory share the project of construing causal explanations for 
inner-mental phenomena (which are supposed to be special entities with causal powers). However,  
unlike type-identity theory, functionalism rejects the perspective of type-physicalism. In principle, 
type-identity theory can be held either as a doctrine about mental particulars (such as my fear of 
‘that’ spider), or as a doctrine about mental universals or properties (such as being afraid of spiders 
or having beliefs that spiders are dangerous). These two doctrines, called respectively token 
physicalism and type physicalism, differ in strength and plausibility.
26
 Token physicalism maintains 
that the mental particulars which occur in our brain are neurophysiological, however, it does not 
exclude the logical possibility that there might be computers and disembodied spirits with mental 
properties. Conversely, type physicalism makes the more drastic claim that all the mental 
particulars that there could possibly be are neurophysiological in nature. Following this view, 
neither machines nor disembodied spirits can be said to have neurons or mental activity. Now, 
functionalism is compatible with token physicalism but not with type physicalism. The 
functionalist, like the cognitive psychologist, recurs to the  mind-computer analogy (the distinction 
that computer sciences draws between hardware and software) to display the deficiencies of both 
the materialist and the dualist. For him, type physicalism is not a plausible view of mental 
properties, because it takes the psychological constitution of intelligent systems to depend on their 
physical composition, the hardware, and not on their program, the software. Token physicalism, on 
the other hand, does not rule out the logical possibility that correctly programmed computers can 
have mental states with mental properties, despite their physical structure or organisation. 
How did functionalism demolish type-identity theory? To answer this question we may report some 
of the most powerful objections to type-identity theory. A particularly remarkable objection is that 
made by H. Putnam to the idea that mental states and brain states bear identity relations. The type-
identity theorist defines a mental state in terms of a mental ‘type’, which is identifiable with the 
neurophysiological/brain state assigned to it. On this view, only physical systems with an identical 
brain can generate what is accurately recognized as a mental state and defined in terms of c-fibres 
firing. However, Putnam argued that this claim contrasts with accumulating evidence in 
neurosciences that demonstrates that animals (like dogs and apes) share relevant aspects of our 
mental activity, despite their central nervous system being quite different from ours. Putnam said 
that different physical systems can find themselves in the same identical mental state, but only 
certain intelligent systems, whose brains behave very similarly to the typical functions of the human 
brain, can be said to share partial aspects of our mentality. According to Putnam, even if we take 
mental states to belong to mental types, it is only the functional, or causal role that a mental type 
plays in one’s internal economy that is explanatorily relevant. The work performed by a mental type 
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in a system is what permits bearing causal relations to bodily stimulations, mental states and types 
of behaviour. Consider pain: Putnam takes it to be engaged with no one particular type associated 
with specific neurophysiological or biochemical C-fibres, but just with the function that such C-
fibres would have contributed to the operations of the organism taken as a whole. According to 
Putnam, pain and such other mental states are tokens of mental types. To token a state of a 
particular mental type is to token an internal state with an appropriate causal role that is central to 
someone’s identity. To be in pain is therefore just to token an internal mental type that specifically 
occupies the pain role. Putnam defines the characterization of the pain role in terms of “functional 
types”. Since distinct mental types can play the same identical causal role, the functional type is 
what tokens of distinct mental types have in common. Putnam’s definition of mental tokens, in 
terms of the abstract causal-functional role that mental types (such as C-fibres) share with their 
potential replacements, or surrogates, entails the idea that mental tokens are multiple realizable. 
According to the thesis of multiple realizability, for any given type of mental state T, T’s role will 
be occupied by the same internal mental state M for a large variety of intelligent species. As mental 
tokens can be physically embodied in a large variety of different ways, then, complex physical 
systems, which vary considerably, can be said to realize the same mental state. 
Another objection to type-identity theory emerges from Fodor’s reflections. Yet in his classic book 
Psychological Explanation,
27
 Fodor critiqued psychological behaviourism, logical behaviourism 
and the type-identity theory, suggesting replacing them with functionalism and cognitive 
psychology. In a more recent paper titled Special Sciences
28
 Fodor launched a devastating attack on 
type-identity theory. Fodor’s criticism regards the assumption that psychological laws reduce to 
laws of physics in virtue of the mediation of laws of neurophysiology. Despite his endorsement of 
physicalism, Fodor thinks of psychology as an ‘autonomous’ special science concerned with 
accounting for a distinctive aspect of reality, whose generalisations have considerable explanatory 
and predictive powers. For him, psychology captures generalisations over types of phenomena that 
physics, and the other sciences, can hardly explain or predict. Moreover, even if Fodor admits that 
psychological states have a physical substrate that implements them, he rejects the identity 
relationship between psychological states and neurophysiological states; rather, these two different 
kinds of states would be coextensive. Fodor argues that the level of abstractions at which the 
generalisations of psychology are most naturally pitched, is something that cuts across differences 
in the physical composition of the systems to which psychological generalisations apply. 
 
2. 8  Functionalism, Cognitive Psychology and Mental Causation 
Functionalism was particularly well-suited to be the philosophy of mind of the cognitive revolution 
because it contributed important theoretical foundations and conceptual analysis to the emerging 
cognitive sciences. In particular, functionalism was the theoretical framework most attuned to 
cognitive psychology. Over the last 50 years, the most important issues of cognitive psychology 
(such as the causal role of semantic, or representational, level properties in computational theories 
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of cognition; the nature of concepts, and what kind of relations they bear to each other; the nature of 
the cognitive architecture) have been investigated as questions of interest to philosophy of mind. In 
turn, the philosophical reflections on such issues have been ultimately informed and influenced by 
the results achieved in cognitive psychology. Despite operating in different disciplines, the 
functionalist and cognitive psychologist subscribe to the same perspective about the intentionality 
of mental states and mental processes. The cognitive psychologists endorsed the view that the mind 
is a neurophysiologically embodied computational system (the brain), and that mental states and 
processes are causally efficacious events that occur in it. Such states and processes would be 
computational states and computational processes (in principle) perfectly reproducible by a 
computer that shares some of our fundamental cognitive capacities. Similarly, the functionalists 
believed that a considerable part of our mental activity can be mechanically reproduced by specific 
and relevant programs of artificial systems. Influenced by the theory of computability and the work 
on the digital computer of Alan Turing, the functionalists argued that mental states and processes 
can be compared to the computational states and processes of a Turing machine. 
A chief focus of the agenda subscribed to by both the functionalist and the cognitive psychologist 
was the centrality of mental causation in psychological explanations. The principal drawback of 
Cartesian dualism concerned its inadequateness to provide a scientific explanation for the causality 
of mental states. If we assume that the mind is not placed in space, it is difficult to see how mental 
causes could produce physical effects. For the dualist, the question of how immaterial substances 
cause physical events is not much more obscure than that of how physical events cause other 
physical events. However, it may be objected that there are many clear cases of physical causation 
but not one clear case of non-physical causation, so the non-physical interaction might be just an 
artifact of the immaterialist construal of the mental. Unlike dualism, functionalism recognizes 
mental causation as a species of physical causation. Functionalism became increasingly popular in 
cognitive sciences because it provided a way to preserve the explanatorily efficacy of mental 
causation without violating the generality of physics. In functionalism, mental states and processes 
causally mediate the link between sensory stimulation and behaviours, moreover, they are multiply 
realizable at different physical levels. The functionalist strategy for solving the problem of mental-
physical interaction is to recognize mental particulars as physical entities. The functionalist holds 
both these assertions: first, mental properties must be defined in terms of their relations; second, 
interactions of mind and body are typically causal in however robust a notion of causality is 
required by psychological explanations. Conversely, the logical behaviourist holds only the first 
assertion, and the type-identity theorist only the second. Therefore, to a certain extent, the 
functionalist tolerates the materialist solution to the mind-body problem advanced in identity 
theory. The functionalist does not exclude that brain events turn out to be the only things with the 
functional properties typical of mental states, nonetheless, he thinks that what determines the 
psychological type to which a mental particular belongs is the causal role performed by it in the 
organism’s mental life. On his view, the concept of causal role is construed in such a way that a 
mental state can be defined by its causal relations to other mental states. For example, toothache, or 
any other state is identified with the types of mental state that among other things causes a 
disposition to move in a certain way (like taking medication in the belief that it relieves a headache, 
or desiring to rid oneself of the pain one is feeling). Functional individuation is therefore a kind of 
differentiation with respect to the causal role. I shall return to the issue of mental causation in 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
27 
 
chapter 6; however, in the next chapter I will consider functionalism in relation to two general 
commitments: folk-psychology and physicalism. 
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3 
 
Behind Functionalism: two fundamental commitments 
 
 
3.  1  Functionalism and Folk-Psychology 
I have already spoken about folk psychology, or commonsense psychology, as the theoretical 
account that explains how and why people routinely act or perform their behaviour. In folk 
psychology it is generally assumed that people engage in behaviour under the influence of their 
intentional states, and return to the intentional vocabulary to explain and predict behaviour. This 
explanatory, descriptive and predictive strategy is bounded up with the view that intentional states 
are explanatorily relevant, because their job is to figure as they do in intentional explanations and 
predictions. Fodor takes the explanatory role of intentional states to be related to certain 
fundamental features, which can be reported as follows:
29
 
 Intentional states have semantic properties. Since intentional states have ‘meaning’, or 
‘content’, which refers either to particular objects or possible states of affairs, they have 
truth or satisfaction conditions. 
In principle, intentional states can be distinguished on the basis of either their mental content or the 
kind of relation they bear to the external world. In the case of the former, we distinguish between 
mental states on the basis of their different semantic content, for example, when we distinguish 
between the belief that Santa Claus is coming to town and the belief that the Pope is coming to 
town. In the case of the latter, we distinguish between two or more intentional states with the same 
intentional content on the basis of the different kind of relations they involve. Consider the 
difference between the belief that Santa Claus is coming to town and the desire that Santa Claus is 
coming to town. As these mental states have the same identical semantic content, what differentiates 
them is the different kind of relations they bear to the state of affairs. Different mental states involve 
different kinds of relations: the belief ‘that x’ involves one’s standing in the belief-relation to the 
semantic content x; whereas, the desire ‘that x’ involve one’s standing in the desire-relation to the 
semantic content  x.  
 Intentional states have causal properties that are causally efficacious to affect people’s 
behaviour. Intentional states are mainly involved in the following causal processes: 
 Intentional states can be caused by environmental factors. For example, my sighting of 
someone who looks like Santa Claus will probably cause to me to believe that Santa Claus 
has come to town. 
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 Intentional states often cause subsequent intentional states. For example, my belief that 
‘Santa Claus has come to town’ will probably suggest to me that this event routinely occurs 
every year. 
 Intentional states often cause behavioural responses. For example, my belief that the object 
called Santa Claus is a real entity that comes to town in a particular period of the year will 
probably affect my future behaviour in terms of expectations of the occurrence of such 
event. 
On Fodor’s view, the attribution of causal powers to intentional states allows us to understand folk 
psychology as an intentionally regulated and law-governed causal explanation of behaviour, that is, 
an explanation that bears causal relations amongst individuals, mental content referring to states of 
affairs and environmental impingements. 
 Intentional states are systematic, in the respect that there is a systematic relation between 
their causal power and their semantic properties. 
Intentional states tend to cause other intentional states and behaviour to which they are semantically 
related. Take the process of reasoning, which constitutes a general case of employment of 
systematic relations among intentional states and thoughts. When an intelligent system enacts 
reasoning, it gives the rise to a chain of thoughts that in turn causes other chains of thoughts. 
Suppose that a system I has the belief that the object x stands in R-relation with the object y, then, 
for any given R-relation and any given couple of objects x and y, I will believe that y stands in the 
same R-relation with x. 
 Intentional states are productive, because there is an infinite number of possible ways for an 
individual to form new intentional states, concepts and thoughts, or to adapt them in a 
completely new fashion. Equally, there is an infinite number of possible ways for a 
competent speaker to form or understand sentences of natural languages. 
In virtue of such features, Fodor and the other functionalists understand folk psychology as a 
psychological theory of mind principally committed to the intentionality of mental states and 
concepts. The functionalists take intentional states to play an explanatory role by being part of a 
‘folk’ theory of how physical systems, such as humans, behave such that each of us acquires by age 
three most of what we will deploy for the rest of our lives. This picture describes mental concepts as 
ensconced in folk psychology by means of a system of generalisations, which is acquired by people 
very early and used in their dealings with the social world. 
 
 2   Folk Psychology and the Standard View of Mind 
Now I want to introduce a very general issue of folk psychology: the question of how mental states 
work in predictions and explanations of behaviour. In the debates of cognitive sciences this question 
has often been posed as the question as to whether the intentional practice of ‘explanation’ is 
symmetrical to that of ‘prediction’. Generally, the tendency amongst philosophers and cognitive 
scientists is to consider prediction as the paradigmatic practice that arises from the attribution of 
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mental states; and explanation as the practice that is always behind prediction. According to the 
standard view of mind, predictive adequacy and explanation are just one and the same practice. This 
view is generally held by thinkers as Lewis, Churchland,
30
 Fodor,
31
 and Dennett.
32
 Most famously, 
Lewis provided his definition of folk psychology in terms of the ‘functional’ theory of mental states 
that reflects the everyday human practices of predicting, explaining, interpreting and judging. All 
these practices would occur by means of relating intentional platitudes able to connect either 
sensory stimuli and mental states to behaviours, or mental states to one another: “when someone has 
a combination of mental states and the environmental sensory stimuli he receives, he tends with 
probability to be caused thereby to go into mental states and produce motor responses.”33 
Lewis’s theoretical model of folk-psychology can be reported as follows: 
 prediction and explanation are symmetrical, in the same way that explanation can also be 
used to make prediction, just as prediction can also serve as explanation; 
 common-sense platitudes that connect behaviour and mental states make up the body of the 
theory \ the covering laws; 
 mental states are the core causes of behaviour. 
As Lewis has argued, prediction and explanation are symmetrical, because the attribution of 
intentional states that involves prediction cannot prescind from explanation, and vice-versa.  He 
considered the psychological mechanisms behind the attribution of intentional states to be the 
primary means of explanations, and explanations to be carried out by means of inductive 
generalizations over behaviour. 
Lewis’s explanatory model of intentional explanation was importantly inspired by the deductive-
nomological model of scientific explanation advanced by Hempel and Oppenheim. Both these 
explanatory models present a similar syntactical structure. In Hempel’s and Oppenheim’s 
deductive-nomological model,
34
 every scientific explanation requires the explanandum E to be 
jointly explained by the covering laws L1, L2,..., Lⁿ plus the initial conditions C1, C2,…, Cⁿ. 
Analogously, as Lewis’ theoretical model compares ‘intentional states’ to the explanans of Hempel 
and Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model,  the argument of the symmetry of scientific 
explanation applies, mutatis mutandis, to the symmetry of psychological explanation. 
 
3.   3  Two interpretations of Folk Psychology: Theory-Theory vs. Simulation Theory 
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Another general issue of folk psychology regards the question of whether the ability to ascribe 
intentional states to themselves and others is something that is acquired by children in the late 
preschool years, or is instead something innate. Cognitive scientists had widely debated the way 
children develop the ability to relate language, intentional states and ascriptions of mental states.  
There is a large agreement that children’s self development of such ability is involved in the 
intentional practices of prediction and explanation. However, it is not so clear how people 
effectively construct explanations and predictions of intentional states or behaviour. With regard to 
this question,  two contrasting hypotheses have been pursued. Both hypotheses assume that the 
attribution of mental states is fundamental to all commonsensical practices and cannot be explained 
by appeal to mere direct perception. In contrast, the hypotheses in question involve different 
understandings of folk psychology. 
According to simulation theory, the practices of prediction and explanation provide a 
characterization of behaviour by imagining and replicating the fundamental aspects of one’s mental 
life. This view takes the individual’s own experience to be the measure of everyone else’s observed 
behaviour, since prediction and explanation are supposed to work when one puts oneself in 
someone else’s place. The simulation theorists think of folk psychology as a set of abilities directed 
to identify someone with another person in imagination and re-enact the fundamental aspects of 
one’s mental activity. Conversely, according to theory-theory, the intentional practices of prediction 
and explanation work via construction of an inductive psychological theory about people’s actions 
and mental experiences, a theory that shares many attributes with the typical scientific theories. The 
theory-theorists identify folk psychology with a psychological theory constituted by a system of 
rules-knowledge generalisations which are implicitly employed in the construction of explanations 
and predictions of mental states and behaviour. According to this view, infants and small children 
make sense of their social world by means of such a constructive system of rules-knowledge of 
mental representations and inferential laws. Children’s ability to ascribe intentions would thus be 
related to the ability to hold an utterance in mind in the form of a quoted expression, in combination 
with causal relations between syntactic rules and actions. A central insight of the theory-theory is 
that children’s ability to ascribe intentions is an innate cognitive capacity.35 
 The argument of the innateness of mental ascriptions brings us back to Chomsky’s argument of the 
innateness of universal grammar. I have already mentioned Chomsky’s linguistic argument,36 which 
claims that the best explanation of how native speakers obtain an utterance in mind in the form of a 
quoted expression is that they have a form of unconscious knowledge of the grammar of their 
language. According to Chomsky, competent speakers know the constituent grammatical and 
syntactic rules of their natural language perfectly because they possess a “universal grammar”. It is 
in virtue of the universal grammar that one can naturally specify, for a finite string of words, 
whether it constitutes a grammatically correct sentence. The unconscious knowledge of the 
linguistic universal principles would thus be ‘innate’ and encoded in the human brain at birth. The 
view that certain skills or abilities are ‘native’ or ‘hard-wired’ into the brain at birth is known as 
nativism. Fodor suggested generalising Chomsky’s linguistic perspective of generative grammar to 
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all the essential aspects of the human mind. On Fodor’s view, the best way to account for our ability 
to explain and predict behaviour is that we have a tacit knowledge of a rich battery of causal 
generalisations, which connect intentional states to other mental phenomena, environmental 
impingements, sensory input and observable behaviour. Fodor is a theory-theorist who thinks that 
folk psychology is a psychological theory consisting of a large collection of sentences which assert 
the existence of an internally-represented ‘knowledge-network’ of causal generalisations. 
Intentional explanation and prediction would then be particular types of ‘causal’ explanations and 
predictions employed in special sciences. Like the inductive reasoning and covering law models 
employed in basic science, folk-psychological practices would form a deductive argument in which 
covering laws are implicitly deployed.
37
 But the covering laws of folk psychology are not laws of 
the universal type. Conversely, psychological generalisations are ‘probabilistic’ laws of the 
deductive type that admit exceptions. These laws typically include universally quantified 
conditional statements known as ceteris paribus, that is, ‘all else is equal’, clauses. They have a 
syntactic structure in which there is an antecedent that is the conjunction of the relevant explanatory 
factors; and a consequent consisting of the external events involved in the inductive reasoning by 
which intentional explanations and predictions are carried out: 
 if x wants that p, and x believes that not-p unless q, and x believes that x can bring it about 
that q, then, ceteris paribus, x will try to bring it about that q. 
 ‘If x intends to do p, ceteris paribus, x will tend to do p’. 
For Fodor, psychological generalisations play the same role in explanation and prediction of 
behaviour as that usually reserved for strict physical laws: strict laws and hedged laws with satisfied 
ceteris paribus conditions operate alike in terms of their roles in covering law relations and in terms 
of their roles in covering law explanations.
38
 He also maintains the nativist view that most of our 
folk-psychological knowledge is as innate as the knowledge of the universal principles that govern 
natural languages. 
 
3.   4  Physicalism and mental reality 
I want to conclude this brief section with the second commitment of functionalism: the 
metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. Roughly speaking, physicalism is the ontological view that 
reality is at bottom physical in nature. Central to this perspective is the principle of completeness of 
the physical realm, or the causal closure thesis, which claims that the physical realm is complete in 
the sense that the sum totality of physical facts determinates the sum totality of facts in the world. 
The most intuitive consequence of this assumption is that all the phenomena (including objects, 
properties, states, events or processes) that inhabit the world are necessarily physical in nature, so 
that the deterministic laws of physics underpin all the laws governing special sciences forces, 
including magnetic and chemical ones among others. The acceptance of physicalism entails that 
there is a systematic relation between physical laws/properties, and the laws/properties of special 
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sciences. There are basically two ways to determine this systematic relation. Assuming the identity 
relation is to say that special sciences laws are identical to laws of physics, whereas assuming the 
supervenience relation is to say that special sciences laws supervene upon physical laws. 
What is wrong with the physicalist view? One problem is that, despite the fact that our brain is 
certainly a complex physical system whose states and properties are necessarily physical, physical 
laws apparently do not underpin psychological laws, and nor do mental properties seem to reduce to 
physical properties. What is more, mental states have a number of salient features that apparently 
stand in contrast to the fundamentals of physics. In fact, the kind of content of mental states refers 
to objects that might not exist, or to states of affairs that might not hold. Another problematic aspect 
concerns the fact that minded individuals are finite physical systems, even if they can generate an 
infinite number of content-distinct mental states. How could a finite physical system carry out an 
infinite battery of rational and intentional states with contents, which are causally efficacious to 
external behaviour? 
The philosopher Quine posed the question of the irreducibility of mental phenomena to the physical 
realm in terms of the irreducibility of the intentional vocabulary to the vocabulary of physics. For 
Quine, the question of naturalising intentional states is largely an issue of how an individual can 
interpret or translate, for one purpose or another, a belief into someone else’s idiom; therefore, an 
issue of how symbols get meaning. Quine asserted that, even if the language of intentionality were 
necessary for our best predictions or explanations of behaviour, it could not be naturalised in any 
case. The problem he raised is whether ‘irreducible’ intentional idioms can be integrated with the 
language of natural sciences; this dilemma is known as double standards and consists of two basic 
and equally contradictory arguments. The ‘argument of indispensability’ claims that propositional 
attitudes should be included in the domain of mathematical objects as they are ‘indispensable’ to 
our best explanations of the world. Grasping the first horn of the dilemma entails that folk 
psychology provides the best psychological theory, despite the fact that meaningful intentional 
states do not reduce to any term that indicates parts of the physical realm. Conversely, the argument 
of the ‘indeterminacy of reference’ claims that the reference of any language, including the 
language of intentionality, is highly ‘undetermined’. Since a behaviour has no unique reference, it 
might be interpreted by two different and equally warranted predictive/interpretative strategies: 
“manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible 
with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another.”39  
Grasping the second horn of the dilemma is to admit that intentional phenomena are scientifically 
empty and baseless. As regards Quine’s dilemma, some agree that intentional idioms cannot be an 
integrative part of the natural sciences vocabulary, while others declare their congruence with it. 
Then, the physicalist dilemma gives the rise to this taxonomy:
40
 
 Eliminative Materialism, defended by Quine and Churchland;41 
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 Intentional Realism, defended by Davidson, Putnam, Kripke, Fodor and Dretske;  
 Instrumentalism, defended by Dennet. 
The viewpoint of eliminative materialism is held by those who resolutely opt for the second 
argument of Quine’s dilemma. This perspective disclaims the truth of intentional idioms and 
propositional attitudes: if behaviorists tend to eliminate intentional states, conversely, type-identity 
theorists identify intentional states with neuronal/physical states and translate the vocabulary of 
intentionality into the language of neuroscience. According to the view of reductive materialism, 
mental states are states of the brain, or central nervous system, which are defined on the grounds of 
a number of different bio-physical structures and processes. Nevertheless, amongst theories of mind 
that are engaged with eliminative or reductive materialism, the tendency is to reject any kind of 
inferential computation over syntactically structured sentences or logical formulas. Within Artificial 
Intelligence the materialistic theories of mind reflect the cognitive models, according to which the 
brain works by entirely distributed holistic connectionist networking, together with a physically 
hard-wired vector coding of coordinate transformations. 
On the other hand, intentional realism is the view that defends the reality of intentional states. The 
realist claims that intentional idioms are ontologically ‘true’ and equally ‘irreducible’ to the 
physical language, so he resolutely opts for the first argument of Quine’s dilemma and rejects the 
argument of indeterminacy of reference. Intentional realists are generally functionalists like Jerry 
Fodor,
42
 who demands the reality of intentional states by appealing to the existence of a mental 
language formed by mental symbols with syntactic and semantic properties. Fodor considers the 
mental language to be at the base of every natural language, and the intentional states and thoughts 
of such mental language as taking the form of mental tokens, or mental representations. Like 
sentences of natural languages, mental tokens are supposed to have syntactic and semantic 
properties, so that they are grammatically and semantically structured in the brain. Fodor’s view 
echoes that of Davidson,
43
 who argued that all that is needed to explain mental causality is an 
account of representations of psychological states defined in terms of mental tokens, plus inductive 
reasoning. 
An alternative position to materialism and realism is represented by instrumentalism, a viewpoint 
proposed by Daniel Dennett.
44
 Unlike realism, instrumentalism invokes purely factual descriptions 
of states of affairs that do not require any normative assumption to be licensed. According to this 
view, sentences which include intentional idioms do not really describe any entity of special kind, 
but only serve to systematize more familiar phenomena. Dennett’s idea can be summarised in this 
way: given the absence of detailed knowledge of the physical laws that govern behaviour, 
intentional idioms can be taken as an useful stance for predicting behaviour. On Dennett’s view, 
intentional items are mere calculation-predictive devices, and not inner mental mechanisms. 
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According to his epistemological strategy of intentional stance,
45
 to predict behaviour of 
mechanical devices, creatures, and humans we have to distinguish between three basic levels of 
descriptions. The physical stance applies to the basic physical level whereas the design stance 
applies to the functional description of reality and the intentional stance defines prediction in terms 
of the matter of extrapolating rationally the behaviour one individual expects from another in a 
particular situation. Dennett argued that the performance of an individual to predict behaviour of 
another individual is exactly the same as predicting the behaviour performed by a thermostat: we do 
not know exactly how the calculator works, however, we expect it to produce particular behaviour 
in response to a particular circumstance. 
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4 
 
Computational Theories of Mind 
 
 
 1  The linkage between Functionalism and Cognitive Sciences 
Thus far I have discussed the theory of functionalism in relation to the dramatic developments that 
led to the cognitive revolution of the mid-twentieth century. I said that the failure of philosophical 
behaviourism and identity-theory in philosophy of mind, together with the success of naturalism 
laid the ground for the advent of functionalism, a theory which specifies the role of intentional 
items for psychological explanations. On the other hand, Chomsky’s novel mentalistic theory of 
language,
46
 plus the results of experimental instruments achieved in psychological research and AI, 
have been fundamental to the replacement of the behaviorist approach in psychology with the 
cognitivist one.  
Functionalism and cognitive sciences are complementary projects. If the impact of functionalism 
depended on its linkage with cognitive sciences, conversely, it inspired the overarching picture that 
explicates the goals and practices of the cognitive scientists, furnishing the conceptual foundations 
for cognitive sciences. The working hypothesis of cognitive sciences is to define the mechanisms 
underlying our cognitive capacities as computations that operate on mental representations, that is, 
as species of information processing. Cognitive scientists try to specify the computational structure 
of cognitive systems, thoughts, beliefs and so forth, and what type of computational state is each 
cognitive capacity, thought, and any other mental type. On the other hand, functionalism is the 
project of philosophers whose concern is to formulate a comprehensive theory of mind that 
understands cognitive capacities, thoughts, beliefs and so on in terms of computational states 
specified in formal-syntactical terms. Inspired by the computational models of cognition, the 
functionalist claims that the thought that ‘water is wet’ is a computational type; nonetheless, he does 
not specify what computational type it is. The task of the functionalist is not to give a detailed 
specification of the functional organization of the thinking organism, nor that of providing a 
computational description of the organism’s thoughts and beliefs. This specification is the task of 
the cognitive scientist, who attempts to discover the functional organisation of cognizing organisms 
by specifying which computational type each mental type is. In this chapter I will examine the most 
remarkable versions that grew out of the functionalist approach. After giving a brief overview of 
Putnam’s formulation of computational functionalism,47 I will talk more about Fodor’s 
computational theory of mind.
48
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      4. 2   Putnam and Computational Functionalism 
Hilary Putnam can be considered the father of computational functionalism, a theory about the 
nature of mental states which takes mental states and events to be computational states of the brain. 
It essentially includes two claims: computationalism and functionalism. Computationalism is the 
claim that organisms with minds have functional organization, which describes the organism in 
terms of states and their relations to each other and to inputs and outputs. Computationalism is often 
associated with the maxim that the brain is a sort of computer, and as such, runs a program: the 
software. Conversely, functionalism is the claim that to have a mind is to have the right sort of 
functional organisation, and that every mental property is a certain kind of this functional 
organisation. Functionalism is commonly associated with the maxim that the mind is the software 
of the brain. The doctrine of computational functionalism has been outlined by Putnam in a series of 
papers beginning with Minds and Machines
49
 and culminating in The Nature of Mental States,
50
 so 
we can divide its development into two phases. 
In his earliest papers Putnam
51
 did not put forward a theory about the nature of mental states but 
used the analogy between minds and machines to set out the concepts and ideas underlying 
computational functionalism. Accordingly, it is possible to clarify issues pertaining to the mind in 
terms of a machine analogue, since, there is a striking analogy between humans and machines. 
Their internal makeup and behaviour can be described either in terms of physical states governed by 
physical laws or, more abstractly, in terms of logical states (machines) and mental states (humans) 
governed by laws of reasoning. In assuming that the mind-computer analogy can help us clarify the 
notion of mental state, Putnam posed the question of the nature of mental states (or the mind-body 
problem) and the problem of other minds in the context of their machine analogue: 
“The various issues and puzzles that make up the traditional mind-body problem are wholly    
linguistic and logical in character…all the issues arise in connection with any computing system 
capable of answering questions about its own structure.”52 
The paradigm example of a computing machine he used is a Turing machine. He argued that minds 
and Turing machines are similar in that they carry out similar behaviour, and present a similar 
internal composition. Minds and Turing machines have both two possible descriptions. There is a 
description that refers to their physical and chemical structure. If we take a Turing machine, it is a 
physically realised object, which is characterized in terms that refer to its physical states, chemical 
or electronic components. This kind of description corresponds to the hardware of the computing 
machine. Moreover, there is a kind of characterization in terms of the program by which the Turing 
machine runs. Consider, for example, a flow chart: this computing machine can be described in 
terms of sequences of logical states, as it determines the order in which the states succeed each 
other, and which symbols are printed. The flow chart specifies laws governing the succession of the 
                                                          
49
 Putnam: 1960. 
50
 Putnam: 1967b. 
51
 Putnam: 1960, 1964. 
52
 Putnam: 1960, p. 362. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
39 
 
machine’s logical states. These logical states are states that can be described exclusively in logical 
or formal terms. Putnam identified the sequence of logical states with the functional organization of 
the Turing machine: the machine’s software.53 In short, the machine’s makeup as well as its 
behaviour can be analyzed in terms of either the software it runs (a characterization of 
mental/computational states expressed in logical-mathematical language) or the hardware that 
physically realises the software. Unlike the hardware, either thoughts or programs are open to 
rational criticism. Putnam claimed that a special Turing machine that behaves according to rational 
preference functions is a “rational agent”. On Putnam’s view, the rules of inductive logic and 
economics theory are arguably the very rules that govern the psychology of human beings.
54
 
In a successive paper titled The Nature of Mental States Putnam went a step further, and suggested 
identifying the mind with the functional organization of the thinking organism, and mental states 
with functional states: 
 “to know for certain that a human being has a particular belief, or preference, and so on, 
involves knowing something about the functional organization of the human being.”55 
Putnam made the claim that mental states are functional states of the organism. A functional state is 
a state of the whole organism’s functional organization, which is defined by its causal relations to 
other states (like the belief that I am in pain), inputs (such as being hurt), and outputs (like my 
vocalization ouch). Considering pain, Putnam said that to be in pain is to have a property that is 
characteristic of the organism’s functional organisation:“being capable of feeling pain is possessing 
an appropriate kind of Functional Organization”.56 Putnam’s specification of pain is reductive in the 
sense that it is formulated not in mental terms, but in terms of computational parameters plus 
relations to biologically characterized inputs and outputs. Functional states do the job of bearing 
causal relations between internal brain states, sensory inputs and  outputs to the motor system. 
Then, the specification of a mental state in terms of other mental states is eliminated in favour of a 
formula that contains logical terms (such as: ‘there is’, ‘and’), variables (such as: ., x, S1,…, Sn), and 
biological/physical terms (for the inputs and outputs). Putnam wanted to demonstrate that the nature 
of the mind is independent from the physical make-up of the brain but depends on the kind of 
functional organization, or software, possessed by the organism: that is, the way in which mental 
states are causally related to each other, to sensory inputs, and to motor outputs.
57
 Unanimated 
physical objects cannot possess what can be specifically defined ‘minds’ because they do not have a 
sufficiently complex kind of functional organisation to render them minds. All there is to being 
intelligent, really having thoughts and other mental states is implementing some very complicated 
software. For example, the software implemented into our brain might be implemented in many 
different sorts of hardware, like Martian brains or computers. Putnam concluded that, if a Martian 
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brain, or a computer, implemented that sort of software, it would have real thoughts and mental 
states. As long as there is hardware with internal mental states that stand in the right causal 
functional relations to each other and to inputs and outputs, we can say that it has a mind. 
 
4.   3   Fodor’s Computational Theory of Mind 
From the early stages of his career Fodor saw in functionalism a theory amenable to the view of 
mind underlying that of the cognitive revolution of the 1950s. He was also enthusiastic about 
cognitive psychology, arguing for the continuity between the theories of cognitive processing and 
the developments carried out by functionalism. Then, between the 1960s and the early 1970s, Fodor 
manifested an active interest in the empirical study of language and linguistic processing which led 
him to write a collection of papers about some of the philosophical issues arising out of Chomsky’s 
framework in theoretical linguistics.
58
 These empirical works in psycholinguistics plus the earlier 
commitment to both functionalism and cognitive psychology laid the groundwork for the 
formulation of his computational theory of mind. The computational theory of mind (CTM), was 
proposed in Fodor’s books The Language of Thought and Propositional Attitudes;59 it is principally 
a theory of intentional states and processes which aims to subscribe to a task based on the co-
existence of intentionality and the physicalist ontology. CTM resembles the conception of mind of 
the cognitive revolution and it bears considerable affinities to functionalism as regards the idea that 
intentional states are causally efficacious functional relations which are multiply realisable. 
Although CTM claims that intentional relations are functional relations, it rejects the functionalist 
theory of content. In introducing Fodor’s CTM, I will follow the exposition given by M. J. Cain in 
his book Fodor: Language and Philosophy;
60
 as we shall see, CTM consists of two argumentative 
components: a theory of intentional states and a theory of intentional processes. 
 
4.   4   CTM and Intentional States 
Fodor’s CTM is inspired by a doctrine of mind of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries known 
as representational theory of mind, which claims that mental representations are meaningful 
symbols that reside in the mind in the form of mental analogues of spoken and written sentences, 
maps, pictures and the like. What CTM adds to this doctrine of mind is the functionalist view that 
intentional states are subjected to computational interactions, and that mental representations 
involved in token intentional states are closer to sentences of natural languages than to mental 
images. CTM can be summarised in these statements:  
 intentional states are subjected to computational relations operating on mental 
representations; 
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 intentional processes are processes involving the manipulation of mental 
representations by means of formal operations (computation); 
 mental representations belong to an innate language: the language of thought. 
According to CTM, distinct types of intentional state relations are nothing more than distinct types 
of functional relations to LOT sentences. The type of intentional state relation one bears to a 
sentence of LOT is something that depends on the functional role of the LOT sentence. Fodor 
advanced this line of thought in The Language of Thought, where he argues that mental 
representations belong to the language of thought, or “Mentalese”, and that such mental language 
has a number of salient features common to all natural languages. 
First, like sentences of natural languages, mental representations are definable in terms of tokens 
with a complex symbolic structure, which is made up of simple symbols combined in a particular 
way. Each singular syntactic constituent that contributes to forming a mental token is engaged with 
the application of specific grammatical or syntactic rules. In turn, the syntactic rules involved in the 
course of combining the distinct component parts determine how the singular grammatical 
constituents must be put together, what combination of grammatical constituents counts as 
legitimate and what does not. Second, like the syntactic rules that govern natural language, the 
syntactic rules that govern LOT are recursive: they can be employed over and over again in such a 
way that minded individuals can generate tokens that they had never previously had. There are 
some finite syntactic rules, yet infinite distinct mental tokens. This seems to suggest that LOT and 
natural languages are both productive and creative. Third, like words and sentences of natural 
languages, thoughts and mental representations are meaningful. Generally, in natural languages the 
syntactic properties of sentences play a systematic and disciplined role for meaning determination. 
Fodor believes that the same kind of meaning determination occurs in LOT. LOT is a codified 
system of mental representations with combinatorial syntax and semantics, in which the meaning of 
a given sentence is exhaustively determined by the meaning of each of its well-formed symbolic 
components.
61
 There are infinitely many distinct sentences of LOT that can be constructed, as well 
as infinitely many distinct meanings that can be expressed by mental tokens. 
Although LOT has much in common with natural languages, it should not be identified with any 
natural language. Rather, LOT would be the necessary prerequisite for learning natural languages, 
since it is involved in the acquisition of the knowledge of the meaning of words. For Fodor, to learn 
the meaning of a word is just a matter of constructing and confirming certain hypotheses about what 
that meaning represents, but there is no way to construe and confirm hypotheses unless there is a 
representational system to do so. Fodor argues that natural languages are linguistic systems used to 
communicate and represent intentional states; nevertheless, pre-verbal infants demonstrate the 
ability to engage in thought without having mastery of any natural language. From this he draws the 
conclusion that, the knowledge of the universals of LOT is an innate and necessary precondition for 
managing any natural language, and that LOT is physically embodied in the human brain at birth. 
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4.   5   CTM and Intentional Processes 
Fodor posed the question of specifying the functional role of a sentence of LOT as a matter of how 
a psychological mechanism manipulates mental tokens and LOT symbols. According to CTM, the 
mental mechanisms that manipulate LOT sentences are causal computational processes which relate 
mental states to computational or logical states by virtue of rules governing symbolic manipulation. 
This understanding of mental mechanisms can be traced back to the work of Alan Turing in 
mathematical logic and the theory of computability. 
In the 1950s Turing carried out a series of researches that inspired substantial changes in our 
understanding of the mental, as he explicitly compared specific capabilities of modern computers to 
exclusive capabilities of the human mind. For Turing, there is a certain similitude between the sort 
of reasoning and problem-solving skills exhibited by computers and individuals: both have 
memories and a certain form of inductive reasoning, plus their own language necessary to 
communicate and interact with the world. The computer takes symbols as inputs and, by virtue of 
the application of certain syntactic manipulating rules, processes them and produces other symbols 
as outputs. The symbols manipulated have semantic properties, so that when the computer 
manipulates symbols the process executed results semantically, or logically, coherent. A mechanical 
device that exhibits the capacity to process the information received from the environment, and 
produce a reasonable response to it (to generate an output that makes sense), can be qualified as 
intelligent. The computer possesses an appropriate interpretation of the symbols manipulated, 
however, it has no really understanding of the meaning of the symbols manipulated but is sensitive 
only to the syntactic properties of the symbols manipulated, and to the symbol-manipulating rules 
applied. Since all the relations amongst inputs, internal processing information, and outputs are 
‘causal’ and ‘systematic’, the process of reasoning is governed by mere syntactic generalisations. 
Turing’s theory of reasoning  provided important inspiration for Fodor's development of CTM as a 
theory of mental processes involved in our intentional practices. For Fodor, thinking is the act of 
employing certain syntactic operations to the content of mental representations. If the syntactic 
properties of mental representations are responsible for the process of reasoning, we may consider a 
Turing machine able to manipulate mental tokens through a series of operations which correspond 
to a semantically coherent logical calculus. The Turing machine elaborates information reasonably, 
given the operations performed by certain syntactic rule-governed transformations over symbolic 
strings. When an intentional process occurs, a computational mechanism (the software) embodied 
into the hardware (the brain) takes a sentence of LOT as input and generates a sentence of LOT as 
output, in a way that results logically coherent. As the symbolic constituents of that LOT sentence 
have semantic properties which are tracked by corresponding syntactic properties, then the syntactic 
manipulation of mental content is sufficient to cause behaviour: 
“If you say '19' when I say '7 plus 12, please', your reply could undoubtedly be explained in part in 
reference to your knowledge of numbers. But this is not enough, given that, after all, knowledge 
does not translate into behavior in virtue of only the content of propositions. It seems evident that 
mechanisms are needed which put into action that which is known, mechanisms which have the 
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function of making the organization of behavior conform to the propositional structures which are 
known.”62 
On Fodor’s view, the logical coherence of psychological processes is strictly related to the capacity 
to obey the principles of mental composition that specify the symbols of LOT, the meaning of their 
constituents, and the syntactic rules that operate over such symbols. Fodor says that this level of 
symbolic abstraction is reached by codified systems that meditate in the right set of causal and 
systematic relations to specific physical inputs, inner mental states and physical outputs. Then, for 
any mental state type M, CTM specifies a function F that M plays in the global economy of a 
computational system S. The functional state R can be faithfully reproduced in a number of different 
physical hardware configurations, given that its realization prescinds from the physical substrate 
that implements it. If two physically instantiated intelligent systems manipulate syntactically the 
structured symbols of the same language, apply the same body of symbol-manipulating rules, and 
instantiate the same functional states, then they can be understood as computationally equivalent. 
 
4.  6 An argument for CTM: concept acquisition 
I said above that the chief idea underlying CTM is that individuals predict and explain their 
behaviour due to a sort of ‘tacit knowledge’ that counts on a rich battery of concepts, causal 
generalisations over environmental conditions, intentional states and external behaviours. This tacit 
knowledge is internally structured in the brain in terms of LOT, so to generate a concept is a matter 
of having a symbol of LOT with an appropriate content. However, how do individuals acquire 
concepts in terms of LOT symbols? 
The question of concept-acquisition was addressed by Fodor in The Language of Thought. Here 
Fodor proposed his nativist view about the innateness of human internal-mental language and 
cognitive capacities. Nativism is the perspective that a thing is innate if it is present at birth or is 
acquired automatically under certain experiences. Fodor suggested generalizing the linguistic 
perspective of generative grammar articulated by Noam Chomsky, because he thinks of LOT as an 
innate language constituted of innate concepts. Most of our concepts would be as innate as the 
psychological capacities through which we recognize, identify, form, construe, correct and create 
any possible well-formed sentences of LOT. In contrast, to learn a non-innate concept is a matter of 
having an intentional description of the acquisition process, which reveals the concept-learning as 
rationally related to the experiences that gave rise to it. Fodor’s explanation of concept-learning 
coheres Chomsky’s explanation of language-learning, according to which, individuals have an 
innate knowledge of the principles of “universal grammar”. Chomsky argued that, unlike the 
knowledge of universal grammar and the related cognitive capacities, natural languages are not 
entirely innate (since competent speakers are able to learn a whole range of new concepts). 
Similarly, Fodor takes the mental processes involved in concept-acquisition as processes of 
hypothesis-testing and confirmation, so when an individual formulates a hypothesis that is 
confirmed a number of times, he will endorse it as the correct one. However, in order to test and 
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confirm the hypothesis as the correct one, the individual has to grasp a previous target concept 
related to that hypothesis: 
“Suppose, e.g., that you are a stage one child trying to learn the concept C. Well, the least you 
have to do is to learn the conditions under which something is an instance of (falls under) C. So, 
presumably, you have to learn something of the form (x) (x is C iff x is F) where F is some 
concept that applies whenever C does. Clearly, however, a necessary condition on being able to 
learn that is that one’s conceptual system should contain F. So now consider the case where C is, 
as it were, a stage two concept. If something is a stage two concept, then it must follow that it is 
not co-extensive with any stage one concept; otherwise, the difference between stages wouldn’t 
be a difference in the expressive power of the conceptual systems that characterize the stages. 
But if the stage one child can’t represent the extension of C in terms of some concept in the 
system available to him he can’t represent it at all since, by definition, his conceptual system just 
is the totality of representational devices that can be used for cognitive processing. And if he 
can't represent the extension of C, then he can’t learn C since, by hypothesis, concept learning 
involves projecting and confirming bi-conditionals which determine the extension of the concept 
being learned.”63 
Thus, learning a concept is a process that involves hypothesis-testing and confirmation, but in order 
to frame the relevant hypotheses one needs to have a previous and innate target concept to grasp. 
Fodor argues that the construction of complex concepts requires the employment of specific 
combinatorial functional operations to the simpler concepts that compose them. What children or 
adults learn when they acquire a ‘higher-stage’ concept is something that can be mentally 
represented in terms of its lower-stage concepts (given the representational powers of LOT 
symbols). If higher-level conceptual systems are acquired from lower-level conceptual systems, in 
turn, lower-level conceptual systems cannot be learned. According to Fodor, target concepts are 
necessarily innate because their content cannot be gradually acquired: 
“To say this is to say that learning the concept ‘red’ is learning something like '(x) x is red iff x is 
sufficiently similar to Ei' where Ei names some such exemplar of the color as a poppy, a sunset, 
or a nose in winter. Patently, environmental inputs could make an essential contribution to this 
sort of concept learning: viz., by supplying the exemplar. The present point is that the process by 
which one becomes acquainted with the exemplar is not itself a process of hypothesis formation 
and testing; it is, rather, the process of opening one’s eyes and looking.”64 
In The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy
65
 Fodor returned to the question of how mental 
processes are involved in concept-acquisition, suggesting that individuals acquire concepts by 
means of innate brute-causal mechanisms, instead of rational-causal mechanisms. The term brute-
causal process denotes a psychological mechanism with no intentional characterization. In 
maintaining that the body of knowledge constituted by the range of target concepts is innate, Fodor 
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advanced two arguments as confirmation of his nativist viewpoint. The first recurs to the evidence 
that concepts and thoughts are universal. Accordingly, the universality of concepts and thoughts is 
innate because individuals acquire them regardless of any learning experiences or social/cultural 
background. The second (the poverty of stimulus argument) stems from the consideration of that 
learning experience which is too poor to enable acquisition of concepts. Furthermore, Fodor’s 
endorsement of radical nativism appears in a more recent work titled Concepts,
66
 in which he claims 
that most, if not all, of our concepts are innate (including concepts as ‘red’, ‘table’, ‘carburetor’, 
‘knob’ or ‘telephone’). 
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5 
 
Mental Representation 
 
 
 1 The problem of Mental Representation 
So far we have seen how functionalism increased interest in scientific psychology, while cognitive 
psychology provided the traditional philosophical issues with empirical groundwork. In alluding to 
this linkage I have detailed the version which developed from functionalism called computational 
theory of mind, explaining that it is a physicalist theory of intentional states and intentional 
processes which resembles the theory of mind suggested by cognitive psychologists. CTM tries to 
explain the nature of ideas, concepts and mental content by postulating the actual existence of a 
system of mental representations (LOT). However, CTM has some limitations: first, it fails to 
explain why intentional states have the content they do, for example, it does not tell us why the 
belief that Santa Claus is coming to town has that particular content instead of many possible 
others. Another problem is that it does not reveal how physical properties can generate semantic or 
intentional properties. The deficiencies of CTM could threaten the project to vindicate the scientific 
status of folk psychology; to overcome the inherent limitations of CTM, Fodor therefore proposed 
adoption of an atomistic theory of content that specifies the physicalist determinants of the content 
of LOT symbols by means of mind-world causal laws and relations of asymmetric dependence 
amongst those laws. In this chapter I will introduce Fodor’s theory of content in relation to a general 
issue of intentionality: the problem of mental representation. The problem of mental representation 
can be seen as the general problem of how the mind gets a mental representation, that is, the 
problem of providing an acceptable explanation of how an inner mental state comes to represent a 
particular external object, event or fact it is about.  
 
5.   2 Naturalistic Theories of Contents 
Generally, philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists use the term mental representation for a 
hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality, or else a mental process, that 
makes use of such a symbol. Representationalism is the view that minded individuals access 
external reality by virtue of mental representations, and that the process of thinking occurs within an 
internal system of mental representations; the representationalist asserts that mental representations 
represent to the mind the physical entities of the world. How do representations come to represent 
the particular objects, events or facts that they do? 
The problem of mental representation demands the construction of a ‘naturalistic’ theory of content, 
but is a theory like this really needed? First, a naturalized theory of content would be important to 
all parts of philosophy that use or assume a theory of thought, besides being a centerpiece of 
cognitive sciences. We have seen that Fodor’s theoretical account relies on a representational 
system consisting of an internal language of thought, within which the content of thoughts is 
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represented in symbolic structures that resemble a syntax and semantics like those of natural 
languages (but on a much more abstract level). However, the mere assumption that the content of 
mental representations is an abstract object (such as a property, relation, or proposition) does not 
suffice to explain why representations come to have the content they do. The problem of mental 
representation is not just that of giving a naturalized account of the abstract content of mental 
representations, rather it is that of specifying, in naturalistic terms, the content-determining relations 
between mental representations and the abstract object they express. Amongst philosophers of 
mind, there are those who have approached this problem reasonably by speculating about the 
manner in which empirical stories turn out. This approach, which links the empirical facts about 
human knowledge-ascriptions with the facts about how intentional states are regulated, or enable, 
organisms to get around the world, is essentially the guiding line for Fodor’s Psychosemantics67 and 
Dretske’s Explaining Behavior.68 Both Fodor and Dretske consider the goal of philosophical 
theories of causation and the goal of theories of knowledge in the same kind of way.  
In fact, the debate in cognitive sciences handles two opposite naturalistic theories of content-
determination: causal-informational theories and functional theories. The causal-informational 
theories
69
 hold that the content of mental representations is grounded in the information it carries 
about what ‘does’ or ‘would’ cause it to occur. However, the main limit of the causal-informational 
approach is that physical objects (including artificial devices like thermostats and ringing 
telephones) that carry information about what they are causally related to do not represent the 
information they carry out. In other words, causal-informational relations are not sufficient to 
determine the content of a mental representation, since a representation may be caused by 
something that it does not represent at all. Causal-informational theorists have suggested two 
different ways for specifying what makes a causal-informational state a mental representation. The 
solution suggested by Fodor is to distinguish mere “informational relations” from “representational 
relations”, on the basis of the higher-order relations that the former bear to the latter.70 Fodor’s 
asymmetric dependency theory gives an explanation of why tokens of mental state types carry 
information about the external objects they represent. On the other hand, the teleological theories 
take the representational relations in terms of relations whose representation-producing 
mechanism selects by means of a ‘function’ of establishing, a function that can be achieved by 
either evolution or learning. According to this view, the mechanism by which a mental token is 
produced has the selected function of indicating the object of that specific representation: for 
example, horses cause horse-representations by means of a representation-producing mechanism 
that responds to horses. As opposed to causal-informational theories, functional theories
71
 consider 
the content of a mental representation to be (at least) partially determined by its causal, 
computational and inferential relations to other mental representations. Proponents of this account 
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generally opt for holism, the view that the content of a mental representation is determined by its 
inferential/computational relations with ‘all’ other representations; this view is in contrast to the 
view of atomism, according to which the content of a mental state depends on none of its relations 
to other mental states. 
  
 3     Fodor’s Theory of Content and Informational Semantics 
The chief aim of Fodor’s theory of content is to reinstate the naturalization project and improve 
CTM. Fodor approached the naturalization problem on the basis of CTM; in  Psychosemantics he 
argued that the meaning of a concept, or symbol of LOT, is essentially a matter of the property that 
it expresses and consequently, that concepts and symbols expressing the same property, or 
alternatively having the same reference, are semantically equivalent. According to Fodor, the 
contents of members of relevant chains of thoughts are semantically related to one another in such a 
way that the sequence of thoughts reflecting the relationship among propositions forms a logically 
valid argument:“...one of the most striking facts about the cognitive mind as commonsense 
belief/desire psychology conceives it... (is) the frequent similarity between trains of thoughts and 
arguments.”72 
 Hence, CTM takes the content of mental states to be inherent in sentences of LOT. The content of a 
LOT sentence is determined by the meaning of the symbolic components plus its syntactic 
structures. However, CTM alone does not explain everything about the intentional properties. In 
particular, it fails to explain how concepts, or symbols of LOT, express the same semantic property, 
or how physical properties generate semantic or intentional properties. Fodor supplied an atomistic 
theory of content to CTM, a theory that makes reference to the meaning of simple symbols (or 
words) of LOT, by specifying the content of mental states in non-intentional terms, that is, not in 
terms of relations between primitive non-logical symbols or other LOT symbols. This atomistic 
account specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions that lay bare the nature of intentional 
properties. Fodor thinks that the properties attributed to intentional states are those generated by the 
typical properties recognized by natural sciences. 
Fodor’s theory of content is inspired by another atomistic theory called informational semantics. 
Informational semantics is an effort to understand the kind of meaning characteristic of thought and 
language as arising out of and having its source in natural meaning. The basic idea underlying it is 
that the very existence of thought, and thus the possibility of language, depends on the capacity of 
systems to transform information (normally supplied by perception) into meaning. Accordingly, the 
primary sources of meaning are located in the mind in the form of symbol-world relations defined 
in information-theoretical terms, such as source, receiver, signal, and so on (as opposed to Fodor, 
who believes that the primary source of meaning takes the form of more general causal terms, so 
that the LOT symbol ‘HORSE’ means horse because tokenings of that symbol are exclusively 
caused by horses). Informational semantics grounds the meaning in an objective notion of 
information that is used for an objective and mind-independent relation between a sign or signal 
(information a signal carries about a source is taken to be what such a signal indicates or means). It 
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is atomistic in the sense that it takes the meaning of simple and primitive symbols to be determined 
by the property that symbols causally covary with, and not by the relations that symbols bear to 
other symbols. 
 
        5.   4 The Disjunctive Problem 
The major problem of informational semantics is that it rules out the possibility of error or 
misrepresentation of the world. We might see a cow on a dark night and mistakenly think it is a 
horse: this misrepresentation would cause to us to token ‘HORSE’ instead of ‘COW’. But if we 
assume that either cows-on-a-dark-night or horses cause tokening of HORSE, then we have to 
conclude that tokening of HORSE has disjunctive content. The mistaken attribution of disjunctive 
content might be avoided if we uncover the non-intentional properties that render causal 
connections between horses and the tokening of ‘HORSE’ relevant and causal connections between 
cows-on-a-dark-night and tokenings of HORSE not. As Dretske suggested, the disjunctive problem 
can be solved if we take the content of a LOT symbol to depend upon the property with which its 
tokening covaries in the learning period.
73
 Accordingly, the causal connections that determine the 
content of a LOT symbol are those that hold in the period in which the symbol is learned. Then, our 
misrepresentations would occur when a tokening of a symbol is caused by something that does not 
have the property the LOT symbol covaries with in the learning period. However, Fodor has 
objected that there is no objective way to establish when exactly the learning period ends and the 
misrepresentation becomes true. 
Another way to explain our misrepresentations of the world makes appeal to the ideal 
circumstances, according to which, the causal connections that determine the meaning of a symbol 
are those that hold in ideal conditions. Ecologically normal situations can be specified as those 
conditions under which the perceptual mechanisms that mediate the relation between the property 
of cowness and the token ‘COW’ function optimally. On this view, misrepresentations occur when 
there are not optimal conditions to determine the real nature of external objects. For example, if an 
individual were confronted by a cow on a sunny day, he would probably not have misrepresented 
the symbol ‘COW’. This strategy affords teleology to the mental states underlying psychobiological 
functions: functioning optimally could be analyzed as a function that contributes positively to the 
survival value of the organism. The fact that the mechanism functions optimally in normal 
conditions could be taken as the evolutionary, and non-intentional, cause of its being retained and 
reproduced in the process of natural selection. Accordingly, a belief can count as a biological state 
only if it has a content that results evolutionarily relevant to a proper function. The term proper 
function here indicates the function a mechanism M selected for producing tokens of symbols S in 
response to instances of P. However, Fodor has objected that the teleological approach (Van 
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Gulick,
74
 Millikan,
75
 Dretske
76
) does not overcome the effects of the disjunctive problem; on the 
contrary, it entails that symbols have no determinate content, as there is no objective way to justify 
the preference of one of proper functions to the other for determining the content of symbols. 
According to Fodor, the strategies that recur to learning period, optimal circumstances and proper 
function do not specify (in non-intentional terms) the circumstances in which the tokening of a LOT 
symbol is caused by the kind of property which that symbol expresses. Then, to solve the 
disjunction problem, Fodor credits his theory of content, which can be formulated in this way:
77
 
A representation R expresses a property P if: 
 it is a law that P causes R; 
 if R is also caused by P*, then this causation is asymmetrically dependent upon the 
causal relation between P and R; 
 that one causal relation is asymmetrically dependent upon another means that you 
can break the former without breaking the latter, but not the other way round. 
Here the causal relation between cows-on-dark-nights and ‘HORSE’ tokens depends, 
asymmetrically, upon the relation between horse and ‘HORSE’ tokens. In other words, cows-on-
the-dark-night can cause tokenings of ‘HORSE’ if and only if there are horses that cause tokenings 
of ‘HORSE’. Hence, the existence of the former kind of relation depends on the existence of the 
latter kind of relation, but not vice versa. 
 
        5.  5 A non-atomistic approach: Conceptual Role Semantics 
Above I dealt with some influential atomistic approaches. As I said, both Fodor’s theory of content 
and informational semantics endorse the view that the meaning of primitive non-logical symbols 
cannot be determined by causal relations between linguistic or mental symbols. The resulting 
semantics of these approaches is in contrast to that suggested by the non-atomistic theory 
called conceptual role semantics,
78
 according to which every symbol or concept that belongs to a 
system of meaningful items inherits its content from the distinctive relations it bears to other 
symbols. Following this view, we cannot have any particular concept unless we possess a whole 
battery of concepts related to it. For example, to grasp the concept of HORSE we need to have in 
our mind the concept of ANIMAL, so that we can infer from the thought ‘x is a HORSE’ the 
thought ‘x is an ANIMAL’. Conceptual role semantics locates the meaning in the relations that 
symbols have to one another or, more broadly, in the way they are related to one another, to sensory 
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input, and to motor output. This non-atomistic approach tries to explain the content of mental states 
on the grounds of epistemic-causal relations that members (concepts and thoughts) of the same 
conceptual scheme bear to one another, to sensory inputs and to motor outputs. 
However, conceptual role semantics was attacked by Fodor because it involves holism, the extreme 
logical non-atomist position that the content of concepts, or symbols, is entirely determined by the 
relations that meaningful items bear to each other in one’s linguistic/conceptual scheme. For Fodor, 
holism has complications that may undermine the viability of intentional psychology because it 
does not exclude the possibility that two individuals, or time slices of the same individual, have 
different concepts or intentional states. Consider the following example, there are two individuals, 
‘x’ and ‘y’, who are alike as regards their beliefs about dogs but in the following: x believes that 
dogs are dangerous, while y believes that they are not. As the symbol ‘DOG’ is causally linked to 
the symbol ‘DANGEROUS’ only in x’s brain, then ‘DOG’ plays a different causal role for x and for 
y. The differentiation between x’s belief (that dogs are dangerous) and y’s belief (that dogs are not 
dangerous) would lead to the holistic conclusion that symbols or concepts of the same distinctive 
language might not be equivalent in meaning. Fodor thinks that conceptual role semantics makes 
the laws of intentional psychology explanatorily inefficacious. 
Another objection regarding computational role semantics concerns the inadequacy of this account 
to explain the compositionality of mental content.
79
 On Fodor’s view, the productivity and 
systematicity of thought provide evidence for the assumption that concepts are compositional. 
According to CTM, complex concepts are compositional since the content of a mental token is 
determined by the token’s symbolic constituents and syntactic structure, that is, by the way the 
constituents are combined. Conversely, computational role semantics individuates the content of a 
LOT symbol on the basis of the causal role it plays in one’s conceptual scheme. But Fodor argues 
that the determination of the content of a LOT symbol is not a matter of individuating its causal 
role. Accordingly, unlike mental and linguistic symbols, causal roles are not compositional. This 
objection to computational role semantics echoes Fodor’s attack on the prototype theory, according 
to which, the prototype of a complex concept is not determined by the prototypes of its constituents. 
As neither causal roles nor prototypes are compositional, they cannot then be compared to concepts 
or thoughts. 
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6 
 
Mental Causation 
 
 
6.  1 The problem of Mental Causation 
In the previous chapter I introduced the issue of mental representation as the question of how the 
mind obtains a mental representation, or how inner mental states come to represent the particular 
external object, event or facts they do. Now I want to talk about another general issue of 
intentionality: the problem of mental causation. In the debate of cognitive scientists and 
philosophers of mind, the term ‘mental causation’ applies to causal transactions involving mental 
events or mental states. Although this term is generally used to refer to cases in which a mental state 
causes a physical reaction, it relates to two distinct viewpoints. On the one hand, there is the 
‘phenomenon’ of mental causation that covers cases in which the causal transaction occurs just 
among mental states themselves, such as when we entertain a series of thoughts in planning, 
remembering, solving a problem, and so on. The phenomenon of mental causation is thoroughly 
commonplace and regularly involved in our daily life; it is fundamental to our performance of 
intentional actions and central to the concepts of agency, free will, and moral responsibility. Our 
performances of intentional actions are something that we do intentionally, like when we wink to 
catch someone’s attention; while our involuntary actions, such as bodily motions, are performed 
without the occurrence of intentional processes. It seems that mental states are the direct causes of 
intentional actions, but if the phenomenon of mental causation seems obvious enough, the 
‘explanation’ of how it occurs is far from being obvious. From an explanatory viewpoint, mental 
causation is the problem of making intelligible the very idea of representation in naturalistic terms, 
and thus the problem of explaining how mental events can cause physical actions, or have causal 
effects on physical events. Originally, this problem was formulated in terms of explaining how 
immaterial minds, or souls, can interact with the body. Although nowadays philosophers of mind 
and cognitive scientists repudiate the Cartesian conception of soul, the problem of mental causation 
has not gone away, since there has been a shift in focus from the individuation of mental substances 
to the individuation of mental properties. In fact, the question of how mental properties can be 
causally relevant to bodily behaviour encounters certain putative marks distinctive of mental states, 
which pose problems for the mental states’ capacity to wield causal powers. In this final chapter I 
will examine this issue in relation to some sub-categories of problems, including: the property-
based problem; the problem of anomalism (the question of how to conform to law-like regularities), 
the problem of externalism (the question of how mental states are extrinsic to the agent’s body), and 
the problem of causal exclusion (the question of how mental states are supplanted by brain states). 
 
6.   2 The Property-Based Problem 
The main assumption that had generated problems for mental causation comes from the perspective 
of dualism. We have already encountered this doctrine in chapter 1, where I introduced the 
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fundamental distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena. As I said, dualism 
was affirmed in the modern age thanks to the reflection of Descartes, who still represents the classic 
source for defences of this perspective. While the dualist claims that the mental is not reducible to 
the physical, the reductive materialist thinks that mental phenomena are nothing more than species 
of physical phenomena consisting of physical substances, properties and laws governing behaviour. 
As opposed to the dualist, the reductive materialist does not face the problem of mental causation 
because he treats mental causation as a form of physical causation. This problem is central to the 
framework of the dualist, whose perspective comes in two principal versions: substance dualism 
and property dualism. Standard discussions also divide the issue in terms of traditional and 
contemporary problems of mental causation. 
Substance dualism is (the classic perspective that derives from the Christian tradition) the claims 
that every individual consists of both a body and a soul that can survive the destruction of the body. 
With Descartes, substance dualism found its full and developed formulation, taking the name of 
Cartesian dualism, the doctrine that the mind and the body each constitute their own substance. In 
Cartesian dualism, a substance is everything that can logically exist on its own, that is, everything 
that can be coherently conceived without having to conceive of it with anything else, whereas things 
that are not substances necessarily need to be a part of something else in order to exist. Regarding 
the mind, Cartesian dualism postulates that it has no physical features (such as shape, location, 
mass, and so on) and so no physically detectable qualities. In turn, the body has no mental features: 
it cannot think, feel or perceive. Until the nineteenth century the problem of the efficacy of mental 
phenomena was still engaged with the presumed interaction between spiritual and material 
substances. But the denial of the Cartesian ‘first-person’ perspective (the view of ourselves from the 
inside of our minds that pictures human individuals as immured within their minds, even though 
they may infer what goes on outside their minds and imagine their minds disembodied) and the 
pressing acceptance of physicalism facilitated the other form of dualism called property dualism. 
This perspective allows for the brain to think, feel and perceive, as it claims that thoughts, feelings, 
and perceptions are instances of mental properties not reducible to physical properties. Accordingly, 
a single physical property can occur in many different substances, for example, snow and bones 
share the physical property of whiteness (unlike substances, properties are repeatable). On the other 
hand, a mental property can occur in many different mental states, like beliefs and desires amongst 
other propositional attitudes, as well as sensations, pains, or itches, which are all irreducible to the 
physical. We may clarify the difference between substance dualism and property dualism in these 
terms. Philosophically speaking, a substance is something that belongs to its specific ontological 
category and must be distinguished from its attributes or properties (but also from its states, which 
are things having a property at a specific time; which in turn must be distinguished from events, 
which are ‘particulars’ with temporal parts). If substance dualism takes the mental and the physical 
as two different categories of substances, conversely, property dualism takes the mental and the 
physical as two different properties which belong to one and the same substance. 
 
6.  3  The Anomalism Problem 
If in the last century the problem of mental causation was characterized in terms of the 
contraposition between substance dualism and property dualism, contemporary discussions divide 
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the issue into three principal problems: anomalism, externalism, and causal exclusion. I begin here 
with the major problem for the causal relevance of mental properties, the anomalism problem, 
which arises from the contraposition between three different assertions.
80
 Although this problem has 
its origin in Davidson’s argument of anomalous monism, it has been acknowledged by other 
philosophers, and most explicitly by Kim.
81
 
Davidson’s argument of anomalous monism tries to render consistent the following apparently 
inconsistent set of statements: the principle of causal interaction, the principle of nomic 
subsumption, and the principle of anomalism of the mental. Each statement is independently 
plausible, but taken together they generate an inconsistency. Generally, on a view of causal 
relevance a property is causally relevant only if it is nomically subsumed, that is, only if it appears 
in a strict law. According to the principle of nomic subsumption, all states that events relate as 
causes and effects fall under strict deterministic laws. This means that a cause has the capacity to 
produce an effect only in virtue of a law-like generalization that applies to that effect. Suppose we 
have two different types of events. Take the event c to be of the type F (c has the property F), and 
the event e to be of the type G (e has the property G); then, property F is causally relevant to 
property G only if there is a law to the effect that events of type F cause events of type G. On the 
other hand, the principle of causal interaction is the statement that mental causation occurs when (at 
least) some mental events causally interact with physical events. But the basic root of the 
anomalism problem is the principle of anomalism of the mental, a statement that includes all the 
generalisations of folk psychology. Accordingly, there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis 
of which mental events we can predict or explain, because, there are no laws which connect mental 
properties with physical properties. If strict laws are necessary for causal interaction (nomic 
subsumption) but no law couches in mental terms (psychophysical anomalism), then mental events 
cannot have causal powers (as opposed to causal interaction). Davidson endeavors to solve this 
inconsistency with token physicalism, the view that mental events are causally efficacious by virtue 
of some token-identity with causally efficacious physical events. However, Davidson’s construal of 
causation was roundly criticized with a number of pressing objections, and his endorsement of 
token physicalism has been interpreted as leading to epiphenomenalism, the view that mental 
properties are causally irrelevant.
82 
 
6.  4  Epiphenomenalism and some hypotheses of solution 
The threat of epiphenomenalism posed by the argument of anomalism can be summarised as: if 
only properties that appear in strict laws are causally relevant (nomic subsumption), but mental 
properties do not appear in strict laws (anomalism), mental properties are not causally relevant at all 
(epiphenomenalism). To avoid epiphenomenalism various strategies have been pursued. 
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Some suggest returning  to ceteris paribus clauses; this strategy maintains that mental property M of 
event f is causally relevant to physical property P of event e, if and only if, there is a strict causal 
law connecting M with P, or a non-strict law connecting M with P. However, it might be objected 
that ceteris paribus clauses may render laws vacuous, and that we thus need to replace such clauses 
with explicit statements that make reference to strict laws.
83
 Another more radical objection is that 
mental properties are not the kind of properties that appear in laws, strict or otherwise. Some 
considerations have been availed in support of this skeptical view, in particular, those made by 
proponents of simulation theory (the view that mental states are attributed to an agent by placing 
one’s self in the agent’s situation, that is, a psychological process that does not require the existence 
of mental laws).
84
 But others assume that despite the fact that mental properties may be the kind of 
properties that appear in laws, they cannot avoid the problem of causal exclusion. 
Another way to solve the anomalism problem was suggested by LePore and Loewer,
85
 and 
Horgan,
86
 who try to capture the causal relevance of mental properties by recurring to 
counterfactuals. According to the strategy of counterfactual causal relevance, the effect is 
counterfactually dependent upon its cause, in the sense that a mental property is causally relevant 
only if its non-occurrence means that the effect also would not have occurred: 
property M of event c is causally relevant to property P of event e if: 
 a) c causes e; 
 b) c has M and e has P; 
 c) if c did not have M, then e would not have had P; 
 d) M and P are metaphysically independent. 
The appeal to causation in a) does not render this partial analysis circular because the analysis is for 
causal relevance, not causation per se. If condition b) highlights the role of properties in causal 
transactions, condition c) states the counterfactual relation between the properties that allegedly 
suffices for one’s being causally relevant to the other. Conversely, condition d) comes from the 
Humean view that logically or metaphysically connected properties cannot stand in a causal 
relation, and so it is given to ensure that M and P are candidates for causal relevance. However, 
some criticized this strategy because the mere holding of counterfactuals does not secure the causal 
relevance of mental properties. Accordingly, the counterfactual dependency of bodily motion G 
upon mental properties F is not exhaustive since it does not suffice for F’s causal relevance to G.87 
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6.   5 The Exclusion Problem 
Another problem with the causal efficacy of mental states is the exclusion problem, which can be 
introduced in the following terms. Mental states bring about behaviour in virtue of the causal role 
they play in psychological processes; nonetheless, the states of our neurophysiological system seem 
to be fully sufficient to bring about all bodily motions. If the neuronal correlates of mental states 
were fully equipped to perform all the causal work, it is unclear what role mental states should have 
given. If physiological facts are definitely sufficient to account for action, mental states are then 
superfluous. The exclusion problem points out the presumed causal and explanatory irrelevance of 
mental states, because brain states make them superfluous. It can be laid out as follows:
88
 
1. Exclusion: If a property F is causally sufficient for a property G, then no property distinct 
from F is causally relevant to G, barring overdetermination. 
2. Closure: For every physical property P, there is a physical property P* that is causally 
sufficient for P. 
3. Dualism: For every mental property M, M is distinct from P*. 
 
4. Epiphenomenalism: For every physical property P, there is no mental property M that is 
causally sufficient for P. 
The scheme above does not subscribe to any particular view about the nature of causation or its 
relationship to laws, but just invokes metaphysical considerations on the largely held physicalist 
principle of causal closure. The simple reference of this principle is that the physical realm is 
causally closed, complete and comprehensive, in the sense that, all phenomena that inhabit it 
necessarily have a prior physical story. This highly intuitive claim entails that every special sciences 
force, law or generalisation can be classified on the basis of physics. So every special science would 
be delimitated to a specific domain of objects, events, properties and states of affairs, having its 
own theoretical vocabulary delimitated to a respective range of phenomena. However, psychology 
does not seem to satisfy this condition, because mental properties can hardly be reduced to physical 
properties, neither can mental causes be equated with physical causes. To avoid epiphenomenalism, 
the view that mental states and events play no role in causal chains, several strategies have been 
pursued:
89
 
 Reduction Strategy: For every mental property M, there is a physical property P with 
which M can be reductively identified. 
 Supervenience Strategy: mental properties supervene upon physical properties, and 
supervening properties can be causally relevant if their base properties are causally 
relevant. 
 Realization Strategy: mental properties are realized by physical properties, and 
mental properties are causally relevant if their realizing base properties are causally 
relevant. 
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 Dual Explanandum Strategy: there are different ways to explain how M and P are 
causally relevant. 
I will report these principal lines of response to the exclusion problem. 
 
6.  6 Reductive Strategies vs. Non-reductive strategies 
Unless we opt for mind-body dualism (the view that in no case mental properties can be reduced to 
physical properties) we need to individuate which physical and intrinsic facts are determinant to 
individuals’ mental experiences. How does psychology, whether scientific or folk psychology, 
classify mental states on the basis of properties that crucially depend on physical properties? In 
principle, there are two ways to relate ‘systematically’ mental properties to physical properties. The 
first kind of systematic relation is a strict identity relation between relevant prima facie mental 
properties and physical properties, and it is usually held by both the identity-theorist and the 
reductive materialist who state that mental properties are identical to our intrinsic physical 
properties. However, problems with this kind of relation arise because there is an identity and 
explanatory gap between mental properties and physical properties. If the type-identity theorist 
reductively identifies mental property M with physical property P, conversely, the functionalist 
argues for the thesis of multiple realizability of mental states and mental properties.
90
 According to 
the functionalist, there are many different physical properties - P1, P2, …, Pn - each of whose 
instantiation can suffice for the instantiation of its corresponding mental property M. Here the 
upshot is that multiply realizable mental properties should not be identified with, nor reduced to, 
physical properties (if P1 and P2 are distinct realizers of M, M cannot be identified with either P1 
or P2). 
An attempt to accommodate the multiple realizability argument is provided by the viewpoint of 
disjunctive reduction, according to which M can be reduced to the disjunction of all the physical 
property realizations (P1 or P2 or … Pn), so that generalisations of the form “M if and only if (P1 
or P2 or … Pn)” hold as a matter of law. Some have objected that the disjunctive reduction is 
committed to disjunctive properties unsuitable for appearing in physical laws.
91
 A variation of this 
approach called local reductionism takes M to be reduced to a single physical kind P relative to 
some species S, giving us laws of the form: 'S only if (M if and only if P)'. Nevertheless, this account 
seems to compromise the idea that mental properties are species-invariant, as it holds the claim that 
mental states might be caused by the same kind of mental properties in humans, Martian, or 
computers. Another way to preserve the identity-relation, while pursuing a strategy that is similar to 
the ones just sketched, is the trope strategy.
92
 According to this approach, the term property can 
refer either to what characterizes an object, or to what unifies several objects. Properties that appear 
in a multitude of different objects are types, namely, the unifying properties that all creatures share, 
whilst tropes are the characterizing and particularized instances of properties unique to each object. 
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Unlike tropes, types are repeatable, but they are not taken to be the sort of properties efficacious in 
the production of behaviour; this role is occupied by tropes. The essential idea underlying the trope 
strategy is that it is not mental properties that are reduced per se but rather their instances or tropes, 
so m-trope and p-trope are taken to be one and the same trope falling under two types: the mental 
and the physical. However, one might reasonably ask if tropes are causally relevant in virtue of their 
being mental tropes as opposed to their being physical tropes. Apparently, the same underlying 
epiphenomenalist implications that plague Davidson’s token-physicalism can be raised for the trope 
approach. 
On the other hand, the second kind of systematic relation is a relation of non-causal determinations 
among distinct families of properties, including mental properties, that metaphysically supervene 
upon physical properties. The supervenience relation entails that every change, or difference, which 
occurs in a mental property necessarily supervenes upon some change that occurs in a physical 
property: 
“Necessarily if something has any mental property M, there is a physical property P such that the 
thing has P, and necessarily anything with P has M; where the notion of necessity in play is taken 
to be metaphysical necessity.”93 
This second kind of systematic relation is held by non-reductive physicalists. Despite ensuring a 
sort of causal dependence between the mental and the physical, it risks being threatened by the 
principle of causal closure. If the physical realm is causally ‘closed’, everything occurring in it must 
have a physical causal ancestry that is sufficient for its occurrence. This essential condition is 
required for the very wide range of properties accounted for by the typical methods of special 
sciences; nevertheless, mental properties do not intuitively satisfy such a condition. If it is true that 
mental facts supervene upon physical facts, then for any given mental event, there might be two 
possible causes which are both responsible for the occurrence of that event. But this claim violates 
the principle of no over-determination, according to which no event can be determined by two or 
more causes. The contradiction might be avoided if we assume that mental properties are realized 
in, or constituted by, physical properties that lay the ground for their occurrence. However, Kim has 
argued that the thesis of multiple realizability requires that physical effects are over-determined.
94
 
His argument for explanatory/causal exclusion threatens the assumption that mental properties are 
irreducible entities.
95
 Accordingly, the assumption that mental-functional property x is realized, or 
instantiated, into a system S in virtue of its having the physical property y entails that the effect 
produced by S has two possible and independent causes: the mental property that causes S’s action, 
and the physical property that realizes that mental property. Unless we assume that x’s functional 
role is excluded by the work carried out by y, S’s behavior will be systematically over-determined. 
Kim draws the conclusion that non-reductive physicalism relies on mental properties whose 
explanatory-causal relevance is systematically excluded at the fundamental physical level, whilst 
reductive materialism can avoid epiphenomenalism. 
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6. 7 The Dual Explanandum Strategy 
The problem of exclusion presents us with the picture that physical properties alone are sufficient to 
produce some behaviour, and thus mental properties must either find a way to do the work that their 
physical realizers already do or face exclusion. An attempt to preserve causal relevancy of mental 
properties from a non-reductive viewpoint can be found in Dretske, who believes that mental 
properties enjoy causal relevance in their own right without being threatened by exclusion. On 
Dretske’s view, the mental and physical are causally relevant to different properties of the effect. 
Although psychological and physical explanations accomplish different theoretical objects, such 
objects are not in competition with each other because the causal relations they track are themselves 
different relations. 
The line of thought underlying Dretske’s dual explanandum strategy is that causation cannot be 
separated from the explanatory schemes that are expressed in it.
96
 Every event is supposed to have 
two causes that satisfy different types of explanatory interests. The triggering cause is the kind of 
cause explained by physical explanations. It tells us how a behaviour came about but does not 
explain why an individual performs that particular behaviour instead of others. Conversely, the 
structuring cause gives us this explanation. Let me clarify the difference between these two kinds of 
causes with a simple example. Consider a simple mechanic artifact, like a thermostat programmed 
to turn on the furnace when a certain temperature is registered. The thermostat’s performance that 
switches the furnace on due to the cool temperature of the room is something that occurs due to the 
triggering cause, while the wires connecting the thermostat to the furnace are the set of pre-existing 
background conditions that allow for the triggering cause to exert that particular effect, that is, the 
structuring cause. Dretske assumes that, just as the thermostat relies on internal sensors calibrated to 
turn on the furnace when a particular temperature is registered, individuals rely on an internal 
representational system coordinated with the motor system to trigger the appropriate bodily 
movement when an internal state occurs in it. A strength of the dual explanandum strategy is that it 
takes mental properties and their physical realizers to be part of separate and autonomous causal 
lines, although this account maintains an unique explanandum for both explanations. But the claim 
that an act of behaviour has a mental origin that is compatible with, but is equally irreducible to, a 
physical origin is ambiguous. The assumption that an effect can be produced twice, once directly by 
M and another indirectly by P, entails that it is systematically over-determined. According to Kim, 
epiphenomenalism would in any case ensue from the problem of explanatory exclusion. Even if 
putative mental causes can determine the subject’s actions, psychological explanation of a non-
reductive type cannot give a different causal story than that operating at the neurophysiologic level. 
All the causal work is done at the neurophysiologic level, so there is just one real causal explanation 
that provides the real causal story. 
 
6.  8 The Externalism Problem 
Another version of the problem relating to the causal relevance of mental properties is the 
externalism problem. So far as we have assumed that mental properties are properties in virtue of 
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which mental states have a content which represents some aspects of physical reality and which 
figures in the production of behaviour. Mental states have causal powers that cohere with their 
content, and the causal processes which involve them are typically rational. Basically, we can 
distinguish between two different kinds of mental content. On the one hand, narrow content is 
content entirely determined on the ground of the agent’s intrinsic properties; on the other hand, 
broad content is content determined on the grounds of the agent’s extrinsic properties. The 
dichotomy between narrow content and broad content gave rise to two different semantic theories. 
Internalism is the theory of content that assigns mental causation to an individual’s intrinsic 
properties. The internalist argues for the thesis of local causation, assuming that a thing can have 
causal power (some capacity, or disposition, to produce effects) exclusively on the basis of its 
intrinsic features. Though facts about the environment might affect one’s actions they have causal 
relevancy because they supervene upon intrinsic facts. Conversely, externalism individuates the 
content responsible for behaviour on the ground of causal, social, and historical relations that people 
bear to their surrounding community. The externalist rejects the thesis of local causation in favor of 
the thesis of broad causation; he refuses to accept the claim that meaningful states owe their 
meaning to their intrinsic make-up because, on his view, the content of our thoughts is extrinsically 
rendered. According to this view, besides the kind of neurological causation involving bodily 
motions, there is a kind of mental causation individuated on the basis of broad content. But if 
causation involves intrinsic features of physical objects and events, it is difficult to see ‘extrinsic’ 
mental properties as genuine causes of physical actions. How could content individuated by 
extrinsic mental properties make causal difference? The problem with externalism is that, whenever 
we try to explain  behaviour by appeal to extrinsic content there is a local and intrinsic property that 
is available as a ‘causal surrogate’ to produce that behaviour. The principle of completeness entails 
that physical causes and physical effects are either spatially connected to each other, or mediated by 
things that spatially link them together. Actions which are physically disconnected from their causes 
cannot be possible, and this point alone highlights the externalist problem: since intrinsic surrogates 
are always needed for mental causation, why should we assume the causal relevance of broad 
external content? 
 
6.  9 The ‘Twin Earth Argument’ 
Hilary Putnam has proposed one of the most prominent arguments in defense of causal efficacy of 
broad content. His twin earths argument
97
 was designed to establish natural externalism of 
linguistic and mental content individuated on the ground of external mental properties. The 
argument begins by determining the content of reference of the very familiar word water. Imagine 
the existence of a ‘twin earth’ perfectly identical to Earth except that instead of a physical substance 
called water, and defined using the chemical compound of ‘H2O’, on this 'twin earth' there is a 
similar substance with many common features and functions. Like water, this substance is 
drinkable; falls from the sky; fills lakes, rivers and oceans, and so on. However, it has a different 
chemical compound,  for example XYZ. This ‘twin earth’ is also populated by individuals perfectly 
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identical to us who share most of our intrinsic and indistinguishable properties. For example, they 
are competent users of sentences of English and use the term water for the substance ‘XYZ’, 
ignoring its intrinsic physical structure. But if in 1750 an earthling mysteriously found himself on 
twin-earth and were confronted with the substance XYZ, he would have probably used the term 
water for XYZ. Since XYZ and H2O are quasi identical but distinct physical entities (having many 
common observable characteristics), even in the counterfactual case of the twin-earthling he would 
have probably used the term water for H2O. The earthling and the twin-earthling share exactly the 
same intrinsic properties, and  their beliefs should therefore be identical too. Nevertheless, these 
intrinsically identical individuals use the same term for completely different things: when the 
earthling utters water his utterance refers to H2O; whereas, when the twin-earthling utters water his 
utterance refers to XYZ. Therefore, the utterance of water has different content for intrinsically 
identical  individuals. From this Putnam concludes that linguistic or mental references are extrinsic 
to the agent’s body, because mental or linguistic meaning fails to supervene upon the agent’s 
internal properties. 
Putnam’s argument seeks to prove the thesis of natural-kind externalism, the view that natural 
environment is fundamental for realizing the mental properties responsible for actions.
98
 According 
to Putnam, different things can have an identical natural kind. A natural kind is the kind of thing 
which items such as H2O and XYZ share, it is a common nature which is not directly observable but 
which provides us with an account of observable properties exhibited by different items. On 
Putnam’s view, when we have thoughts about natural kinds we often do not know anything about 
an object’s essential features. Rather, it is the meaning of words we routinely use in our 
environment that transfers over to the content of our thoughts. So the meaning of our thoughts 
cannot be restricted to the object’s internal factors. A variation of this view known as social 
externalism was proposed by Burge.
99
 Social externalism claims that social institutions play a role 
in determining the content of our thoughts about many kinds of things, including those that do not 
involve natural kind concepts. This view stresses the contribution made by social environment in 
which some individuals are more expert than others about what is (and what is not) included in the 
concepts mentioned above, and it takes the meaning of thoughts to depend on intrinsic properties 
plus our social expert opinions. 
 
6.  10 Broad Causation vs. Narrow Causation 
Above I reported one of the greatest arguments for wide causation, now I want to turn to Fodor’s 
argument for narrow causation.
100
 Fodor’s conceptual role (or procedural-semantics) approach is 
committed to individuating the content of mental representations underlying mental causation on 
the basis of intrinsic properties. Although Fodor does not exclude mental states having broad 
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contents (contents which stand in some complex environmental relations to our surroundings), he 
argues that a notion of ‘narrow content’ is necessary for psychology.  
Fodor’s argument can be reported in these terms. Suppose you insert a quarter of dollar into a 
vending machine. The coin inserted has a wide range of intrinsic properties, such as size, colour, 
design, texture, and so on, which are all common to whatever coin is accepted by the vending 
machine. Furthermore, it has a wide range of external properties such as value, provenance, 
individual history, and so forth. According to Fodor, properties that stand in some kind of relation 
to external facts do not affect the vending machine, so the coin’s extrinsic properties (like its 
provenance or history) are causally irrelevant to the actions it performs. Conversely, the coin’s 
intrinsic properties, like its size, design, or texture, are properties that can affect the behaviour of the 
vending machine. Fodor argues that the mind works like a vending-machine: it has either extrinsic 
or intrinsic properties, but produces responses only to the incoming stimuli coming from the latter. 
According to him, narrow content is the kind of content that supervenes upon the intrinsic make-up 
of physically identical individuals. If taken in the same environment, the earthling and his duplicate 
will achieve parallel results despite having different wide contents, and this is because their 
thoughts have always the same narrow content with the same casual powers. Fodor explains this 
common psychological aspect by assuming that the kind of mental content that supervenes upon the 
agent’s intrinsic properties has the right kind of internal functional role to produce identical effects. 
Then he proposed a criterion of causal relevance defined on the basis of pattern of counterfactual 
dependence which cannot be satisfied by contents externally individuated:
101
 
-property M is causally relevant to behavior B if only if: 
 when M has failed to occur, then B has not occurred; 
  when M has succeeded in occurring, then B has occurred. 
In a later essay Fodor partially modified his internalist view, assuming that broad content cansatisfy 
the criterion of causal relevance, but that we have to distinguish extrinsic properties that affect twin-
individuals' causal powers from extrinsic properties that do not.
102
 However, in still more recent 
works, Fodor argued that the notion of narrow content is probably not needed in psychology.
103
 
 
6.   11  Dretske’s causal-informational theoretic approach 
A very different way to preserve the casual role of broad content can be found in Dretske’s causal 
informational theoretic approach,
104
 which reinforces the externalist view that most of the contents 
of mental states and representations postulated by folk psychology turn out to be wide contents. 
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This approach makes reference to the dual explanandum strategy, maintaining an implicit 
dependence between ‘causal’ and ‘explanatory’ relevance. The dual explanandum strategy is quite 
powerful since it promises to solve two outstanding problems of mental causation, the exclusion 
problem and the externalism problem, assuming that causation cannot be separated from the 
explanatory schemes of triggering causes and structuring causes. Accordingly, intrinsic physical 
properties are the triggering causes responsible for bodily motions (as they trigger, or initiate, a 
process ending in some bodily movement), whereas mental properties are the structuring causes 
responsible for the causal processes that constitute instances of behaviour in the brain. On this view, 
behaviour is a physical process that includes, as a component, its mental cause: if wide mental 
properties have a causal role for the fact that a mental event x can cause a process ending in some 
bodily event (movement) y, then behaviour can be understood as the whole process of x causing y. 
Dretske argues that wide content becomes causally relevant to behaviour because there is a 
“counterfactual” or “informational” dependence between mental states and facts about the 
environment. Therefore, the theoretical connections between mental and behavioural descriptions 
point to a kind of explanatory relevance.
105
 Nonetheless, this assumption gives rise to a couple of 
questions.
106
 We might ask if these causal connections really have causal relevance, given that the 
apparent relevance of the broad properties is already obtained by the narrow physical properties. If 
narrow properties do all the work in the description and explanation of behaviour, mental states 
underlying causation are sensitive to the local, intrinsic agent’s features. Then, our 
conceptualization of both causes risks being an illusion created by the way we try to assign causal, 
or explanatory, relevance to broad mental properties. This scenario motivates the original 
epiphenomenalist arguments that mental content under externalism fails to supervene upon the 
agent’s intrinsic internal properties. Another question to raise here is whether intentional states 
deliver the kind of causal relevance we need. The physical and the mental are supposed to produce 
different properties of the effect. When an individual raises her hand, the structuring of the relevant 
processes in her brain presupposes a rationalization of the hand-raising behaviour by means of the 
agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions. We expect the mental structuring processes that cause the 
hand-raising behaviour to be relevant by virtue of our intentions, but this behaviour may be the 
result of the physical triggering processes alone, that is, the result of the unconscious and automatic 
processes which occur in the brain. 
To summarise, in this final chapter I dealt with the multiplicity of problems surrounding the issue of 
mental causation: the problem of anomalism, the problem of externalism, and the problem of 
exclusion. After alluding to the established relations between physics and special sciences, I 
examined psychology as revealing the very features (including multiple realizability, higher-level 
and broad properties) that look at actual scientific practices and determine what science requires for 
acceptable causal explanation. Beyond the conceptions of causation routinely invoked in scientific 
causal explanations, the issue can be treated as a problem in applied metaphysics. Metaphysicians 
are inclined to tinker with an a priori conception of mental causation, posing apparently insuperable 
difficulties by recurring to truthmakers for psychology. Realism about the mental requires that 
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mental predicates figuring in causal accounts of behavior designate distinctively mental properties. 
The metaphysician has the goal of preserving mental truths instead of mental properties. On his 
view, truthmakers for psychological truths include the irreducibility of mental properties, and he 
seeks to give plausible truthmakers for psychological and psycho-physical claims, including claims 
about mental causation. However, the purview of the metaphysician might stand in contrast to our 
actual scientific beliefs and practices. If the aim of psychology is to show how mental properties 
can be causally relevant to physical occurrences, then our conception of causation needs to fit the 
explanations typically invoked in sciences that fall under physics. 
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7 
 
A brief conclusion to discourse of Intentionality 
 
In the first part of my dissertation I engaged in an examination of the most thoroughly canvassed 
approaches to the theories and problems of intentionality in philosophy and psychology. Starting 
from the origins of the concept of intentionality, I introduced Brentano’s account and the principal 
philosophical commitments to intentionality over the last hundred years. After this, I turned to the 
birth of scientific psychology and explored the scientific background that led to the cognitive 
revolution, and stressed the emerging field of study of cognitive sciences and the philosophical 
approach pioneered by functionalists. So far we have learnt that in the nineteenth century Brentano 
argued that intentionality is the mark of the mental. However, Brentano’s thesis that intentionality 
resists naturalization was echoed in the twentieth century. In the middle of the twentieth century 
functionalists and psychologists searched for a way for mental phenomena to be naturalized, and the 
problem of intentionality thus became the problem of explaining the mental in naturalized terms.  
In introducing functionalism, I said that it is a philosophical theory about the nature of mental states 
and mental processes which involves two major commitments: the explanatory and descriptive 
practice of folk psychology, and the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism. Yet the physicalist 
philosophers Feigl,
107
 Oppenheim and Putnam
108
 provided formulations of valid arguments in 
favour of the dominance of physics for special sciences, including psychology which must reflect 
the methods of modern sciences. In almost the same historical period as functionalists were carrying 
out their research programme, the cognitive revolution marked the birth of the interdisciplinary 
study of the mind known as ‘cognitive sciences’, in which the results of research conducted by 
cognitive psychologists, proponents of artificial intelligence, theoretical linguists, neuroscientists 
and philosophers converged. With the advent of the cognitive revolution, psychologists came to 
change their conception about the research focus of their disciplines. Shifting their central concern 
to that of explaining intentionally characterized cognitive capacities, cognitive psychologists 
postulated that the explanation of such capacities requires an appeal to central representational 
states and processes. Therefore, as I explained, the proposal of cognitive psychologists coheres with 
that of functionalism, since they both reached similar results. While endorsing the commitments of 
intentional psychology and physicalism, functionalists were expected to account for the intentional 
properties of psychological states by resorting to causal explanations similar to those used to 
explain the kinds of properties typically recognized by non-intentional special sciences. The central 
aim of functionalists was to point out the problem of establishing how and to what extent the 
contents of our intentional states can be ultimately determined by their physical properties. 
Functionalism, which can be traced back to the work of those philosophers of mind, received its 
canonical treatment in the work of Jerry Fodor, who developed the nativist view of Noam 
Chomsky. Fodor gave an account, defined in rounded terms and modern dress, of the most 
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fundamental issues of psychology and philosophy of mind, including those of mental 
representation, computation, innatism, realism, and mental efficacy. He also was engaged with 
providing a naturalistic theory of the content of intentional states, a theory that appeals to the non-
intentional properties recognized by natural sciences.  
Thus, the naturalization project is the project of construing a scientific psychological framework 
able to successfully account for the intentionality of mental states and mental processes. A theory of 
intentionality defined in these terms would demand the possibility of defining intentional properties 
as properties that can be reduced to or supervene upon physical properties, and would entail 
acceptance of the thesis that intentionality, or the ‘mental’, does in some way inhabit the physical 
domain. This claim clearly challenges Brentano’s thesis that the physical cannot generate 
intentionality, but not his thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental. In the last two 
chapters, I identified two general questions concerning the intentionality of our mental activity, and 
I therefore discussed the much-debated problems of mental representation and mental causation, 
and reported some ontological and epistemological consequences for research in developmental and 
comparative psychology. The former problem concerns determining the form of our mental 
representations. Generally, from the perspective of folk psychology, to understand representation is 
to understand representational states of mind. We have seen that folk psychology is a theory of 
mind that claims that what people know about the mind is related to the way they apply conjectures 
about other people’s minds to explain their behaviours. When we apply a theory of the mind we 
recur to a theory that helps us to answer the following question: what do we know about the mind? 
Folk psychology claims that beliefs, desires and thoughts are states of mind representing the world 
and having effects in it, because a state that represents the world causes its possessor to behave in a 
certain way. Based on this assumption, the functionalist thinks that the theory of mind postulated by 
folk-psychology is one that can be applied to human beings, animals or computers: as our 
knowledge of thoughts is derived from behaviour, then it is (in principle) possible to apply the basic 
elements of common-sense psychology to other beings too. 
Concerning the question of determining the form of mental representations, this question unleashes 
a dispute about whether all mental states are representational; that is, whether all mental states 
exhibit intentionality. Thinkers who reject Brentano’s view argue that not all mental states are 
representational, since there are mental states, like pain and bodily sensations, which have non-
representational properties. Generally, non-representational mental states are defined in terms of 
qualia. According to some identity theorists, at least some types of mental states, including those 
states like pain or the taste of an apple, ought to be identified with particular types of brain states. 
On this view, similar to the way that lightning is identified with electrical discharge, or water with 
H2O, these identifications would be necessarily a posteriori. On the other hand, the view of 
representationalism, or intentionalism, takes all mental states (in all their aspects) to be 
representational in nature. I discussed representationalism in relation to the mind-computer analogy, 
explaining that this view tries to provide a very influential contemporary answer to the question of 
the form of mental representation by assuming that the brain functions like a Turing machine which 
processes representations in a systematic way. A central assumption of the mechanical view is that 
the mind is a natural part with a regular, law-governed causal structure, which is a computational 
structure because some mental states and processes are computational. Even if computation can be 
understood in terms of representations, only those mental states which are purely representational 
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can be candidates for being computational states. In principle, the more plausible examples of 
computational states and processes are those which are essentially purely representational in nature. 
Beliefs and desires, amongst other propositional attitudes, look like the best candidates for being 
computational states of mind: their essence is to represent the world, and despite often appearing in 
consciousness, it is not essential for them to be conscious. However, the computational theory of 
mind is controversial as regards the question of whether pain is purely representational, and equally 
controversially, whether there can be a purely computational theory of pain. 
Thus far we have seen that, the computational theory of mind paints a picture according to which 
representational states are related to one another in a computational way, similar to the way that a 
computer’s representational states are processed by means of algorithmic rules. The nature of 
representational states such as belief is exhausted by how it represents the world as being, and the 
properties it has as a consequence of that. There is no reason to think, from the perspective of 
commonsense psychology, that intentional states have any properties other than their 
representational ones. But this claim leads us to the question: can the representational properties of 
mental states guarantee genuine causation of physical actions? The question introduces the issue of 
mental causation which, as I said, poses metaphysical arguments for the much-discussed property-
based problems, including Davidson’s argument of anomalous monism;109 Block’s argument 
against externalist theories of mental contents;
110
 and Kim’s argument of causal exclusion of 
intentional states. These outstanding variations of problems related to mental causation reveal the 
difficulties arising from the very features routinely invoked in causal explanations of multiple 
realizability, higher-level and broad properties. The arguments alluded to here regard mental 
causation with suspicion, suggesting a revision of our conceptions of mental causation, mental 
properties and causal powers. Worries about mental causation are tied to the question of how mental 
properties can be considered causally relevant to physical effects if they are not identical to physical 
properties. One of the main reasons for thinking that the whole idea of mental causation is not 
applicable at the level of fundamental physics concerns the claim that psychology should not be 
reduced to neurophysiology. Yet even among philosophers who are skeptical about mental 
causation at the fundamental physical level, there are those who think that causation has a firm 
place in the special sciences at least. The proposal of those philosophers of mind and cognitive 
psychologists was to demonstrate a way to link the mental with the physical so that the mental is 
not causally inept. 
The issue of mental causation brings the debate of philosophers and cognitive scientists to the 
question of the nature of mental representations, that is, the question of what it is that cognition 
covers. But another question arises from the discussions on mental causation, regarding the nature 
of cognitive architecture and processing, or rather, how cognition proceeds. There is simple 
evidence for the purpose of uncovering the cognitive architecture while subsuming our folk 
psychological practices under propositional attitudes defined in terms of mental representations. 
The evidence alluded to in the models developed by the functionalists and the cognitive 
psychologists can be introduced in these terms. Although the central mental machinery (with which 
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individuals are equipped) is sensitive to what is relevant in the environment, it has enough 
complexity to be simply characterized in terms of the mere environment. This simple evidence has 
inspired those reflecting on the nature of cognitive architecture to separate classic from 
connectionist approaches to mental architecture. Proponents of connectionist architectures and, 
more recently, of dynamic approaches to cognition have often introduced their views as avoiding 
the postulation of the sort of mental representations posited by folk psychology. The connectionist 
denies there is any structure in terms of representations and identifies the mind with the brain, 
which consists of a vast network of nodes whose different and variable excitation levels explain 
intelligent learning. Connectionism has aroused interest especially among those wary of positing 
significant ‘hidden’ mental structure not evident in ordinary behavior. In contrast to this form of 
eliminativism, classicist accounts of cognitive processing explain the nature of the basic design or 
cognitive architecture of human systems in a totally different way. The classicist endorses the view 
that ‘cognition’ is a form of computation that can be explicitly defined in terms of symbolic 
manipulation, that is to say, in terms of mental representations and the employment of functional 
rules for them. However, we need to be a bit more precise about whether the way we think is (partly 
or wholly) through computing. How do intelligent creatures, in their interaction with the world, 
process or manage information? How is the information which is managed structured? How should 
the mind of creatures that manage that information be structured? Such questions are all engaged 
with the problem of explaining how ideas, or knowledge, reach our minds. In the history of 
philosophy, this problem has been approached from two opposite poles. On the one hand, the 
experiential view tries to offer a response to the problem by assuming that ideas, and knowledge in 
general, reach our mind through experience with the world, according to the claim that mind is like 
a tabula rasa, in which the act of experiencing determines the acquisition of knowledge or ideas. 
This position is held by empiricists and environmentalists. Conversely, the innate view claims that 
either ideas or knowledge are already built into the mind at birth (in the 'black box' according to the 
classicist); this position is held by nativists and rationalists. From the perspective of cognitive 
sciences, the question of how the mind processes the information which comes from the external 
world is related to the issue of the mind’s cognitive architecture and organisation. 
In the last forty years the study of mental organisation has received special attention from many 
areas of cognitive sciences. Several studies have focused on exploring the phenomena of production 
or comprehension of language under the influence of, or by embracing, the experiential or innate 
views; it is thus no surprise that the philosophical distinction between experiential and innate views 
reflects, within the perspective of cognitive sciences, the distinction between classical and 
connectionist theories of the architecture of mind. These principal versions of the computational 
theory of mind --the classicist approach and the connectionist approach-- correspond to the main 
proposals that exist about the mind’s cognitive architecture. The areas that lend themselves most 
naturally to the computational theory of mind are those most famously associated with logic, 
commonsense and practical reasoning, as well as natural language syntax. In particular, research on 
these topics in cognitive psychology and AI has become deeply intertwined with the classical 
approach, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the computations take place over 
representations that possess the kind of logical, syntactic structure which is captured in standard 
logical form, typically based on Turing machine models. In the first 30 years of cognitive sciences, 
the computational view obtained its specific formulation following the appearance of the work 
carried out by the pioneers of AI Allen Newell and Herb Simon. According to their proposed 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
71 
 
physical symbol system hypothesis, a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient 
means for generating intelligent actions.
111
 Newell’ and Simon’s hypothesis takes the heart of 
human cognitive architecture to be formed by chains of condition-action rules defined over data 
structures expressed in symbolic terms; their model of cognitive architecture has usually been 
formulated in terms of explicit computational models that generate intelligent behaviors that 
approximate some aspect of human cognitive behavior. Variations on this general view were 
predominant in much of AI and psychology until the 1980s, when the types of behavior to which 
their computational models were applied most extensively were problem solving and reasoning. 
However, the literature of cognitive architecture has received important contributions especially in 
the recent years, following the affirmation of the approach based on syntactic rules and mental 
representations associated with Fodor
112
 and Pylyshyn. This classicist approach to cognitive 
architecture maintains the framework of LOT as computational hypothesis (according to which 
mental states are computational relations to LOT sentences, and mental processes are computational 
processes involved in the manipulation of such sentences), because it invokes representations that 
are manipulated or processed according to formal rules. The ambition to preserve the explanatory 
power of folk psychology, from a viewpoint that takes mental representations to be ‘local’ as 
opposed to ‘distributed’ in their nature, was determinant to the development of the theory of 
modularity of mind. In 1983 Fodor published his book The Modularity of Mind, in which he carried 
out an important psychological study of mental architecture in defence of LOT architecture. As we 
shall see in the next part, significantly, Fodor’s modularity thesis distinguishes the central 
processing system from the modular processing systems, providing a model of the computational 
architecture of the mind/brain which is compatible with the naturalized commonsensical account of 
mentality. 
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PART II 
Modularity and Time 
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8 
 
From Intentionality to Modularity 
 
 
 1 The Computational Theory of Mind: a model of Symbol Manipulation  
I want to begin the discussion on modularity with the question I posed at the end of the first section: 
how is the mind cognitively structured and organized to process information? Our best explanation 
for this question is to assume that the mind is a computer. The mind-computer analogy relies on 
some basic ideas. We know that a computer is a causal mechanism which contains representations 
or, still better, processes representations in a systematic way. To process information systematically, 
the mechanical device is supposed to have a language, and to possess knowledge of the rules 
governing that language. One fundamental idea of the machine metaphor concerns the abstract 
mathematical notion of computation, and another how computation can be automated. To 
understand the two ideas underlying the computational nature of representational mental states it is 
useful to appeal to the notion of Turing machine, which enables a relatively abstract specification of 
mental state types that does not pin them down to particular neural structures. Accordingly, 
representational states are related to one another in a computational way, similar to the way in 
which the representational states of a computer are processed by means of algorithmic, or logical, 
rules. If a theory of a natural phenomenon can be represented algorithmically, then it can be thought 
of as computable. The machine analogy shows that many kinds of different physical entities could 
be in the same mental state. In the context of the computational theory of mind, the term ‘cognition’ 
indicates that the concern of the theory is with cognitive processes, such as reasoning and inference, 
that link cognitive states like beliefs or desires. This provides a small explanation for why the 
computational theory of mind has been taken to form the philosophical basis for cognitive sciences. 
In 1965 Herbert Simon predicted that machines would soon be capable of doing any work that 
people could do, yet fifty years later this prediction does not appear completely plausible. Many 
thinkers remain skeptical about Simon’s claim, in particular Dreyfus113 and Searle saw the failure of 
the computing analogy (or at least its representational version) as a problem-in-principle for AI, and 
not just as a matter of time. For Dreyfus, if a computer is going to have general intelligence, that is, 
it is to be capable of reasoning about any kind of subject matter, then it has commonsense 
knowledge. However, he said that a significant part of what we call thought and behaviour cannot 
be formalized, because they cannot be reduced to explicit rules, and translated into a computer 
program. In a similar fashion, Searle launched his attack on the central thesis of AI that thinking is 
formal symbol manipulation. The upshot of the famous argument of the Chinese Room is, at the 
very least, that although we let the outside world have an impact on the room, a person in it, or the 
room alone, cannot understand any meaning or ‘semantics’ that compose Chinese. Nothing can 
think simply by being a computer because thinking itself cannot be simply symbol manipulation. If 
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it is true that nothing can think simply by being a computer, should we discard the whole idea of 
thinking computers? The question of whether commonsense knowledge can be represented in terms 
of rules and representations remains a general issue of AI, despite the fact that it is evident that a 
(more or less) consistent portion of mental phenomena is beyond the reach of those techniques 
dearest to the computationalist. Besides being dominant in a lot of the research in cognitive science, 
Fodor’s representational theory of mind is the version of the computer metaphor which forms an 
implicit methodology for much research in AI. I do not intend here to repeat the examination of the 
main ideas underlying this theory of mind, rather, for my purpose, I want to focus on the idea that 
mental representations and information processing are essentially symbol manipulation.  
The central tenet of Fodor’s mental theory is that the mind is a logic machine that operates on 
sentences from a mental language by symbol manipulation. The states of mind represent the world, 
whereas the atoms which compose mental representations are symbols that combine to form 
meaningful expressions. The symbols can be concatenated to form expressions in the language of 
thought (LOT), that is, the system of mental symbols constituting the neural basis of thoughts. This 
mental system is structured like a natural language, although it cannot be identified with any natural 
language. The content of a LOT sentence is a person's belief or thought, and a mental state is 
identified with a set of attitudes towards that sentence. This version of computationalism based on 
rules and representations claims that the mind (or any adequately programmed computing device) 
processes the following steps: it generates symbolic sentences as inputs from sensory channels, 
performs logical operations on these sentences, and transforms sentences into linguistic or non-
linguistic behaviours as outputs. The symbolic expressions representing LOT propositions have 
various logical or inferential relations to each other, and information processing therefore involves 
all computations of logical consequences. Therefore, processing the information contained in a 
mental state simply consists of computing the logical consequences of the propositional attitudes, 
using a set of inference rules. Reasoning, for example, is a process in which the syntactic properties 
of LOT symbols are causally determinant for organisms to produce behaviours as outputs. The 
syntactic or formal properties of the representations in a person or computer are interpretable as 
calculations, inferences, or pieces of reasoning, all of which are semantically interpretable. In this 
manner, semantic properties are linked to causal properties, and the content of thought is linked to 
causation of thought. This way of connecting the representational properties of thought (or its 
content) with its causal nature (or its causation) would be guaranteed by the presence of a mental 
syntax realized in the physical structure of the brain. 
The notion of ‘symbol manipulation’ receives special emphasis when considered in relation to the 
question of how the mind, in processing information, is cognitively structured and organized. This 
feeds the debate within cognitive sciences about the organization of the mind and the nature of 
mental states. In his influential book The Language of Thought Fodor defined LOT as “the only 
game in the town” because it provides the best explanation for many of the familiar properties of 
intentional states and processes. Fodor thinks that all plausible modern psychological theories of 
concept-learning, decision-making, and perception are committed to LOT. There is an undeniable 
fact about the systematic nature of the semantic properties of thought: that mental processes exploit 
systematicity in the rational transitions from thought to thought, and trains of thought have rational 
structure and causal outcomes which are dependent on this rational structure. For Fodor, the best 
way to explain systematicity of thought is LOT: systematicy and other cognitive features can be 
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explained on the basis of cognition modeling in which those regularities are explained with a certain 
kind of explanatory coherency in relation to LOT. In 1983 Fodor published The Modularity of 
Mind, in which he proposed one of the most illuminating psychological studies on the mental 
architecture as a confirmation of the framework of LOT. In it Fodor advanced an influential view in 
defence of LOT architecture which makes a fundamental distinction between input systems and the 
central system. As Fodor said, there are empirical reasons to assume that the cognitive architecture 
of mind is functionally divided into different parts. One part presents the feature defined by the term 
of modularity; Fodor argues that this part is substantially limited to perception and some aspects of 
language processing, leaving open a possible modular characterization of the motor system. In 
contrast, the part without this feature is mainly engaged with reasoning and higher cognitive 
processing. Then, explanations of mental representations may be empirically justified on the basis 
of an analysis of mental architecture in terms of modules vs. central system. 
 
 2 The dispute between Classicists and Connectionists 
Fodor’s modularity theory represents a well worked out approach to classical architecture. The 
term classical architecture, or classicism, refers to the view that whatever the particular cognitive 
architecture of the brain (that is, the specific grammar of LOT) may turn out to be, there is a 
‘necessary condition’ to be satisfied. This condition is that propositional attitudes belong to a 
representational or symbolic system so that: 
 the representations of that system must have a combinatorial syntax and semantics, 
according to which the structurally complex (molecular) representations are systematically 
built out of structurally simple atomic constituents, and the semantic content of a molecular 
representation is a function of the semantic content of its atomic constituents together with 
its syntactic/formal structure. 
 The operations on representations constituting the domain of mental processes, such as 
thinking, reasoning and so on, which are causally sensitive to the syntactic/formal structure 
of representations defined by this combinatorial syntax. 
Essentially, classical architectures
114
 employ rules and symbolic representations which have 
concatenative compositionality. On the classical view, mental architecture must include the 
nomological necessity of cognitive regularities such as productivity, systematic, and inferential 
coherence. In classical models the characterization of the notion of cognitive architecture may be 
reconstructed in these terms:  
 Cognition essentially involves representational states and causal operations of which domain 
and range are examples; and consequently, any naturalized and adequate account of 
cognition should acknowledge such states and processes. 
 Higher cognition (i.e. thought and thinking with propositional content) conceived in 
commonsensical terms has certain scientifically interesting properties: in particular, it is a 
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law of nature that cognitive capacities present productivity, systematicy and inferential 
coherency. 
 Accordingly, the architecture of any proposed cognitive model is scientifically adequate 
only if it guarantees that cognitive capacities are productive, systematic, and inferentially 
coherent. This would scientifically explain how it could be a law that cognition has these 
properties. 
 The necessary condition for a cognitive architecture to guarantee productivity (and the other 
essential cognitive features) is that it involves a representational system. 
A defence of this general reasoning can be found in both the writings of Fodor
115
 and Pylyshyn
116
, 
and most recently in their joint article Fodor and Pylyshyn: 
“The architecture of the cognitive system consists of the set of a basic operations, resources, 
functions, principles, etc. (generally the sorts of properties that would be described in a ‘user’s 
manual’ for that architecture if it were on a computer) whose domain and range are the 
representational states of the organism.”117 
In principle, we can assert that in classical models information tends to be processed serially (given 
that these models employ rules and symbolic representations which have concatenative 
compositionality in a linear sequence, like in the case of sentences) and takes place at symbolic 
level. As opposed to classical architectures, connectionist neural-network architectures do not 
require any role-governed reasoning in a language of thought but rather provide explanations for 
mental phenomena on the basis of neural network models. The approach held by the connectionist 
models the dynamics of psychological processes and phenomena at the level of neuron networks, 
rather than at the level of symbol manipulation. This approach has been formally pursued since the 
early work of Wiener and Rosenblatt in the early 80s, who proposed a model of cognitive 
architecture radically different to that of LOT. According to connectionists,
118
 the realization of 
personal-level representations (thoughts) and processes (inferences) has to be implemented in the 
brain and central nervous system, and not directly at the level of intentional states. Mental states are 
realized by patterns of activation within a network of simple processors called nodes, and mental 
processes principally consist of the spreading activation of such patterns. Unlike the classical 
symbolic structures, which have evaluable semantic constituents, connectionist nodes are not 
semantically evaluable, nor do the relative patterns have semantically evaluable constituents. 
Within connectionist architectures, processing information does not refer to explicit representations 
and rules (thus, representations do not need to be concatenative), but is parallel distributed (rather 
than ‘serial’) and takes place at sub-symbolic level (instead of at the ‘symbolic level’). The 
connectionists advance this model of the architecture of the cognitive mind by arguing that it 
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consists of layered networks of interconnected (abstract) neurons. The elements whose 
manipulation drives computations in the connectionist network are no more than the connections 
between these nodes, which are neither semantically evaluable nor semantically compositional. As 
mental representations are computational distributed (whereas, according to the classicist, they are 
computational atomic), then processing information is typically massively parallel. 
This understanding of processing information in terms of the distribution of ‘weights’ among 
connected nodes (and not in terms of the formation of hypotheses and the relative confirmation of 
those hypotheses) more closely resembles the features of actual human cognitive functioning, like 
learning (in which the connectionist network is trained through repeated exposure to the objects 
which it must learn to distinguish). However, this alternative model of mental architecture was 
strongly criticized by defenders of classical architectures, according to whom, connectionism is just 
a new and more sophisticated way of reviving  the old and long dead theory of associationism. 
Classicists  argue against connectionism by appealing to the peculiarities of language. According to 
LOT, complex representational mental states can potentially be generated  infinitely from a finite 
stock of primitive representational states, just by using recursive formation rules in accordance with 
the linguistic capacities of natural languages. The combinatorial structure of language can be 
explained only if we take into consideration the properties of productivity and systematicy of a 
given system of mental representation. Such properties of thought and thinking are explained by 
means of the content of the representational units, and of their compositionality within contentful 
complex mental representations. Semantics of both language and thought are compositional insofar 
as the content of a complex representation is determined by the contents of its constituents plus its 
structural configuration. The classical arguments of the productivity and systematicy of language 
are supported by the innate character of both language and thought. LOT claims that language and 
thought share innateness, in addition to the recursive capacities of productivity and systematicy. 
This line of thought is defended by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their joint article, in which they proposed 
an argument in defence of the truth of classical mental architectures. According to this influential 
argument, mental representations are explanatorily necessary and can be realized in connectionist 
architecture, but the reverse is not true. The most forceful criticism of connectionism concerns the 
fact that this account fails to adequately explain the law-like cognitive regularities of productivity, 
systematicy, and recursion of language, without postulating the LOT architecture. Hence, both 
classical or connectionist architectures need to satisfy the necessary condition for successfully 
explaining the typical features of language. Although the connectionist model can do so, it is, 
however, simply implementing the classical LOT architecture. Otherwise, we must conclude that it 
cannot guarantee productivity, systematicy and inferential coherency, and as a result is empirically 
false. In short, despite the connectionist network resembles features of human cognitive 
functioning, it has evident difficulty explaining properties such as productivity and systematicy, or 
fundamental learning processes like language acquisition. However, even if connectionist models of 
mental architecture could explain productivity, systematicy, and the other essential cognitive 
features, they would have little new to offer. Hence, connectionism could be both true as an 
implementation theory of the classical architecture, and false as a theory of cognitive architecture, 
but, even in the best case scenario it does not constitute a radically new way of modelling cognition. 
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9 
 
    The Theory of Modularity of Mind  
 
 
 1 The Modularity Thesis and the notion of Module  
Now I want to focus on Fodor’s psychological work on mental architecture. Fodor’s modularity 
thesis appeared for the first time in the book The Modularity of Mind,
119
 in which Fodor advanced 
an interesting view of the architecture of mind, and which contains an extensive discussion of 
research in cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics. The question posed by Fodor about the 
viability of the modularity thesis is principally an empirical one which is more closely related to 
debates in psychological research than to philosophical speculation. However, this theory of mental 
architecture has significant conceptual implications, given that it goes much beyond the ideas 
proposed in The Language of Thought.
120
 
The central tenet of the modularity thesis remains that of assuming the mind to be not a single 
homogeneous processing system, but rather a complex processing system comprising several task-
specific sub-systems, which in turn operate relatively independently of one another. Fodor 
distinguishes between three functionally distinct types of mental mechanisms or sub-systems which 
give the mind its overall structure: input/output systems (modules), transducers and the central 
system. The central system is the domain of beliefs, desires and the like; this is the cognitive part of 
the mind which is concerned with belief-fixation and higher-level processing (including general 
reasoning, problem solving, constructing scientific explanations, and so forth). Fodor insists that the 
processes executed by the central system are global and holistic (which is why he thinks that such 
processes are not easily amenable to investigation by cognitive science). On the other hand, the 
second functional part is that occupied by the transducers, which are at the interface between the 
mind and the world. Transducers are principally divided into two types: a) input transducers take 
physical and non-symbolic inputs from the environment and produce symbols as outputs; and b) 
output transducers take symbols as inputs and transform them into non-symbolic outputs. 
Transducers are supposed to carry out a fundamental function: they are what prevent the mind being 
isolated from the world. The mind connects informationally with the external world only in virtue 
of transducers, which perform their job automatically and not by means of computation. In other 
words, to determine what output must be produced, transducers work without any application of 
symbols manipulating rules. Finally, the third part of the mental architecture is that functionally 
occupied by the input/output systems or modules, which stand between the transducers and the 
central system. Fodor defines every perceptual input system (for example, visual system, auditory 
system, etc.) as a relatively isolated mental module. Accordingly, mental modules are domain-
specific, informationally encapsulated sub-systems of the mind which contrast with the central 
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system. Input-systems take the symbolic output of input-transducers as their input and produce 
representations of the external world as output; their principal function is therefore to represent the 
world, rendering information accessible to thought.
121
 In extrapolating the required information, 
input-systems do their job merely on the basis of pure computation, according to inferential rules 
that establish how the external world must be given the deliverances of the transducers that feed 
them as inputs. Input-systems generate representations of the external world in the form of symbols 
(resulting in the tokening of a belief), and these representations are fed into the central system. In 
turn, output-systems take their inputs in the form of symbols from the central system, and deliver 
their outputs to output transducers. In principle, output systems are involved in motor coordination 
and control, since their function is essentially that of instructing the body to move in a specific way 
during the performance of an action. As Fodor does in his book, we are going to be mainly focused 
on the input systems, that is, on the perceptual modules.  
Fodor refers to the modular part of mental architecture in terms of peripheral cognition, which  
contrasts with central cognition. He individuates the input-systems as the domain of the 
mechanisms underlying our unconscious abilities, defining them as singular and physically-
structured modules. The idea that individual mental faculties can be precisely associated with 
specific physical areas of the brain originates in the ideas of Franz Joseph Gall (who can be 
considered the founder of the 19
th
 century movement known as phrenology). This intuitive idea has 
been developed by Fodor into a theory constructed in the context of cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science. More particularly, Fodor claims that the inspiration for his modular thesis came 
from results obtained by the linguist Noam Chomsky and the psychologist David Marr. What does 
the term ‘module’ mean? Fodor uses the term ‘module’ to describe something that  in terms of 
structure and function, is very similar to the organs discussed by Chomsky. On Chomsky’s view, an 
organ (or module) denotes a body of innate knowledge. Chomsky proposed that there is such a 
module for language acquisition. He regarded the language system as a module whose development 
is genetically determined and which utilizes a body of innate specified information. In a similar 
fashion, Fodor used the notion of module to mean a functionally defined part of the mind that is, in 
important respects, independent from the ‘central system’ responsible for beliefs and reasoning. 
However, the acceptation of ‘module’ given by Fodor is different to that of Chomsky. To a large 
extent, the difference between their acceptations concerns the fact that Chomsky made no 
commitment to the fundamental properties assigned to modules by Fodor, as described in the next 
section. For Fodor, the functional mental architecture consists of a modular part involving relations 
between input-systems connected to the five senses and input-systems connected to language, 
together with the ‘central system’. Furthermore, Fodor’s modularity thesis was influenced by 
Marr’s theory of visual systems, which assumes the visual system to be divided into a number of 
more specialized sub-modules. 
 
 2 The Fundamental Features of Modularity 
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In his modularity thesis Fodor offers a list of principal features which, taken collectively, 
characterize the type of input-system. These characteristics of modularity can be reported as 
follows:  
Domain-specificity. Fodor argues that modules are domain specific, in the sense that they are only 
sensitive to specific kinds of inputs. A perceptual input/output system is domain specific to the 
extent that it has a restricted subject matter and uses information only in a restricted cognitive 
domain. It is specialized in that it responds to certain inputs, and usually has its own sensory 
transducers through which it processes information about a class of objects and properties which is 
circumscribed in a relatively narrow way. In this way modules are limited to a particular type of 
inputs, and according to Fodor this is the reason why modules are as efficient as they are: 
“domain specificity has to do with the range of questions for which a device provides answers 
(the range of inputs for which it computes analyses)”122   
Domain-specificity mechanisms are typically more fine-grained than sensory modalities like vision 
and audition. This appears clear from Fodor’s list of plausibly domain-specific mechanisms, which 
includes systems for color perception, visual shape analysis, sentence parsing, and face and voice 
recognition, none of which seems to correspond to perceptual or linguistic faculties in an intuitive 
sense.
123
 
Mandatoriness. Fodor argues that modules are mandatory in the sense that they process operations 
automatically, that is to say, not under conscious control. Modules tend to be mandatory in the 
sense that the operations they carry out are switched on by presentation of the relevant stimuli, and 
these operations run to completion. Visual or auditory illusions provide perhaps the best example of 
this characteristic. If the appropriate stimulus is presented and seen or heard, the illusion will be 
seen or heard. To illustrate this characteristic of modularity, Fodor gives three examples. First, he 
thinks that hearing a sentence as grammatical or not is a matter of being mandatory. If someone 
hears a given utterance in a known language, she will hear a sentence and give it meaning. English 
native speakers cannot hear the sounds of a sentence in English as mere noise, rather they hear the 
sounds only as English. If they hear an utterance in English, they will attribute meaning to that 
utterance. A second example concerns the objects we perceive ‘spatially’. Any object perceived is 
perceived in a three-dimensional space: it is not possible to see a 3D array of objects in space as 2D 
patches of colour. Thirdly, Fodor claims that touching a surface involves feeling it; that is to say 
that people can only see or touch things in a certain way. There is no way for an individual to avoid 
seeing when her eyes are opened, neither can she avoid feeling when touching an object. According 
to Fodor, various examples of this sort can be given for other types of modules (including the higher 
level module for speech recognition). 
Inaccessibility to central monitoring. Fodor argues that modular processes are not centrally 
accessible, and this means that an individual cannot have introspective knowledge of their 
workings. As centrally inaccessible systems are those input-systems whose internal processing is 
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obscure to introspection, then their outputs are accessible only to other modules, or to central 
cognition. An input-system is centrally inaccessible if the intermediate-level representations which 
it computes before producing its outputs are inaccessible to consciousness and equally unavailable 
for explicit reporting. It is important to note that the mark of inaccessibility is analogous, in 
important respects, to that of informational encapsulation. Both characteristics are pertinent to the 
nature of informational flow across computational mechanisms, however, they work in opposite 
directions. Inaccessibility specifies that representations within a module are not accessible to central 
processes; conversely, informational encapsulation establishes that modules cannot have direct 
access to the content of either central cognition or other modules. Fodor gives the example of visual 
modules: they do not have access to our knowledge (or cognition) that a given picture is an optical 
illusion, and when such an optical phenomenon is presented to us the illusion persists. From this 
Fodor draws the conclusion that we cannot consciously affect the inner workings of the module, 
because there is no direct way of affecting it. In short, encapsulation entails restriction of the flow 
of information into a mechanism, whereas inaccessibility entails restriction of the flow of 
information out of it. 
Speed. Speed is perhaps the emblematic characteristic of modularity. Fodor claims that all modules 
are fast, indeed much faster than processes in the central mind. Cognitive processes qualify as “fast” 
in Fodor’s sense if they occur in approximately less than half a second; once activated, a module 
usually produces its output in well under a quarter of a second. For example, speech shadowing is 
very fast, with typical lag times of  about 250ms. Since the syllabic rate of normal speech is about 4 
syllables per second, this suggests that shadower is processing the stimulus-length parts, probably 
the smallest parts that can be identified in the speech stream: 
“only at the level of the syllable do we begin to find stretches of wave form whose acoustic 
properties are at all reliably related to their linguistic values”.124 
Remarkable results in terms of speed are also available for vision. Fodor says that the two important 
aspects that this reveals are the contrast between the speed of modules’ processing as opposed to 
how slow central processes can be, and the strong link between speed and their mandatory 
operation. 
Informational encapsulation. According to Fodor, perceptual computational mechanisms are 
‘informationally encapsulated’ because they are insulated from the causal influence of operations 
carried out by other similar mental modules. A sub-system is informationally encapsulated in the 
sense that while processing a given set of inputs it cannot access information stored elsewhere. 
Consider visual processing: as a result of informational encapsulation a visual system can represent 
visually, but not auditory, perceptible environmental properties. Pylyshyn indicates this 
characteristic of modularity using the term cognitive impenetrability. Input/output mechanisms are 
cognitively impenetrable, in Pylyshyn’s sense, if they are not penetrable by any other area of the 
cognitive system (in particular by beliefs and knowledge). 
Shallowness. Another characteristic of modules is that they have outputs which are relatively 
shallow, which means that such outputs do not require much processing. Fodor uses the example of 
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the visual system which needs little processing to output representations of basic categories of 
objects. On Fodor’s view, the acceptation of shallowness includes two properties: an output is 
defined as shallow if it is either computationally cheap (little computation is required to produce it), 
or informationally general (its informational content is not very specific).
125
 
Fixed neural architecture. Besides being characterized as domain-specific, fast, automatic, innate, 
inaccessible, and informationally encapsulated, modules are generally realized in a fixed neural 
architecture. This means that input systems tend to be associated with localized structures in the 
brain.
126
 This one and the next two features are considered as complementary/convergent criteria for 
modularity rather than essential ones. 
Specific breakdown patterns. This characteristic provides empirical evidence for Fodor’s modular 
theory. Accordingly, modules are realized in a dedicated part of the brain that, if damaged, cannot 
be replaced by activity elsewhere in the neuronal system. Thus, an input/output system is 
functionally dissociable if it can be selectively impaired, damaged or disabled with little or no effect 
on the operation of other systems. Evidence for this feature of modules has been obtained from 
neuropsychological research. Neuropsychological records indicate that selective impairments of this 
sort are frequently observed as a consequence of circumscribed brain lesions. Standard examples of 
such breakdowns in functioning emerge from studies on vision concerning prosopagnosia (impaired 
face recognition), achromatopsia (total color blindness), and akinetopsia (motion blindness); as well 
as in studies on language disorders such as agrammatism (loss of complex syntax), jargon aphasia 
(loss of complex semantics), and dyslexia (impaired reading and writing). The studies of these 
disorder phenomena suggest that the lost capacities are subserved by a functionally dissociable 
mechanism. An individual can suffer from one such condition while all her other input systems, 
along with her central system, function perfectly normally. The occurrence of such specific 
impairments to the functioning of input systems is taken as evidence for the neural localization of 
input-systems.  
Ontogenetic pace and sequencing. This is the final characteristic of modularity. Fodor says that 
input-systems (and the capacities associated with them) exhibit specific ontogenetic sequencing, 
since they develop at a rate and in an order that is uniform across the human species (as manifested 
in the various critical periods for different abilities). On Fodor’s view, this development is 
genetically determined, and largely independent of the specifics of an individual’s experiences or 
her general intelligence: 
“develop according to specific, endogenously determined patterns under the impact of 
environmental releasers.”127 
Furthermore, modules are innate and not acquired; as Fodor says, we are born with them. Language 
acquisition may be thought of as the most emblematic example. Influenced by Chomsky,
128
 Fodor 
                                                          
125
 Fodor: 1983,  p. 87. 
126
 Fodor: 1983,  p. 98. 
127
 Fodor: 1983, p. 100. 
128
 Chomsky: 1986. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
86 
 
assumes that much of the task-specific information utilized by the input systems, and more 
specifically by the language system, is innately specified. This assumption endorses the nativist 
belief that the architecture of the mind and the development of its components and modules are 
innately determined. 
Before concluding this examination of the defining characteristics of modularity, let me say a little 
about an important aspect of such features. As a matter of contingent empirical fact, Fodor assumes 
that modules tend to share a particular collection of these properties. It is, however,  important to 
remember that modules may lack some of these characteristics. On his view, input-systems do not 
need to have all or even most of the typical properties assigned to them. Rather, an information-
processing sub-system is defined as “modular” for Fodor if it has most of those features to an 
appreciable degree, for example, visual processing and ‘input systems’ that process linguistic input 
are modular in this way.
129
 However, some marks of modularity are more important than others; 
specifically, informational encapsulation and domain-specificity are more essential for modularity 
and equally explanatory to several of the other features listed above. If input-systems turned out to 
lack most of these properties, they would nonetheless remain modules if they were task-specific and 
informationally encapsulated sub-systems of the mind. 
 
 3  Globality of Central Systems: Isotropy and Quineanism 
As we have seen, Fodor’s proposal regarding the structure of the mind is that there is a part of the 
mind that is modular and another part that cannot be divided into domain-specific and 
informationally encapsulated sub-systems. The human cognitive architecture can be divided into 
three broad categories of mental mechanisms defined in functional terms: transducers (the retina 
and optic nerve, the eardrum and auditory nerve, the skin’s sensory nerves, etc.); input systems for 
low-level perceptual processing (including language perception), which mediate between the 
transducer and central cognition and transform the information into a format that the central system 
can process, together with output systems responsible for motor control; and central processors 
responsible for higher level cognitive processes, (such as decision making and belief-fixation). 
Fodor says that modularity is restricted to the domain of input/output systems, or modules, which 
(at least partially) possess the typical characteristics assigned to them. Modularity can explain 
peripheral cognition associated with perception and linguistic processes (including language 
acquisition and language processing), but it is not able to explain any aspect of central cognition. 
This is because central cognition is not modular to any extent.
130
 
How does Fodor describe central cognition? As I said, Fodor sees central cognition as the primary 
domain of beliefs, desires, hopes, and all the other intentional states which participate in reasoning 
and inference, and intellectual and practical problem solving. The central system operates at the 
higher level of mental representations and mechanisms involved in all the relevant characterizations 
of our mental activities. In all higher-order processes (for example, in belief-fixation, decision 
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making, imagining, understanding, and speaking) information is ‘stored’ or represented in terms of 
symbolic strings and carried out at the level of symbolic processing: the central system. Given that 
the central system does not have a modular structure, it cannot be divided into domain-specific and 
informationally encapsulated sub-systems, rather it takes input from a variety of distinct sources. 
Unlike peripheral cognitive processes, central processes responsible for belief-fixation/revision and 
decision making are global and holistic. Consider the process of belief-fixation, which involves 
integrating data from various input modules to generate beliefs that square with the subject’s 
general beliefs about the world. The process underlying the fixing of a belief is potentially sensitive 
to the whole set of beliefs held by a subject; the structure of the belief system allows an individual 
to use information in reasoning that comes from any part of her stock of beliefs and knowledge. 
Then, belief-fixation involves framing hypotheses and seeking confirmation of such hypotheses, 
using data that bear upon the truth value of such beliefs. 
To confirm the globalism of central processes, Fodor focused crucially on certain claims regarding 
the holistic character of scientific inference. Fodor argues that there is a high degree of functional 
similarity between scientific inference and belief fixation/revision, since both are centrally involved 
in the non-demonstrative assessment of empirical hypothesis. Fodor takes them to be global in two 
crucial respects: isotropy and Quineanism. The confirmation of a hypothesis is isotropic if the facts 
relevant to that rational inference may be drawn from anywhere in the field of previously 
established truths. In turn, confirmation in science is isotropic because: 
 “the fact relevant to the confirmation of scientific hypotheses is sensitive to properties of the 
entire belief system; as it were, the shape of our whole science bears on the epistemic status of 
each scientific hypothesis.”131 
On Fodor’s account, confirming a scientific hypothesis is a global and holistic process, because it 
requires the whole edifice of theories held by scientists and the relationships such hypotheses have 
with that edifice. Confirmation in science is simply a matter, generally speaking, of taking 
information from any domain, however individuated, of one’s background theory; isotropy then 
refers to the epistemic relations between a hypothesis and a set of background facts. From a 
modular perspective, scientific confirmation cannot be informationally encapsulated as it involves a 
whole body of scientific and epistemic commitments, instead of a restricted body of data. Equally, 
isotropy is a property that applies to central processes, which are processes that appreciate epistemic 
relations. Fodor believes that success in confirming a hypothesis depends on the capacity of that 
process to bring out any relevant component of the theoretical background theories with which the 
subject is furnished. Highly unencapsulated processes involved in reasoning are characterized by 
isotropy in the sense that they have access, in principle, to all the information available to a 
cognitive agent. 
The second property of inferential processes is Quineanism. Scientific inference would be Quinean 
because the form of the whole theory affects the epistemic status of the hypothesis. Fodor says that 
scientific confirmation is a species of abduction. As ordinarily construed, abduction (or inference to 
the best explanation) involves the assessment of a hypothesis not merely in terms of its empirical 
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adequacy, but also in terms of its possession of theoretical virtues such as simplicity, 
conservativeness, coherence and consistency.
132
 Accordingly, a scientific hypothesis enjoys such 
theoretical virtues only if it is coherent, consistent, etc. with all of one’s background commitments. 
But, as Fodor claims, such virtues are not restricted to entirely scientific theories, but are also part 
of belief systems. Consequently, an ordinary hypothesis confirmation will be global only if it is 
coherent, consistent, etc., to the entire proper subset of a background theory or belief system. The 
argument proposed by Fodor for the globality of central processing is as follows: since scientific 
inference is Quinean and isotropic, and given the high degree of functional similarity between 
scientific inference and everyday belief-fixation, we can reasonably suppose central processing for 
our ordinary belief-fixation to be Quinean and isotropic. Fodor draws the conclusion that the 
cognitive architecture on which central processes depend must be able to subserve Quinean and 
isotropic processes. 
 
 4 The extent of Modularity: the Massive Modularity Thesis 
Since the appearance of Fodor’s modularity thesis there has been an active debate about the extent 
of modularity. Among psychologists, philosophers and cognitive scientists who accept the theory of 
the modularity of mind, there is controversy about how much of the mind is modular. In principle, 
the modularity thesis may vary with respect to either the number or the identity of the modules in 
the human mind. How many modules are there and how specific are they? Fodor answers very 
cautiously, as he believes that there are different modules for each of perceptual modality, plus one 
language module responsible for linguistic processing. In contrast to Fodor, other thinkers seem 
more adventurous, and go a step further to propose that the mind is ‘massively modular’. The thesis 
of massive modularity is the claim that there is no distinction between the central mind and 
modules, because there is no such thing as a non-domain specific and unencapsulated cognitive 
central system. On this view, the mind is made up of a number of domain-specific modules, which 
means that there is a distinct, more or less encapsulated, mechanism for each kind of cognitive task. 
For example, the tacit knowledge of the theory of other minds can be thought of as an innate 
module (among other modules) devoted to commonsense reasoning about physics, biology, 
psychology, etc. The tenet of the massive modularity thesis is that our mental faculties are much 
more fragmented than Fodor thought. The idea that the mind is nothing more than a collection of 
modular systems (as opposed to the view that there is a non-modular system responsible for 
integrating modular outputs) is proposed by evolutionary psychologists including Tooby,
133
 
Pinker,
134
 Sperber,
135
 and Carruthers.
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Carruthers presented a sophisticated defence of massive modularity. He says that  central cognition 
is entirely modular, because all cognitive processes are modular or emerge from interaction with 
modular processes. To integrate all cognitive processes and assign to them some of the 
characteristics of modules in a plausible way, Carruthers proposed a revision of the notion of 
module, and suggested removing some of its characteristics and redefining others. His weakened 
notion of ‘module’ allows a lot of variability in each of the characteristics attributed to modules by 
Fodor. Firstly, he eliminated some characteristics as he thinks that these are incompatible with the 
view that modules are part of central processing. He considered plausible domain-specificity, 
mandatoriness, and also the innate character of modules and the neural specificity characteristics, 
but he proposed to modify the notion of encapsulation and to add the characteristic of frugality. 
Following his modifications, modules are processing systems which are usually associated with a 
functional domain, are frugal in their operations and are encapsulated to varying degrees. 
According to Carruthers, only the outputs of a modular process will be available to other 
processes.
137
 At the same time, Carruthers rejected shallowness of the output and also discards 
speed. Speed is rejected because if modules are fast, as Fodor says, then this characterization only 
makes sense when modules’ speed is compared to the speed of central processing. However, if we 
take both peripheral and central cognition to be entirely modular, there is no sense in making this 
comparison. This assumption is consistent with the massive modularity thesis, according to which 
some of the characteristics attributed to those “strong” modules must be removed in order to include 
all possible processes of the mind in the set of modules. Thus, the thesis of massive modularity aims 
to give an account of the architecture of mind entirely based on interactions between modules, of 
which there could be many types. 
Fodor has criticized the thesis of massive modularity because it contains an evident problem. 
According to Fodor, if there is no such general non-domain-specific cognitive mechanism, how 
does the mind decide, for any given input, which module should deal with that input? The problem 
with the massive modularity view concerns the exclusion of a decision procedure necessary to 
assign input to modules; Fodor argues that this procedure cannot itself be modular because it must 
select information which is going to be handled by many different modules. His attack on the 
massive modularity thesis appears in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way,138 and also in LOT 2,139 in 
which Fodor reiterates that the central system is non-modular, and connects this view to general 
doubts about the adequacy of RTM as a comprehensive theory of the human mind. Fodor’s 
argument is centered on one principal function of the central system: the fixation of beliefs via 
abductive inferences. According to Fodor, the fact that a rational inference has an isotropic and 
Quinean character demonstrates that it cannot be realized into modular systems. These features 
would render belief-fixation a holistic, global and context-dependent mechanism that cannot be 
realized in any modular, informationally-encapsulated system. What is more, given RTM’s 
commitment to the claim that computational processes are sensitive only to local properties of 
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mental representations, holistic features of central cognition seem to fall outside RTM’s scope.140 
The syntactic properties of mental representations are local in the respect that they supervene upon 
the intrinsic and context-independent properties of such representations, whereas other kinds of 
properties are global and context-dependent. To the extent that cognition involves global properties 
of representations, Fodor concludes that CTM cannot provide a complete satisfactory model of how 
cognition works: 
“Cognitive science that provides some insight into the part of the mind that isn’t modular may 
well have to be different, root and branch, from the kind of syntactical account that Turing’s 
insights inspired. It is, to return to Chomsky’s way of talking, a mystery, not just a problem, how 
mental processes could be simultaneously feasible and abductive and mechanical. Indeed, I think 
that, as things now stand, this and consciousness look to be the ultimate mysteries about the 
mind.”141 
Although Fodor has long championed CTM as the best theory of cognition available, he draws the 
skeptical conclusion that its application is basically limited to the portions of mind that are modular. 
Then, the global and holistic nature of the central system undermines the plausibility of CTM as a 
theory of such central processing. Computers are successful in executing the local inferential 
processes, but they are unfit to execute the kind of global and holistic processing we routinely 
perform. In order for a computer to process global and holistic tasks, it should either search 
exhaustively for a whole belief system, or take a whole belief system as input. But, as Fodor says, 
this is highly improbable, because the mind does not work in this kind of way:  
“The totality of one’s epistemic commitments is vastly too large a space to have to search 
through if all one’s trying to do is figure out whether, since there are clouds, it would be wise to 
carry out an umbrella. Indeed, the totality of one’s epistemic commitments is vastly too large a 
space to have to search whatever it is that one is trying to figure out.”142  
Fodor’s conclusion is that cognitive science needs a radical new theory of how the mind works; 
despite his commitment to CTM as the best theory of intentional states and intentional processes we 
currently possess (given that CTM has the capacity to explain productivity and systematicity of 
thought and our intentional states, along with the intentionality of sentences that ascribe intentional 
states to individuals), he excludes the idea that CTM can explain the global and holistic nature of 
central processing. 
 
 5  The Adaptationist View 
I want to conclude this examination of Fodor’s modularity thesis by focusing on a second central 
issue related to the perspective endorsed by the evolutionary psychologists. The issue is concerned 
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with the question of whether modules should be thought of in terms of adaptations, namely, 
products of selection pressures that faced our hominid ancestors. In the context of the present 
discussion, the term ‘evolutionary psychology’ should not to be confused with the general claim 
that human beings evolved from earlier species of apes, in a long and complex evolutionary process 
which started about seven million years ago. This claim is beyond debate, as it is largely accepted 
within the scientific community as a solid truth. What the term evolutionary psychology here refers 
to is a more specific and controversial claim, according to which mental capacities and related 
faculties are adaptations, in the evolutionary and biological sense. Biologists define an adaptation 
as a trait, or capacity, whose nature is the product of natural selection. If we endorse a modularity 
perspective, we might hypothesize that modules were selected through natural selection, and that 
such selection was specifically occurred to solve an adaptive problem. As natural selection provides 
organisms with evolutionary functions that cause situations that enhance their survival, modules, 
among other adaptations, should satisfy a specific function which was selected for an adaptive 
reason. This claim is consistent with the adaptionist theory, which establishes the general condition 
that if something has a function, this function must be the product of evolution by natural selection. 
The notion of biological function demands actual evolutionary, or causal, history, as it applies to all 
the biological organs which are credited with having a function with an evolutionary origin. Taken 
in an evolutionary and adaptionist sense, a modular mechanism is something to which natural 
selection has awarded a certain biological function that causes behaviour to enhance the survival of 
an organism and, more generally, of a species. This perspective is defended by evolutionary 
psychologists who treat psychological traits as adaptations in the Darwinian sense. Evolutionary 
psychologists search for evidence that organisms live in a type of environment in which the 
possession of mental organs aids their survival. In defending the thesis of massive modularity, the 
evolutionary psychologists individuate such mental organs in modules which are  relatively isolated 
and dedicated to specific information-processing tasks, and which are resilient, probably innate 
mechanisms within the mind. 
Fodor has long been skeptical of evolutionary psychology, including the claim that the mind is a 
product of natural selection. His doubts concern the general assumption that the knowledge of the 
evolutionary history of a system is really necessary to make inferences about its function, as the 
notion of function, which is relevant for psychology, might be synchronic but not diachronic: 
“You might think, after all, that what matters in understanding the mind is what ours do now, not 
what our ancestors’ did some millions of years ago.”143 
In The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Fodor responds to a number of arguments to demonstrate that 
natural selection is not necessary to underwrite claims about the teleology of the mind: 
“One can often make a pretty shrewd guess what an organ is for on the basis of entirely 
synchronic considerations. One might thus guess that hands are for grasping, eyes for seeing, or 
even that minds are for thinking, without knowing or caring much about their history of 
selection. Compare Pinker: “psychologists have to look outside psychology if they want to 
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explain what the parts of the mind are for.”144 Is this true? Harvey didn’t have to look outside 
physiology to explain what the heart is for. It is, in particular, morally certain that Harvey never 
read Darwin. Likewise, the phylogeny of bird flight is still a live issue in evolutionary theory. 
But, I suppose, the first guy to figure out what birds use their wings for lived in a cave.”145 
The question he posed concerns the presumed necessary role of natural selection in figuring out 
how the mind works. But, as Fodor says, natural selection does not guarantee understanding of the 
work of psychological mechanisms, because to understand how a psychological mechanism 
functions does not require knowledge of the selection pressures that led to it. For the evolutionary 
psychologist, the adaptive complexity of the human mind must be treated as a collection of 
adaptations, and natural selection as the only explanation for such adaptive complexity in the living 
world. Fodor's response to this point is that the complexity of the mind is not relevant to determine 
whether it is a product of natural selection: 
“What matters to the plausibility that the architecture of our minds is an adaptation is how much 
genotypic alternation would have been required for it to evolve from the mind of the nearest 
ancestral ape whose cognitive architecture was different from ours…It’s entirely possible that 
quite small neurological reorganizations could have effected wild psychological discontinuities 
between our minds and the ancestral ape’s.”146 
Fodor argues that we cannot actually establish whether a small neurological change in the brain of 
our ancestors led to a larger change in their cognitive capacities, despite the appeal of adaptive 
complexity it does not warrant the idea that our minds are the product of natural selection. On his 
view, whether we can regard modules as adaptations should depend only on evidence recognized by 
empirical psychological research, and not on philosophical theorizing which tests the possible 
explanations available. This point is made clearer in his latest book What Darwin Got Wrong,
147
 in 
which Fodor reiterates that explanations based on natural selection are both of decreasing interest in 
biology and actually incoherent. 
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10 
 
Visual, Auditory and other forms of Perception  
 
 
 1 Visual Perception 
In this chapter I want to deal with the question of how the modularity thesis applies to perception. 
Presumably, a general and naturalistic account of perception should attempt to explain all kinds of 
perception (whether specifically human, more generally biological, or purely mechanical) 
exclusively in causal terms, that is, in terms of causal laws, structures, and functional causal 
dispositions. In the context of perceptual theories it is accepted that whatever else is involved in 
perception, it undoubtedly involves processes (relying on a collection of relevant information, or 
data, about the environment) in which sensors, or sensory organs, are used to provide causal inputs 
from the environment to organisms. A naturalistic approach to perception is represented by 
informational semantics as developed by Dretske and Fodor, which gives a characterization of the 
relevant kind of sensory information in terms of nomic covariance relations between sensory inputs 
and outputs.
148
 Nomic covariance relations are used to underwrite a concept from the information 
conveyed by sensory transducers to the brain; therefore, the possession of working sensory organs, 
or mechanical sensors, is necessary for any kind of perception. This claim echoes the understanding 
of mental architecture theorized by Fodor. Thus far we have seen that Fodor made a fundamental 
distinction among the functional parts that compose the organization of the mind, in which a central 
system (or central mind) contrasts with transducers and input-output systems (modules). In 
proposing that the explanation of ‘input-output systems’ must be taken in the context of a modular 
view of perception, rather than in the context of a view which considers perception as a part of 
cognition, Fodor assumes that ‘input systems’ includes the systems responsible for linguistic 
inputs/outputs processing. 
The power of Fodor’s modularity thesis resides in the fact that it applies to a wide range of 
explanations of perceptual systems. Its particularly fruitful application is illustrated by the example 
of computational theories of vision. Proponents of the classical approach to mental architecture 
often appeal to computational theories of vision as illustrative of the sort of explanation they 
propose. Computational theorists of vision naturally treat the visual system in terms of 
representational processing; from the representation of the distribution of light reflected onto the 
retina, to the eventual construction of a representation of the objective scene around the perceiver. 
For Fodor, the visual perceptual system is modular and has low level cognitive activity. Consider 
the function of the human eye: that of a transducer that transforms input radiant energy into 
nomically covarying output as electrical impulses in the optic nerve. Hence, there is a sense in 
which visual perception is not a rational process in the same way a thought is. To confirm this 
assumption, Fodor recurs to the example of visual illusion, which may be simplified as the 
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phenomenon related to something that visually seems to be what it is not. What is interesting to 
note about this perceptual phenomenon is that the illusion persists even if we know that it is an 
illusion. When we encounter a situation in which we are inclined to believe something and its 
opposite, we tend to eliminate, as rational thinkers, the inconsistency in our thought. Although a 
rational agent would be inclined to eliminate explicit contradictions in his or her belief, in the case 
of visual illusion such inconsistency remains unchallenged. What kind of overall picture of the 
mind is suggested by the phenomenon of visual illusion? The case of visual illusion clearly 
demonstrates that perceiving is not the same as judging or believing. In fact, if perceiving were just 
a form of believing, this situation would lead to continuous conflict among our current 
psychological states, as in the case of explicitly contradictory beliefs. Let us suppose that the belief 
that x is the case (for example, the belief that ‘stripes are uniformly coloured’) and the belief that x 
is not the case (for example, the belief that ‘stripes are not uniformly coloured’) coexist 
simultaneously and consciously. This contradictory situation would render objectively impossible 
the selection of behaviors that are rationally coherent with a given belief. No rational agent could 
live with such explicit contradictions in his/her beliefs, because, if perception were a form of belief, 
this would lead to irrationality. Cases of perceptual illusion had already been  discovered in the 
early work of Gestalt psychologists, who suggested ways in which the mind structures perceptual 
experiences. Subsequently, the psychologist David Marr carried out pioneering work which 
confirmed the hypothesis that we capture the structuring effects of perceptual experiences 
computationally. Marr’s computational theory of vision joins Jerry Fodor’s modularity thesis in 
providing empirical evidence for defining the visual system as a relatively isolated ‘mental module’, 
that is, an information-processing system which is in important respects independent of the ‘central 
system’ responsible for belief and reasoning. 
 
 2 Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision    
In the literature of psychology and cognitive science, the term ‘visual perception’ is used for the 
ability to interpret the surrounding environment by processing the information contained in visible 
light, whereas the term ‘vision’ denotes the resulting perception of such processing. Generally, 
visual perception and the various psychological components involved in vision are referred to 
collectively as the visual system, which constitutes the object of extensive research in various fields 
including experimental psychology, cognitive science and AI, theories of computation, 
neuroscience and molecular biology, all of which operate at very different levels and use different 
techniques. However, in 1980 Marr proposed an innovative computational approach that led to 
promising advances in the scientific understanding of visual perception. Marr’s computational 
theory of vision
149
 involves a complex information processing task which attempts to capture and 
represent the various aspects of the environment. In a process such as vision, it is important to give 
a full description of the information processed by the nervous system; the central tenet of Marr’s 
model is thus to explain how visual information is processed in a computational system which is 
only loosely constrained by physical properties. Marr introduces three different types of abstraction, 
or analysis, of informational processing systems:  
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 Computational or cognitively functional analysis  
 Algorithmic analysis 
 Physical implementational analysis 
The first type of abstraction is computational analysis. This task analysis of cognitive systems 
serves to identify the specific information-processing problem that a system is configured to solve, 
and the general constraints upon any solution to that problem. If the role of the computational task 
is to describe what is being evaluated and why, the algorithmic analysis tries in turn to explain how 
the cognitive system performs the information-processing task. The second task principally aims to 
identify input information and output information and algorithms for transforming input into 
required output, as well as specifying how information is encoded. Finally, implementational 
analysis tries to find a physical realization for the algorithms developed to achieve this computation. 
The implementation analysis of such algorithms identifies the neural structures (populations of 
neurons) which realize the basic representational states to which the algorithm applies, or the neural 
mechanisms that transform representational states according to the algorithm (whether this physical 
implementation is part of the neural tissue or part of an external computer). In other words, the 
computational level addresses, at a high level of abstraction, the problems that the computational 
system must overcome; the algorithmic level attempts to identify the strategy that may be used to 
solve these problems; and the implementational level attempts to explain how solutions to these 
problems are realized in neural circuitry. To clarify these different levels of abstraction we might 
consider the example of a Turing machine: computational analysis represents the characterization of 
multiplication functions; algorithmic analysis corresponds to the Turing machine table; and 
implementational analysis is simply the physical construction of the machine. 
After introducing these different levels of abstraction, Marr provides a general theoretical 
framework of vision which combines them. The computational, algorithmic and implementional 
tasks are employed to characterize vision from a computational perspective that involves, at each 
level, a symbolic representation of the information carried in the retinal image. We know that the 
intensities perceived by a visual system are a function of four main factors: geometry (shape and 
relative placement), reflection of visible surfaces, illumination and viewpoint. Then, we can think of 
a visual image as composed of a wide array of intensity, created by the way in which light is 
reflected by the objects viewed by an observer. According to Marr, early visual processing aims to 
create a description of external objects by constructing a number of representations from the 
intensity values of the image. To demonstrate that vision proceeds by explicit computation of 
symbolic descriptions of the visual image, Marr proposed that vision includes three stages of 
representation, each of which builds greater and greater detail back into the image, so that eventual 
recognition and response is achieved. This multi-level account of vision includes the following 
types of visual representations: 
I. A 2D or primal sketch of the scene, based on feature extraction of fundamental components 
of the scene, including edges, regions, etc. (Note the similarity in concept to a pencil sketch 
drawn quickly by an artist as an impression). 
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II. A 2½D sketch of the scene, where textures are acknowledged and surface orientation is 
computed. (Note the similarity in concept to the stage in drawing where an artist highlights 
or shades areas of a scene to provide depth). A representation of distance and depth centered 
in the observer is achieved in this stage. 
III. A 3D model, where the scene is visualized in a continuous, three dimensional map. A 
representation of depth and volume centered in the object is achieved in this stage. 
Marr argues that early visual systems derive representations in which these factors are separated. 
The primal sketch is the resultant description of the shapes of surfaces and objects, their orientations 
and distance from the viewer; the representation and analysis of local geometric structures and 
detection of intensity changes and illumination effects take place at this level of representation. 
Independent spatial organizations of the viewed intensities in a 2D scene reflect the structure of the 
visible surfaces. To capture these organizations, Marr’s theory of vision makes use of a set of place 
tokens corresponding to edges, bars, ends, and blobs; such low level features are represented by five 
factors (quintuples) including: type, position, orientation, scale, and contrast. In the first stage, early 
vision makes local changes in light intensity explicit, locating discontinuities in light intensity 
because such edges, bars, ends, and blobs often coincide with important boundaries in the visual 
scene. The resultant representation consists of a collection of statements about the edges, bars, ends, 
and blobs present in the scene: where they are located and orientated, and any other information 
with which to define a crude initial processing. Structures like boundaries and regions can be 
constructed using the application of grouping procedures. The full primal sketch seizes many of the 
contours and textures of an image; however, this first stage is only one aspect of early visual 
processing. The second stage of observer-orientated representation is the 2½D sketch, which is the 
consequence of early visual processing, in which the orientation and depth of the visible surfaces 
and discontinuities are represented. The second level of representation involves an analysis of 
motion, depth and shading, and further, full analysis of the primal sketch. Marr defines the 2½D 
sketch as composed of some local surface orientation primitives, distance from the viewer and 
discontinuities in depth and surface orientation. Like the 2D sketch representation, the 2½D sketch 
is specified in a viewer-centered coordinate system. Despite the 2½D sketch being necessary to 
guide any action undertaken, it does not suffice for recognition of visual objects. For that a third 
representational level is required. The 3D sketch representation allows the observer to recognize 
what object a particular shape corresponds to. This third level of representation describes shapes 
and their organization using a modular and hierarchical organization of volumetric and surface 
primitives centered into the object. 
What Marr’s computational theory suggests is that vision proceeds from a two-dimensional visual 
array on the retina, to a three-dimensional description of the world as output. The visual system 
provides this description by creating a representation of the pattern of light on the retina and making 
computational inferences in various stages. The goal of early visual processing is to give the initial 
description of the surfaces present in the image; the task for the psychology of vision is thus that of 
explaining how our visual system produces a representation of the 3D visual environment from the 
distribution of light on the retina. In order to finally obtain the 3D sketch representation, the system 
has to build into the mind ‘knowledge’ of certain rules or principles in order to make the inference 
from one stage to the next. For Marr, such principles are not accessible via introspection;  even if 
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we know that they are in some way present in our minds, we cannot access them introspectively. 
Yet he suggests that it is possible to investigate vision at any of these levels independently. There 
are essentially two conclusions which can be drawn from Marr’s multitask analysis. First, that the 
visual system’s job is to provide a 2½D representation of the visual environment that can serve as 
input for recognition and classification processes (primarily information about the shape of objects 
and their spatial distribution). This entails that perception involves the construction and 
manipulation of abstract symbolic descriptions of the environment. Second, the 3D sketch is a 
representational task centered on the object of the scene, rather than on the viewer-frame of 
reference. Marr argues that when describing an object, we do not need to know what we are looking 
at in order to determine some aspects of it. For him, the visual system provides information to 
recognition systems that abstracts away from the perspectival features of observer representation. 
Recognitional abilities are constant despite changes in how things look to the perceiver due to an 
object's orientation, its distance from the perceiver, and its partial occlusion by other objects. Edge-
detecting algorithms applied to the retinal image result in a description which could be likened to a 
written description of which edge features are where in an image (in much the same way as 
programming code on a computer describes the formation of an icon on the display screen). Then, 
object recognition is reached when one of the reconstructed descriptions matches a stored 
representation of a known object class. 
 
 3 Auditory Perception and the analogy with Visual Perception 
When considering modalities other than vision that enhance an account of perception defined within 
the framework of the modularity of mind, we have to mention auditory perception. Beyond 
revealing new and rich territory for empirical and theoretical exploration in its own right, the study 
of auditory processing certainly deserves a role in the development and vetting of an adequate and 
comprehensive understanding of perception. The topic provides a useful case for cognitive 
scientists and experimental psychologists to evaluate claims about modular perception already 
proposed in the visual context. There is an evident relationship between visual perception and space 
on the one hand, and auditory perception and time on the other. Studies in cognitive sciences often 
focus on visual perception in relation to spatial issues, while auditory perception is more concerned 
with temporal aspects of perception. But what does the term ‘auditory perception’ mean? In a broad 
sense, this term refers to the capacity to perceive and understand sounds, including speech and 
environmental sounds. This capacity is concerned with the way the brain identifies, interprets and 
attaches what we hear (namely, the meaning of sound) by means of specific organ-transducers, such 
as the ear. We know that in nature sounds exist in the form of vibrations that travel through the air 
or through other substances; the ear detects such vibrations and converts them into nerve impulses 
which are sent to the brain, which in turn provides an interpretation of this information. But there 
are many processes, involved beyond simply hearing a sound, which turn a mass of incoming noise 
into something useful and understandable. Here I shall report some of these important processes: 
Auditory discrimination
150
 is the process through which people note the difference between sounds. 
This process plays a special role in the comprehension of language. Given that spoken words are 
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understood on the basis of different sounds, this mechanism allows us to distinguish between subtle 
differences in sound in words, and to identify the beginning, middle and end sounds of words. It is 
supposed that auditory discrimination is developed in children at a very early age; this assumption 
can be made based on simple considerations. If a child were not able to discriminate between 
sounds in words (for example, between the sounds “pat” and “bat”, where /p/ is voiceless whilst /b/ 
is voiced), then, in perceiving a vast amount of noise, he would not be able to focus on important 
noises and ignore irrelevant noises as unimportant (so he will perceive and process the sounds of 
“pat” and “bat” as if they referred to the same word). In virtue of this mechanism, children and 
adults can distinguish perceived words that sound the same from perceived words that do not, such 
as voiced versus voiceless words (for example: “pat” vs. “bat”, “tip” vs. “dip”, etc.). Instead, 
auditory synthesis is the process by which the brain combines different sounds into understandable 
units, similar to the way letters are combined into words and words into sentences. Like auditory 
discrimination, auditory synthesis is necessary for comprehension of language since it is related to 
the ability to join or blend sounds together to create words, such as: “c-a-t = cat”. On the other 
hand, beginning with putting units together at a syllable level teaches child that long words can be 
broken up into smaller constituents: as at the early stages of phonetic reading or spelling. Auditory 
analysis is therefore the mechanism by which one can break up words into their individual sound 
constituents. For example, to determine whether one has spelled the word “cat” correctly, we have 
to break the word up into its individual sound components: “cat = c-a-t”.151 In contrast, auditory 
sequencing is a process closely related to both memory and auditory perception, as it refers to the 
ability to understand and remember the order in which certain sounds happened.
152
 Finally, auditory 
rhyming is a process that includes both discrimination and production.
153
 
Having introduced those processes, we may think of the auditory system as a collection of 
components. This view might grant the validity of asking questions about the architecture that 
causes listeners to assign sources to locations and pitches to sources. Psychological studies have 
encouraged a modular conceptualization of auditory processing analogous to the dominant theory in 
visual processing.
154
 Evidence for a modular system exists in the literature as regards descriptions 
of deficits in auditory processing (descriptions of deficits in auditory processing had already 
appeared in the literature by the end of the 19th century). Specifically, three major disorders were 
identified: cortical deafness, which describes a condition in which individuals have no auditory 
perception;
155
 auditory agnosia;
156
 and pure word deafness,  a condition in which individuals are not 
capable of perceiving or interpreting speech sounds as words.
157
 Each of these auditory disorders 
can be viewed as being analogous to a specific disorder in the visual domain; specifically, it seems 
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reasonable to contend that cortical deafness and blindness represent sensory impairments; the 
agnosias represent perceptual and/or semantic impairments; dyslexia and pure word deafness 
represent receptive language impairments and phonagnosia and prosopagnosia represent person 
information impairments. 
Clinical descriptions of auditory disorders lay the groundwork for an ongoing debate about the 
underlying nature of the auditory system: whether the disorders reflect quantitative differences in 
the severity of damage to the auditory processing system, or qualitative differences between 
independent modules of that system which are susceptible to selective impairment. To the extent 
that phonagnosia and auditory associative agnosia are auditory analogies for prosopagnosia and 
visual associated agnosia, questions relating to the specificity of deficits and the number of modules 
that exist can be raised in the auditory domain. If we assume that pure word deafness and 
phonagnosia are auditory analogies to visual disorders in processing words and faces, then we can 
postulate two types of auditory processors: one for voices and another for words. This possibility 
may be seen as a modification of the theory that verbal and nonverbal sounds are processed 
independently.
158
 However, other studies suggest treating prosopagnosia as an independent visual 
processing impairment associated either with damage to neural hardware dedicated to processing 
faces,
159
 or with an impairment in the complex category processing required to identify faces.
160
 In 
any case, a modular theory of auditory processing which allows for several patterns of deficits to be 
observed on the basis of the severity of damage to modules appears to provide the best explanation 
for the existing data. In fact, we could hardly explain how a perceptual impairment can impair the 
processing of one class of stimulus (non-linguistic sounds) but not another class (linguistic sounds), 
unless we assume that independent processing modules exist.
161
 The idea that disorders reflect 
impairments in the operation of distinct modules provides a more coherent account of cases in 
which a selective impairment in one type of stimulus is attributed to a perceptual deficit. As 
different modules process different types of information, then a low-level impairment in one 
module would not necessarily affect the manner in which stimuli are processed in the other 
modules. In the light of the widespread support for modularity in visual processing and the strength 
of these analogies between visual and auditory disorders, the impact of the modularity thesis on the 
study of auditory perception is unsurprising. 
 
 4 Other forms of Perception: Speech Perception and Music Perception 
One of the most promising directions for research into auditory perception focuses on the 
relationships between the perceptual modalities that shape experience. A primary interest of study 
centered on testing language comprehension deficits in the auditory modality. It is supposed that 
speech perception is dealt with by a phonetic and linguistic module. The module specific to speech 
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has its own perceptual primitives, which are intended to be the articulatory gestures that constitute 
phonetic events.
162
 The speech module is thought to be independent of the modules for pitch and 
timbre. When resonance is presented in isolation, the auditory module for timbre interprets its 
centre-frequency slope as a chirp; conversely, when this same resonance is placed in the appropriate 
context, the phonetic module interprets its slope together with other parts of the pattern as a 
phonetic event. Speech perception appears simply to use all of the phonetically relevant information 
in the signal, despite having its own specifically phonetic criteria which are very different from 
those for pitch and timbre. This suggests that there are two distinct component lexical and phonetic-
processor modules. Empirical evidence for this assumption is provided by clinical studies on double 
dissociations in patients. It has been demonstrated that patients who are unable to identify non-
linguistic sounds can understand speech;
163
 and patients who are not able to comprehend speech 
can, nevertheless, identify non-linguistic sounds.
164
 The performance of these patients clearly 
indicates that linguistic and nonlinguistic auditory sounds are processed by independent processing 
modules.
165
 
On the other hand, auditory perception is connected to general issues of musical experience. 
Auditory experiences are critical for appreciatively listening to music, and to appreciate music is to 
appreciate sounds, sequences, arrangements, and structures of sounds. Listening to music requires 
listening in a way that abstracts from the environmental significance, and thus from the specific 
sources, of the sounds it includes; it is then a topic that affects the relationship between hearing a 
sound and hearing a source. We might question whether there is a specific module for music 
recognition, or general auditory recognition for both speech/music and environment/sounds 
recognition. Evidence for the view that there is a specific module for music perception is provided 
by studies of cases in which selective impairment and sparing of musical abilities are compromised 
by music-related deficits in neurologically impaired individuals. It has been shown that when the 
general auditory system is damaged, amateur abilities such as music recognition suffer more than 
expert abilities such as speech recognition. Accordingly, non-musicians might lose their ability to 
recognize spoken words yet remain able to recognize music; conversely, brain-damaged patients 
afflicted with verbal agnosia (namely, word deafness) can recognize nonverbal sounds including 
music even though they have lost the ability to recognize spoken words.
166
 The study of music 
perception includes several theoretical issues regarding temporal processing, including the issue of 
the nature of timing information behind music processing, or whether our perception of rhythm 
must be explained in terms of modality-specific processes or modality-general processes. Time 
perception will be the object of the following chapters. 
 
                                                          
162
 Liberman & Mattingly: 1985. 
163
 Spreen et al.: 1965. 
164
 Metz-Lutz and Dahl: 1984; Saffran et al.: 1976. 
165
 Albert, Sparks, Von Stockert et al.: 1972; Shallice: 1988. 
166
 Godefroy: 1955; Mendez: 2001. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
101 
 
11 
 
Time Perception 
 
 
 1 The Importance of Time 
Time is a crucial dimension of our perceived world, we often wonder about the fashioning and 
incomprehensible character of time dimension and the way it affects us. When we perform our daily 
tasks, it is unlikely that we pay attention to every single step in our experience. We wake up in the 
morning and start putting our energy into certain activities, activities that permit us to be part of the 
society or the world in which we live. We go to work, then we have lunch and later we go home 
again. At the end of the day, after dealing with our social lives or carrying out personal activities, 
we sleep (if we do not suffer from insomnia). In everything we do during the different stages of the 
day, we apparently pay little attention to what we are actually doing. We do not pay close attention 
to the streets we walk down every day from home to work or work to home. For instance, we do not 
decide whether we will walk on the pavement on the right hand side of the road or on the left hand 
side of the road. We just do it “automatically”, in the same way that we “automatically” use our 
right or left hand when we have lunch. Equally, once we have learnt to swim, cycle or to fish, etc., 
we do not need to remind ourselves of every step that the learned process consists of, for example 
every movement we need to make to perform a specific physical activity. We process these steps 
unconsciously and automatically, but at every step of our cognitive processing the information is 
elaborated at a specific rate. Timing apparently plays a key role in our functional organization, but 
how people experience time is still unclear. Over the past fifty years cognitive psychologists have 
revealed a substantial number of specific mechanisms, processes and strategies, including those 
concerning temporal processing; on the other hand, Fodor’s work on mental architecture has 
demonstrated that the mind involves a highly specialized modular structure with the presence of 
highly specialized functions. Fodor recognizes the existence of different modules corresponding to 
the perceptual modalities, plus a further module for language processing. Thus in the context of the 
present discussion, I wonder whether we may assume that the important part of our mind which 
deals with time perception is modular in nature. In other words, I am posing the following question: 
is there a module for temporal processing? Here I argue that such a module really exists. However, 
before examining the hypothesis of a module for time processing, I should offer a general overview 
of the main issues and strategies that apply to time perception. In introducing the topic, this and the 
next chapter will be centered around two general questions concerning how and where is time 
processed in the brain. Only after this step, in the final chapter of my dissertation, will I debate the 
presumed modularity of time. 
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 2 What is Time Perception 
Roughly speaking, time perception refers to the ability (exhibited by minded individuals) to judge 
the duration of events, or to apprehend the passage of time by the order of occurrence of 
experiences or physiological rhythms. It is generally accepted that when people perceive temporal 
passage they sense the irreversibility of time, the feeling that what lies in the future is  continually 
getting closer to the present, and what is present continually recedes into the more distant past. This 
feeling makes individuals confident of the idea that things and events change through time only in 
one order or direction. Time can be experienced in the way we wait for something to happen or to 
end, but also in more subtle ways, since the same interval of actual time might be perceived as long 
or short, as fast or slow. Research on time perception address  a broad range of the temporal 
experiences we have in our daily life; this topic is very complicated and requires research efforts to 
be directed into different, yet interconnected areas. Among these topics, we can list five principal 
time experiences:
167
 
 Duration, which assigns the moments of a time interval to real-world behaviour and 
processes. The ways that different intervals might be related (inclusion, succession, overlap, 
etc.) places independent experiences into a common context that is useful for understanding 
the causal dynamics of the world. 
 Simultaneity, which addresses how events that start and end at close but different moments 
are experienced as occurring concurrently (i.e. we feel the present as an interval rather than 
a durationless instant). 
 Ordering, that is, how we perceive precedence amongst events. Not only we perceive 
events one after another, but while perceiving an event as occurring after another we 
consider also the relationships that link them.
168
 
 Past, present, and future, which respectively regard: (i) feelings we once sensed and we 
cannot experience in the same way again, but an abstract (incomplete) representation of 
which can be recalled; (ii) feelings that we have here and now, or during short periods 
perceived as present (the so-called “specious present”); (iii) feelings that we have never 
sensed but which it is possible to do so after some time, being capable of abstractly 
representing this possibility (in a different way to recalling the past).
169
 
 Time flow, that is, the fundamental feeling of the present that is constantly changing in a 
unidirectional way, which makes future become present and then become past. 
Topics related to the experiences of time listed above have attracted significant research interest in 
the literature of philosophy, psychology, cognitive sciences, biology, neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence, to cite just some fields. In particular, investigation into the cognitive mechanisms of 
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biological agents involved in time perception and how such mechanisms could be interpreted from a 
computational perspective, involves two general issues: one regarding the interaction of time 
perception with other cognitive processes and the other regarding the presumed neural basis of time 
processing.
170
 The former is accomplished by the question of how time is processed within the 
brain. Time researchers committed to this issue try to provide explanations of how people plan 
actions, filter information, direct attention to events, form decisions, or how they understand the 
common and different properties of two similar behaviours executed in different time scales (i.e. 
temporal compression). Instead, the latter deals with the question of where time is processed into 
the brain. This question is typically investigated in the context of neuroscience, in which the 
research aims to find the (separate) subsystems necessary for time processing on long and short 
scales, the dedicated or implicit nature of time representation, and the role of development in the 
acquisition of time perception capacity. In this chapter I examine the former issue in relation to a 
general introduction to the study of time perception; some of the principal recent theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the question of how time is processed will be summarized here. The second 
issue will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 3 Two paradigms of Time Perception: Perspective Time and Retrospective Time 
When we approach the literature on time perception we encounter several conceptualizations and a 
large variety of models used to explain how the brain processes duration. Experimental 
psychologists indicate the presence of distinct processing components involved in perception of 
duration or timing movements. Temporal processing and experiences relating to time interval 
estimation are supposed to operate across different neural systems and multiple cognitive processes. 
Generally, empirical studies divide the issue into two experimental paradigms: prospective timing 
and retrospective timing.
171
 The substantial difference between these two kinds of experimental 
paradigms concerns the different situations in which participants are asked to judge time.
172
 In the 
context of ‘prospective time theories’, time estimation is explicitly the focus of the task; essentially, 
it is studied in isolation or in relation to four principal paradigms:
173
 
 verbal estimation: after exposure to a time interval, reporting how much time has elapsed;  
 interval production: producing an interval of a certain duration, for example, 1 min; 
 interval reproduction: perceiving an interval of a certain duration and then reproducing it; 
 interval comparison: comparing two intervals and reporting which is longer.  
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In each of these paradigms temporal duration is considered a fundamental feature of the entire 
experimental procedure. In general, prospective time experiments focus on judgments made 
regarding the duration of an interval of time that is presently experienced. Time judgments are made 
after the experimental participants are alerted in advance that they will be asked to judge the 
ensuing time interval. Through similar experiments, psychologists seek to demonstrate that if 
participants are informed before they perform the task that they will have to make a time judgment, 
they are presumably motivated by this warning to monitor the passing of time and pay attention to 
any available cues.
174
 In principle, models of prospective time estimation rely on the idea of an 
‘internal clock’ (which in one dominant version involves  recourse to a pacemaker device that 
produces a sequence of time units which are fed into an accumulator).
175
 In addition to the internal 
clock component, prospective time models consider several processes as involved in time 
estimation, including working memory, long-term memory, attention and decisions. 
Conversely, subjects tested under the paradigm of retrospective timing are not provided with any 
warning at the start of the interval that they will be required to make a time judgment. In the 
procedure of retrospective timing, the participants are unexpectedly asked to judge the duration of a 
time interval after it has already elapsed; the time judgment is made when the participant is unaware 
that a question about time is going to be asked. Compared to time estimation assessed using 
prospective timing, in retrospective time experiments temporal information is processed in a more 
unreliable fashion. Given that the subject receives no prior warning, the estimation of duration in 
retrospect is supposed to be reconstructed from memory, insofar as it is carried out based on 
processed and stored memory contents.
176
 Then, the structure of events constitutes a critical 
determinant of remembered duration,
177
 and memory processes also deserve attention.
178
 
Psychologists and time researchers agree that perspective timing and retrospective timing operate at 
different levels and provide explanations of different psychological mechanisms. We might very 
state that, in general, retrospective timing theories focus on time judgments which are made in 
temporal intervals ranging from a few seconds (short-term memory) to a whole lifetime (long-term 
memory),
179
 whereas, pure prospective duration judgments are made over a limited and shorter time 
range where a subject devotes attention to time for a period of seconds to minutes. 
 
 4 The Temporal Continuum Perspective 
One interesting view in the study of time perception is that individuals and organisms naturally 
behave on the basis of a continuous hierarchy of biological and cognitive automatisms. Whatever 
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performance we observe, we note that a behaviour is the unified result of a number of internal 
biological processes regulated in time. In language learning, learning or performing movements, in 
both decision making and planning action, individuals show a certain ability to manage time 
information for controlling actions. For instance, timing control is necessary to regulate the 
following exemplary performances: 
 whether a sound produced can have a semantic meaning (words, sounds, music, or language 
itself); 
 the steps composing movement, such as walking or running; 
 the bio-physiological mechanisms inside bio-masses; 
 the perception/cognition of days/seasons alternating; 
 the perception/cognition of changes themselves. 
During these performances the brain organizes information in a unified way, comprising multiple 
levels of cyclic activities which extend from very long time scales (e.g., menstrual cycles, circadian 
rhythm) to much shorter ones (e.g., the firing rate of cortical cells).
180
 This picture, sometimes 
called temporal continuum perspective, suggests that time serves to organize a sequence of events 
which are linked together. Essentially, the subjective experience of time can be individuated at 
either biological or psychological levels. On the one hand, there is a biological basis to time 
perception. Some psychologists, as Cohen pointed out,
181
 propounded the idea of a biological clock 
that determines how time is experienced. According to the biological approach to time perception, 
people have internal cycles which are used to measure time. Humans and other diurnal species 
normally sleep at night and are active during the daytime; the timing of functions with prominent 
rhythms, such as sleepiness, metabolism, alertness, and other biological rhythms of various 
periodicity serves to align our physiological functions with the environment. Despite the fact that 
the frequency displayed might vary from fractions of a second to years, daily rhythms provide most 
of the information available, and by paying attention to these cycles individuals (and other 
creatures) can know how much time has passed. The principal idea of biological time is that there is 
a kind of automatic rhythm that recurs continuously and which is not directly affected by 
environment. The cyclic patterns recurring on a daily basis in humans are called circadian rhythm. 
By definition, circadian rhythms are biological rhythms internally generated with approximately a 
24 hour period (the term ‘circadian’ derives from the Latin word ‘circa diem’, namely, ‘about a 
day’). Circadian rhythms serve to temporally programme the daily sequence of metabolic and 
behavioural changes, since they persist in the absence of temporal cues (such as the alternation of 
light and darkness) and are coordinated internally by the biological clock. On the other hand, the 
metaphor of the internal clock has been recently dominant in experimental psychology. Over the 
last decades empirical works on time perception have proposed the idea of an internal clock 
concerned with the psychological mechanism of time experience. Analogously to the biological-
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circadian clock that regulates the daily rhythms of fundamental aspects of physiology and 
behaviour, such a psychological clock, or time-keeping mechanism, is supposed to form the 
cognitive basis for the subjective experience of time.
182
 However, a similar clock for time sense 
relating to fractions of a second to multiple minutes has not been identified with (just) one specific 
organ of the brain, so it seems that no single sensory organ (or perceptual system) is uniquely 
responsible for encoding psychological time. The difficulty of individuating the neurobiological 
areas necessary for representing duration and temporal passage leads us to the second general issue 
of time perception (where time is processed), which will be discussed in greater depth in the 
following chapter. 
  
 5  The Internal Clock Theory: Pacemaker–Counter Models vs. Oscillator Models 
The internal clock theory arises from several interpretations of the psychological components for 
interval timing. There are a variety of theoretical models that apply the image of the “internal 
clock”: Matell and Meck183 provided a general overview of the three principal models for the 
internal clock theory: the pacemaker-accumulator model, the process-decay model, and the 
oscillator/coincidence detection model. All the internal clock models conform to a common 
structure which is basically composed of: a clock component that starts upon the onset of a timed 
signal; a memory component that stores duration codes; and a decision/comparison component that 
compares the clock’s output to previously important duration codes held in the reference memory. 
The clock component is supposed to be made up of repeatable processes that can be mapped onto 
timing. Instead, the memory component can be thought as a long-term store of previous reinforced 
clock’s output values; whereas, the decision-comparison component is the mechanism that 
evaluates how well the current clock value matches previously stored temporal memories. Besides 
having an equivalent common structure, such models differ in terms of the very important aspect of 
the different neurobiological plausibility they involve. In this paragraph I focus on the dominant 
models of duration estimation in prospective time theories: the pacemaker–counter device model 
and the oscillatory–processing device model, while the process-decay device model will not be 
considered here. 
The first dominant contemporary model in prospective timing is a version of the pacemaker–
counter device model, known as the scalar expectancy theory, or SET, as proposed by Gibbon, 
Church, and Meck.
184
 The idea underlying the scalar timing model is that there is an accumulator 
that counts the amount of pulses emanating from a pacemaker. The pacemaker runs continuously as 
pulse-generator, and the accumulator is activated by the onsets of signals to time generated by the 
pacemaker, which acts as pulse-counter. The sort of hypothetical internal clock based on the 
pacemaker–counter device is composed of three connected parts: 
 a pacemaker that produces pulses or “ticks”; 
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 an accumulator that stores the ticks produced during a time period; 
 a switch that connects the two. 
Each of these parts posits a distinct stage of temporal processing. During the first stage, the internal 
clock, or input processing, estimates the time between two events. The ‘clock stage’ involves the 
pacemaker emitting over time a continuous stream of pulses that flow into the accumulator via an 
attention-controlled switch. When a stimulus is timed at the start of a target time interval the switch 
closes, allowing pulses to flow from the pacemaker to the accumulator. In turn, when the stimulus 
goes off at the end of the time interval, the switch opens, stopping the flow of pulses into the 
accumulator and cutting the connection. Then, for each time interval the accumulator is engaged 
with the opening or closing of the switch, and in this sense the switch behaves like an arbitrary reset 
signal that can be compared to the signal though which a mechanical stopwatch is reset. The basic 
idea of this model is that representations of duration are generated at the clock level by the 
pacemaker–accumulator system. As the pulses emitted by the pacemaker accumulate in a counter, 
then the number of the counted pulses is what determines the perceived length of an interval. 
Accordingly, the number of pulses accrued during a target time interval and contained in the 
accumulator gives a representation of duration, being used as “raw” material for time judgments. At 
the next stage of the clock mechanism, the ‘memory stage’, the temporal information is stored in the 
memory. Basically, SET systems involve two sorts of memory. A working memory for duration is 
essentially formed by the contents of the accumulator. This sort of reference memory stores 
important times, necessary to execute particular tasks. What is more, the memory stage also 
involves estimation of duration to be stored in a long-term reference memory. The next level of the 
clock mechanism pertains to the decision-making mechanism, which compares the stored interval 
of time with intervals formed by the current external onset.
185
 At the ‘decision stage’, the current 
accumulator account is continuously compared to a stored duration code sampled from reference 
memory. The decision-processing mechanism works on the basis of a temporal criterion. When the 
accumulator-account reaches the temporal criterion, the current timed interval is expected to end; in 
virtue of such expectation, an individual can make a temporal judgment about shorter or longer 
duration. If the objective time interval ends before the account reaches the temporal criterion, then 
the time interval is shorter than expected; conversely, if the account reaches the temporal criterion 
before the objective time interval ends, then the time interval is longer than expected. In short, the 
pacemaker–counter device encodes the time it takes for two events and then compares the time 
information stored in memory to all future events; only after the operation of all the three levels can 
a time judgment be made. According to this information-processing framework, time judgments and 
timed behaviours derive from the sequential operations processed at these three levels.
186
 
As opposed to the pacemaker–counter device, or SET, the oscillatory–processing device model is 
developed in the dynamic attending theory, or DAT, where the clock mechanism is described in 
terms of an oscillator that detects specific combinations of periodic neural events activated upon the 
onset of signals. Within this oscillator–detection account, the clock activity is encoded by 
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associating the combinatorial activity of the oscillator with a particular duration. DAT focuses on 
the contribution of the environment with entrainment of various biological rhythms;
187
 this clock 
model is based on the dynamical systems perspective, which builds on the observation that there are 
physical regularities within the flow of events in the environment. If we observe rhythmic 
phenomena in music, speech or even motor coordination, we note that such regularities mark 
coherent beginnings and ends for several successive time spans; therefore, due to these regularities 
we can predict forthcoming events and establish a state of expectation. The general idea behind 
DAT is that judgments about the timing sequence of physical events can be made by using an 
internal oscillator, which must be able to detect the synchrony/asynchrony between internal rhythms 
and external rhythms. While the clock model based on the pacemaker–counter device includes 
clock, memory and decision-making stages of temporal processing, conversely, the oscillator model 
is composed of two principal components: a nonlinear oscillator, and an attentional energy pulse 
rhythm.
188
 The summation of these two components forgoes the explicit memory comparison 
between two coded durations in favour of dynamic information afforded by synchrony versus 
asynchrony, between an internal ‘driven’ rhythm and an external ‘driving’ rhythm. An internal 
driven rhythm can be thought of in terms of attentional rhythm. The internal oscillator changes 
gradually and adapts to allow the attentional rhythm to get closer to the stimuli onset. Thus, the 
oscillator continues to adapt the time period, or timespan, between the peak of an attentional pulse 
and the onset of a stimulus. In particular, the oscillator process runs until the attentional peaks are 
closely aligned with the expected stimulus onsets.
189
 The result of the continuous adaptation of the 
internal oscillator to the context of environmental stimuli is a synchronization of attentional pulses 
and stimuli onsets.
190
 Consequently, the accuracy of temporal judgments depends on the temporal 
coherence between internal and external events; this coherence can exist only if the oscillator 
mechanism has the capacity to synchronize the internal rhythmicity of waiting, or attunement, with 
the appropriate external rhythms of the environment.
191
  
Before concluding the examination of these two internal clock models, I want to mention some 
distinctive features. First of all, these two approaches imply different understandings of duration. In 
SET, sometimes called the ‘interval model’, duration is explicitly represented as a ‘code’ that is 
stored in memory. Conversely, in DAT, sometimes called the ‘entrainment model’, duration is 
implicitly represented in terms of the oscillator period. While the interval model involves explicit 
comparison of two stored duration codes, the entrainment model involves a phase-based temporal 
contrast metric. A further important difference between those models concerns responses to 
stimulus onsets. The interval model involves the arbitrary resetting of the pacemaker-accumulator 
clock with the onset of each stimulus whilst the entrainment model involves more gradual 
correction of the oscillator phase and period. In the latter model, stimuli are supposed to 
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synchronize neurons in a certain area of the cortex, acting as an effective starting signal. As each of 
the synchronized neurons produces its own particular pattern of activation over time, this unique 
pattern of activation is associated with a particular time interval that serves as a basis for later 
comparison. This oscillator-coincidence detection account is favored by Matell and Meck
192
 
because of its neurobiological feasibility. I will later return to these models with regards to the 
question of whether explanations of time perception can be given from a modular perspective. 
Before that, let me discuss on the second general issue of time perception: the question of where 
time is processed in the brain.  
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12 
 
Time Perception in the context of Neuroscience 
 
 
  1  The Study of Time Perception in Neuroscience 
Thus far we have assumed that time perception is an adaptive function that facilitates the ability to 
make temporal judgments, predict and anticipate future events, or organize or plan sequences of 
actions. In introducing the topic, I dealt with the question of how people perceive time, so I focused 
on the perspective of the ‘internal clock’. According to this view, the relative accuracy with which 
humans (and animals) perceive duration and the passage of time is accomplished by a complex 
cognitive system, which invokes multiple component processes in the representation of real-time 
information. However, a specific and restricted neurobiological organ for time processing has not 
been found, and this point alone introduces a second general question: where is time processed in 
the brain? In recent decades the investigation into time processing has been a neglected topic in 
cognitive sciences and neuroscience.  
Neuroscientists indicate that several neural regions are engaged in timing, and explore issues of 
explicit time judgments in relation to the fundamental functionality of the principal brain structures 
involved. They propose that timekeeping is distributed in the brain via patterns of activity across a 
neural network, including specific contributions from neural activity within sensory modalities. 
However, explanations of time behaviour demand the construction of a wide framework that 
includes not only the neural timer, but also non-temporal components, such as attention, memory 
and decision-making. The brain regions underlying these processes are supposed to work together 
with the neural timer, as a part of the network subserving time perception. Neuroscientific 
approaches match a striking number of contributions from the fields of cognitive psychology, 
psychiatry, neurology and neuroanatomy; plus a wide variety of techniques ranging from 
psychophysical and behavioural experiments to pharmacological interventions and functional 
neuroimaging. Recent empirical studies, focusing on the neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
the experience of time, led to major progress with the realization that time perception involves 
distinct brain mechanisms and areas on different time scales.
193
 In this collection of recent research 
studies, several models were presented to cover experienced time intervals ranging from 
milliseconds to minutes in the brain areas individuated as the active ones. These demonstrated that 
certain brain areas are neural substrates of potential timekeeping mechanisms, including the 
cerebellum,
194
 the right posterior parietal cortex,
195
 the right prefrontal cortex
196
 and fronto-striatal 
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circuits.
197
 But the question of individuating the determinant part of the brain for representing 
duration has not been definitely answered. The variety of timing tasks and durations observed at 
different time ranges are partly responsible for the complicated nature of drawing a clear and 
definitive account of these brain structures. 
 
 2  The Role of the Cerebellum in Temporal Processing 
The assumption that the cerebellum is part of the biological basis of timing was first made more 
than 40 years ago,
198
 although its role in temporal processing has been intensively examined in the 
last decades. The cerebellum is active in many processes which operate based on the  precise 
temporal relationships between events, in particular, neuroscientists believe that it serves as internal 
clock in both the domain of perception and motor activities. Furthermore, recent studies have 
demonstrated that separate neural elements in the cerebellum have different delay properties which 
might potentially encode duration.
199
 Evidence for this assumption come from several 
neuroscientific methods which focus on the role of the cerebellum in various timing tasks. Clinical 
studies of perception suggest that the cerebellum plays a role in representing temporal information. 
Patients with lesions in the cerebellum were found to be impaired in either the precise timing of 
movements,
200
 or sensory discrimination of duration.
201
 It has also been shown that patients with 
lateral cerebellar lesions increase the variability of intervals produced with a series of taps.
202
 Other 
studies propose that cerebellar patients have more difficulty than other experimental participants in 
discriminating between brief intervals marked with sounds, despite being equally efficient at 
discriminating between the intensity of sounds.
203
 All the studies reported here suggest that the 
deficits observed when patients process time information are not due to general auditory processing 
incapacity, but rather to perceptual deficits which are apparently specific to temporal dimension (as 
we shall see, the results of these studies are very important in the light of a presumed module for 
temporal processing).  
On the other hand, the involvement of the cerebellum has been individuated in a variety of tasks 
studied in the motor domain; in particular in the cases of movement production and rhythmic 
movements.
204
 Evidence for the cerebellar timing hypothesis comes from research on simple forms 
of sensorimotor learning tasks, such as eye-blink conditioning, or speech perception/production in 
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which the timing of brief intervals is a central component. However, either perceptual or motor 
studies highlight the critical role of the cerebellum in tasks in which precise representation of 
dynamic information is necessary. Generally, the role of the cerebellum is confirmed in the explicit 
timing of relatively brief intervals. In the citied timing tasks, for example, the extent of temporal 
processing is quite limited, spanning only up to about 500 ms; but activity in the cerebellum is also 
reported in timing tasks in which intervals of time are shorter than 1.2 sec.
205
 Somewhat along the 
same line, studies using rTMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) data demonstrate that the 
cerebellum is essential in the reproduction of brief intervals of 400– to 600-msec.206 Although there 
is less evidence for the cerebellum's contribution to timing in the range of seconds to minutes, 
recent studies suggest that it is plausible that relatively short intervals form the building blocks for 
the representation of long intervals. Evidence consistent with this assumption comes from neural 
imaging studies of duration, in which it is demonstrated that the cerebellum provides codes for 
processing intervals of time lasting 12–24 sec.207 Whether the cerebellum is involved exclusively in 
the timing of brief intervals, or whether it also covers a wider range of durations, is open to 
question; however, its role in the timing of long intervals is consistent with the central clock–
counter mechanism perspective. 
 
  3  The Basal Ganglia and the Cerebral Cortices 
In addition to the cerebellum, neuroscientists indentify the basal ganglia as the most likely 
subcortical structure involved in both the early stages of time processing,
208
 or the encoding of time 
intervals.
209
 Contributions to time perception provided by the basal ganglia and the cerebellum can 
be distinguished on the basis of different interval ranges. In principle, the cerebellum is mainly 
active in timing tasks relating to sub-second intervals of time, as it provides representation of 
duration in the millisecond range, whereas the basal ganglia has been indicated as the neural counter 
for longer durations, although it plays a role in timing tasks of either sub- or supra-second 
intervals.
210
 Recent PET (positron emission tomography) studies would confirm that, besides the 
cerebellum, the basal ganglia contributes to a network underlying perception of durations of less 
than 1 sec. In any case, the prefrontal and the neocerebellar regions are supposed to perform 
dissociable functions within the network for time perception.
211
 On the other hand, even the cerebral 
cortex is likely to participate actively in the processing of time intervals. Recent imaging studies 
focused on the involvement of the frontal cortex in the processing of brief intervals of less than 1 
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sec,
212
 whereas activity of the right hemispheric prefrontal cortex has been found in both sub-
second and supra-second intervals.
213
 What is more, the critical role of the supplementary motor 
area, or SMA, in the timing of intervals shorter than 1 sec,
214
 or longer than 1 sec is currently being 
studied.
215
 Evidence for the involvement of the parietal cortex in time interval processing emerges 
from studies using rTMS.
216
 Other studies using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) 
revealed that the parietal cortex acts as an interface between sensory and motor processes by 
translating temporal information into action.
217
 To conclude this brief overview of the brain areas 
that play a role in timing, the right posterior parietal cortex is active in the timing of short intervals 
of less than 1 sec marked by either auditory or visual signals,
218
 but also in the timing of longer 
intervals.
219
 
 
12.  4 Neurological mechanisms: Intrinsic Theories vs. Dedicated Theories 
As I said, neuroscientific approaches focus on several brain areas or systems underlying our 
perception of duration and timing of bodily movements. From the perspective of neuroscience, 
there is no single brain area on which the functioning of our temporal experiences is completely 
reliant, rather different brain regions are assigned a central timekeeping function. However, it 
should be said that the cognitive components entangled with time processing do not necessarily 
depend on a potential internal clock, since they may more likely be related to an integrative 
processing of multiple modules distributed throughout the brain. The idea that multiple brain 
regions show activation during time perception tasks, and that multiple cognitive processes 
contribute to perception of duration, is supported by empirical studies, such as experimental 
manipulations of task load (i.e. attention or working memory); clinical studies involving selected 
patients with dysfunctions in different brain areas (i.e. cerebellum, basal ganglia, frontal and 
parietal cortex); and neuroimaging studies using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging).
220
 
Time researchers claim that neural mechanisms involved in temporal processing and time 
experiences operate in different neural areas, some of which are not primarily related to the 
encoding of duration (that is, the internal clock) despite taking part in a complex timing system 
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involving attention, working memory and decision-making processes.
221
 Evidence from 
neuroscience feeds the debate about whether there is a central mechanism for explicitly encoding 
time, or whether neural populations within each region intrinsically encode temporal characteristics 
of sensory events on the basis of time-dependent neural changes.
222
 This question divides the issue 
into dedicated time and intrinsic time. 
Intrinsic time theories endorse the view of distributed neural networks, in which neural populations 
associated to each region encode duration.
223
 According to this view, the different brain areas which 
contribute to time perception are distributed in the neural network without incorporating a dedicated 
timing system with a centralized clock; activity of these areas would instead depend on the modality 
and the type of task processed. Thus, time is supposed to be an emergent and intrinsic property of 
the underlying neural dynamics, it depends not on a dedicated timing mechanism but on state-
dependent neural changes, such as short-term synaptic plasticity.
224
 Models based on intrinsic time 
consider timing to be inherent in the neural dynamics of the cerebral cortex (including the primary 
sensory areas), assuming that several neural units possess such intrinsic temporal-processing 
property. For example, in the modality-specific timing areas, visual neurons are responsible for 
visual timing; auditory neurons are responsible for auditory timing, and so forth; these sensory-
specific areas do not need to be identified with any dedicated central clock mechanism. However, 
intrinsic mechanisms are generally limited to very short time intervals defined as up to several 
hundred milliseconds. On the other hand, the alternative view of dedicated time suggests that time 
perception is processed by dedicated timing systems. Accordingly, all time modalities draw 
information from a central timing module, in which the cerebellum (necessary for matching 
movement with events and pairing events in time to consequences) and the basal ganglia (a possible 
gatekeeper mechanism and long-interval discriminator) are often implicated as specialized timers. 
Further dedicated timers of the central timing module are likely to be distributed across the cortex, 
the supplementary motor area (SMA) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Activation of these areas in 
dedicated timing processes would be confirmed by studies using fMRI (functional magnetic 
resonance imaging) and TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation). 
In the current debate regarding temporal-processing mechanisms involved in the milliseconds 
range, the state-dependent network (SDN) model has been proposed.
225
 The SDN model claims that 
even though temporal processing may be dedicated to the spatial attributes of a scene, time is, 
however, an emergent property which is intrinsically coded. According to this view, the 
representation of duration depends on the neural network’s initial state, in which the contextual 
influences of stimuli with similar attributes form the basis for time judgments. Recently, this 
original hypothesis has been addressed by empirical studies. In the study proposed by Spencer,
226
 a 
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randomized occurrence of an irrelevant distracter interval in a duration estimation task was 
introduced to test predictions of the SDN model. The results obtained in the experiment support (at 
least in part) the SDN model for time intervals shorter than 300ms; it has been shown that 
interference effects diminished with intervals of 300ms. Other research provides empirical data to 
evaluate the plausibility of the SDN model. One study demonstrated that, in predictions of 
contextual influences, interference decreased when the duration of stimuli that had to be judged had 
different frequencies, or when the stimuli were separated with inter-stimulus intervals of longer than 
250ms.
227
 
 
12. 5 Time Scales of Time Perception 
Among time researchers the assumption that the processing of temporal information in the distinct 
brain areas and mechanisms takes different time scales is being affirmed.
228
 Central to the literature 
of perception of duration is the distinction between supra-second and millisecond range intervals. 
Several models based on this distinction came under close scrutiny.
229
 As regards to short temporal 
scales (expressed in milliseconds) I alluded to the contraposition between intrinsic and dedicated 
time theories, whose major focus is whether duration in the sub-second range is processed by 
dedicated systems (thus, if there are dedicated areas or circuits in the brain that control the 
processing of time), or whether neural populations within different regions of the brain intrinsically 
encode duration in consequence of time-dependent neural changes (thus, if temporal information is 
inherent to the neural dynamics of modality-specific areas).230 
Conversely, the study of time perception in longer temporal scales (expressed from seconds to 
minutes) encounters the view of the centralized clock-type mechanism to estimate duration. In the 
context of prospective time theories, we saw that in one dominant version the internal clock is 
described in terms of a pacemaker that produces a series of pulses, taking the number of pulses 
recorded over a given timespan to represent subjective duration.
231
 Current models of prospective 
timing reveal that paying attention to the flow of time increases perceived subjective duration 
(somewhat similarly, being distracted from assessing time results in the shortening of perceived 
time). ‘Attention’ has been viewed as an important causal agent of perceived duration in many 
models of time perception or estimation. The importance of allocating attention to time was recently 
tested in a variant of clock model experiments using a specific task: the peak interval procedure.
232
 
In this procedure, a rat was trained to press a level bar after a certain time interval had passed 
(similarly to the rat of Skinner’s boxes), whereas a distracter signal was present when the interval 
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had to be timed. The experiment shows that if attention is distracted from judging time, the 
accuracy of the timed performances deteriorates. In addition to attention, other causal agents, such 
as emotion and bodily sensations, have been identified as shaping the perception of time. With the 
emergence of experiments testing causal agents of perceived duration, new theoretical models were 
presented to extend (but also to challenge) the classic internal-clock view of time ranges of seconds 
to minutes. 
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13 
 
Time and Modularity 
 
  
13. 1 A further issue of temporal perception: Modularity 
In the last two chapters I engaged in an examination of the much-discussed issues of time 
perception. The whole are of study of time perception has a long history that goes back to the 
beginning of experimental psychology, however, it has progressed on numerous fronts especially 
since the 1970s, when large differences have emerged between the prospective and retrospective 
findings. Time in passing (prospective estimation) and time in recall (retrospective estimation) 
involve distinct issues and distinct procedural paradigms, but regardless of the development of 
quantitative paradigms and techniques used to summarize large bodies of experimental data, the 
pure psychological research of timing has itself shown an important renewal in the last decades.
233
 
The most dominant techniques to explore the sense of time have been associated with verbal 
estimation, duration production, and duration reproduction.
234
 Reproduction of time intervals 
necessarily emphasizes memory for explorations of time in passing; whereas, verbal estimation and 
production require reference of standard temporal units (e.g., seconds, minutes). Pure perception of 
duration is contaminated by the linguistic and semantic tags associated with traditional units of 
measured time.
235
  
Thus far we have seen that an influent view takes duration to be measured by an internal clock 
mechanism able to provide representations of the “correct” time. The idea of the stopwatch is quite 
simple. Somehow the brain emits a steady stream of pulses, and subconsciously tallies how many 
were produced during a specific interval; what is perceived as deviate from this declared target is 
naturally seen as errors of estimation. The view that when we perceive durations we are endowed 
with the biological equivalent of such stopwatch had impact on an increasing number of theories. In 
the recent years, new ideas emerged about the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the 
experience of time, time researchers and neuroscientists claim that the brain runs multiple 
stopwatches simultaneously depending on the kind of task required. It is currently believed that the 
biological stopwatches make use of several brain mechanisms, including those that control memory, 
regulate metabolism or any else circadian rhythmic, and that they process sensory inputs at different 
temporal ranges. Thus, neuroscientists renewed the interest in time perception, accomplishing 
research of cognitive psychology with newly and emerging empirical data; they joined with many 
cognitive psychologists that understanding how the brain deals with time is important.
236
 In many 
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ways, neurological research provided innovative experimental techniques, including brain imaging 
techniques that are used in association with different time scales. With the advance of brain imaging 
techniques, it became progressively more evident that highly detailed but static representations of 
brain configuration could lead to important insights, nonetheless, these insights appear inevitably 
limited by the absence of sufficient information as to the dynamic changes occurring on differing 
time scales. It is now evident that the brain necessarily deals with time on a number of differing 
scales, and also in a number of different cortical areas (or modules) having a number of differing 
functions (including absolute timing, relative timing, rhythmic frequencies). In this scenario we 
encounter a subdivision of brain on the basis of: supra-second vs. millisecond ranges of time 
intervals, motor timing tasks vs. non-motor timing tasks, or sequences of intervals vs. isolated 
intervals. This multitude of aspects of time perception gave the rise to many distinct, and 
sometimes, incompatible theories of time processing, all related to the two general questions earlier 
discussed: how and where in the brain is time processed? As we saw, time researchers are far from 
reaching a consensus on these questions, and this difficulty seems importantly due to the variety of 
explanations of what mechanisms (how), and what neural systems (where), process duration. It is 
not clear, for example, what timing pulses are, or how they are produced, or still where they are 
managed in the brain. What is more, the number of timing pulses that the brain emits per minute can 
increase or decrease, as depending on other important aspects which are not intrinsically ‘temporal’, 
such as attention, emotion, mood, health, and even surroundings. A major issue is whether there are 
dedicated areas or circuits in the brain that control the flux of time information, or whether time 
information is inherent in the neural dynamics of modality-specific areas; the issue marks out the 
contraposition between dedicated time vs. intrinsic time. However, the questions of how and where 
time is processed by the brain lead to another question: is time perception, along which the other 
kinds of perceptions, modular in nature? To give an affirmative answer to this question is to endorse 
a modular view of the mental architecture of time perception, analogously to that proposed for 
audition, vision, speech, or other kinds of perception. 
 
13. 2 The perceived object of Time Perception: duration and succession of events 
I believe that one difficulty to endorse a modular perspective for time processing might be related to 
the tricky character of the objects of time perception. This simple consideration can be made from 
the fact that the objects of time perception cannot be compared to the physical objects that fall into 
the three-dimension space. Whatever timing task we perform (for example, if we try to execute a 
rhythmic movement, or to count the beats of the song we are listening), we cannot point the finger 
at a ‘duration object’ as we do at a sound source. Woodrow wrote: “Time is not a thing that, like an 
apple, may be perceived;”237 and I think this view, and other similar views, might have disheartened 
the development of explanations of time processing from the perspective of the modularity thesis. If 
time is none physical object, what is the object of our temporal perception? 
This is a much-discussed issue of cognitive psychology, but the question originated from 
philosophical reflections. The study of psychological correlates of subjective time experience is a 
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late development in the long history of theoretical and empirical research on the relationship 
between humans and time in general. Outlining the history of the philosophy of time from Plato and 
the Greek philosophers, to Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Guyau, Spencer, McTaggart, 
Bergson, Paul Fraisse, and so many others, created solid ground for the psychology of time. 
Philosophers often defined time dimension as the dimension of change. The Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus, for example, claimed that the cosmos is endlessly changing, manifesting ongoing 
cyclical patterns, as one of the forefathers.
238
 Sometimes the idea of temporal change recurs in 
terms of the metaphor of the temporal flow, or passage of time. In a general speaking, this metaphor 
tells us that what is in the future continually recedes into the present, and then into the ever more 
distant past, marking out the only one direction of time (time irreversibility) postulated by the 
second law of thermodynamics. In his famous book The Principles of Psychology, William James 
introduced one of the earliest psychological studies of the psychogenesis of time sense, discussing 
the perception of time duration and the passage of time as a core concept in psychology. James 
wrote: “the knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always 
mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing.”239 introducing the foundations of conceptions 
that will later become the basis for time perspective theories: “there is thus a sort of perspective 
projection of past objects upon present consciousness, similar to that of wide landscapes upon a 
camera-screen”.240 Almost in the same period, in his thesis “Essai sur les données immédiates de la 
conscience”241 Henri Bergson discussed time as intuition of duration, felt through the stream of 
consciousness in reference to the immediate experience. Bergson argued that subjective time is a 
spatial degradation of “pure” time achieved by a symbolic representation constituted by the past 
consisting of memory, and the future formed by expectations. However, the present, past and future 
that form the subjective time might be just mental constructions of our experience of changing 
events. Then, it is not clear what perception of time should be beyond a mere perception of things 
whose state is in continuous evolution. The drawback of our sense of time was well analyzed by 
McTaggart in his famous paper The Unreality of Time,
242
 in which he assumed that the distinction 
between past/present and earlier/later positions in time underlines the profound paradoxical status of 
time dimension. Yet, if time does not exist in the physical reality (that is, if individuals cannot 
objectively perceive the present in McTaggart’s sense), what is the perceived time?  
Despite time cannot be perceived as we perceive a physical object, it is profoundly rooted in our 
mental architecture as well as the spatial dimension. To paraphrase Augustine: “time exists into our 
mind”.243 Somehow along this line, the Gestalt psychologists assigned to time a critical role in 
perception. It is evident that the perception of structure in time is absolutely fundamental to the 
perception of any object, such as an apple. The temporal binding of the features of an apple, both 
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within a sensory modality and across sensory modalities, is what renders an apple a cognitive 
object. This sensory–temporal feature binding lays the ground for the cognitive realm of semantic 
representation and mnemonic storage and retrieval.
244
 In very general terms, we could say that time 
is the binding between physical objects that fall under perception, and that changes in those objects 
have a temporal organization based on succession (order) and duration (simultaneity). From the 
early years the interest of psychologists was centered on the accuracy of the estimation of small 
time periods and on the rhythmicity of living organisms.
245
 The inquiry began with 19th century 
research of isochronous sequences, that is, sequences of sounds separated by equal intervals,
246
 but 
then investigation into perception of duration and simultaneity followed, changing the view of the 
interrelationship between time and perception in the various senses. By the mid-20
th
 century, 
psychologists have began to focus on the relationships between the duration and the perceived 
organization of rhythmic patterns. The great pioneer of this tradition is Paul Fraisse. Fraisse who 
conducted an impressive amount of systematic research in the area, providing important 
contributions in the field. From the 1940s through the 1970s, Fraisse explored different approaches 
to the psychology of time, including: chronobiology, psychophysics, the Piagetian approach to the 
acquisition of the notion of time, philosophical approaches, as well as the application of these 
viewpoints to the perception of rhythm in music and in poetry. In Psychology of Time Fraisse 
proposed a general model of the developed sense of time: “Time of things or duration of me? 
Duration from sensations, or duration from of our mind?”.247 Drawing from Gestalt Theory, he 
argued that time perception comes from a ‘bridge’ between the past, the present and the immediate 
future induced by the duration of perception: “as soon as we fix our attention, organization 
appears…distinguishing objects, isolating successive structures, which therefore are figures”.248 
Fraisse developed the idea of a “time horizon, consisting of past and future time perspectives”. 
After reviewing his earlier work and that of others, he discussed the fundamental distinction 
between perception and estimation of duration in a later paper titled Perception and Estimation of 
Time.
249
 
 
13. 3 Is there a module for temporal perception?  
Thus, understanding time, or still better what perceive or think of time, has a high degree of 
complexity, and this is because perceptual time is not ‘isomorphic’ to physical time. What is more, 
in humans experienced time might be affected by several factors, including attention, memory, 
emotional states and motivation, interest, context, etc., which are all potential modulators of time 
perception. For example, cognitive and emotional factors may affect accuracy and precision of time 
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estimation in the seconds-to-minutes range. Among our senses, the ‘sense of time’ is peculiar, as 
time is ubiquitous in our experiential world and yet nowhere can be found in the physical one. A 
thread of the psychological and neuroscientific research was to search for a particular time organ in 
the human body. Evidence shows that no single or specific organ is given for time perception, but 
all sensory modalities are possible entries at the interface of physical time with perceptual time. 
This evidence might threaten the development of explanations of time processing within the context 
of the modularity thesis. Consider, for example, the possession of transducers as the ear. We can 
understand how much the ear is important to heard sounds and process the information it contains at 
higher levels of processing. But if the ear is fundamental to auditory perception, conversely, there is 
no such specific perceptive apparatus for estimating time intervals. However, I am convinced that 
the tricky aspects of time do not threaten the project to develop a general account of temporal 
perception based on the theory of modularity of mind. Rather, in this conclusive paragraphs I try to 
give some reasons for endorsing the modularity view of time perception. My conviction is that time 
perception is part of the modular architecture in the same sense as visual perception is. To support 
this hypothesis, I will report a number of covering functional, biological, and neuropsychological 
studies that confirm this view. Let us reformulate the question posed at the beginning of this 
discussion in this way: is there a module for temporal processing? Before discussing the hypothesis 
of the modularity of time processing, some observations can be made as a way of giving some 
initial support to the modularity view of time processing. 
 It is well-known from the behaviorist literature that animals can learn time intervals. In some of 
Pavlov’s experiments, the reinforcement was delayed by a particular time interval. When dogs 
were trained with the delay, they started salivating only at the end of the interval.
250
 Also, many 
other animal studies have shown that rats, dogs, pigeons, and other animals are capable to learn 
the temporal structure of tasks. Skinner’s boxes experiments demonstrated that if rats or pigeons 
receive a reward when they press a bar, they quickly learn to anticipate this event (for example, 
when this reward is only given every 30 seconds, the rats will increase their bar-pressing when 
the 30 second deadline approaches). Those dated experiments, which clearly point out a sense of 
duration of time intervals,
251
 inspired the research of temporal duration conducted by Fraisse. In 
between the 1940s and the 1970s, Fraisse carried out a striking investigation on time, rhythm, 
succession, and duration, spanned the transition from the behaviorist psychology (of which 
Fraisse believed had difficulty in including time as a variable) to cognitive psychology. On the 
ground of this research,
252
 in the 1984 he published Perception and Estimation of Time. Fraisse 
argued that there are distinct and independent mental mechanisms which deal with succession 
and perception of events, and that such mechanisms operate at different time scales. Here I 
argue that those mechanisms individuated by Fraisse for perception of succession and duration 
can be themselves referred as processor subsystems forming a time module. 
 
                                                          
250
 Pavlov: 1927. 
251
 Gibbon: 1977. 
252
 Fraisse: 1963, 1967, 1980, 1981. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
124 
 
 The hypothesis that there is a module for temporal processing is consistent with a large 
literature concerning the internal clock perspective. Yet in 1975 by Thomas and Weaver
253
 
proposed an intentional model based upon a cognitive processor. The temporal processor 
hypothesis claims the existence of a ‘temporal mechanism’ for estimation of duration, this 
hypothesis was successively tested in some connectionist models
254
 and confirmed in an 
extensive literature.
255
 As it was discussed in a previous section (11.5), Matell and Meck
256
 have 
reviewed the three versions of the internal clock theory: the pacemaker–accumulator model; the 
process-decay model; and the oscillator–coincidence detection model. We have seen that, in the 
pacemaker–accumulator model, a functional ‘temporal module’ is identified with a pacemaker-
counter device that emits pulses that are accumulated in a counter; where the stream of pulse 
from the pacemaker results in a linearly increasing accumulator value, and the number of the 
counted pulses determines a perceived length of intervals.
257
 On the other hand, in the process-
decay model a decay of activation in memory is used to estimate elapsed time;
258
 whereas, in 
the oscillator–coincidence detection model stimuli synchronize neurons in a certain area of the 
cortex, acting as a starting sign. Regardless of the paradigm for the internal clock we adopt, the 
hypothesis that the brain is provided with a time module for time processing is consistent with 
both prospective theories and retrospective theories. Prospective timing involves time 
estimation of short time intervals stored for later comparison, taking at the start of any interval 
the subject to already know that an estimation will have to be made; in contrast, retrospective 
timing involves estimation of duration when the subject is aware that the time interval to be 
judged has already passed. In any case, the ability to estimate time is crucial in every situations 
in which we observe an action and expect a response (that can be considered an account of 
expert behavior); or in multi-tasking situations in which we are asked to switch between tasks 
after specific intervals.
259
 The processing of temporal intervals in real life is often implicit, 
automated, and tightly interwoven with other aspects of cognition such as perception, learning, 
and decision-making. The reason why time estimation is implicit in nature is that, for most 
tasks, the timing aspect is often secondary to the real task being performed. Then, I argue that 
these features of temporal perception are exactly the kind of features indicated by Fodor for 
modular systems. As in the case of the other modules, we can suppose that a separate module 
for time processing might be integrated in a more extensive theory of cognition. A module for 
time processing might form the explanatory basis for temporal perception; whereas, more 
complex and explicit forms of time estimation might be explained on the ground of more 
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general cognitive strategies, which build on the basic capability furnished by the time 
module.
260
 In the last years, the idea of the modularity of time perception was entertained by 
some models proposed for estimation of time intervals in the sub- and supra-second ranges. 
These models suggest to explain time estimation, respectively, on the basis of the pacemaker-
based internal clock, with functional characteristics similar to the internal clock accounts 
proposed by Matell and Meck,
261
 and the oscillator-based internal clock,
262
 according to the 
generic view of intrinsic theories that representation of temporal information is inherent in 
neural dynamics.
263
 
 
 Further evidence for the modularity of time processing emerges from the study of the perception 
of rhythm in music. The perceptual organization of rhythmic stimuli is considered a paradigm 
for the perception of structure in time, since commonly associated with the perception of rhythm 
is a feeling of movement in time.
264
 The study of the perception of rhythm deals with a general 
elemental problem in temporal grouping and temporal correlation with which the brain is faced; 
by studying the perception of rhythm psychologists try to investigate the mechanisms by which 
the brain solves the problem of temporal chunking and feature recognition. The fundamental 
characteristics of perceived temporal organization in music are linked to the concepts of 
grouping, beat, and meter. Psychologists observe that a basic response to music is to clap, tap, 
or move the body in time in a periodic fashion with a perceived pulse defined beat.
265
 By 
definition, a perceived beat corresponds to a series of approximately periodic time points in 
music that stand out in some way to the listener; whereas meter refers to the temporal 
organization of beats on multiple time scales. Taken together the time scales form a metric 
hierarchy, such that the beats at each level of the hierarchy periodically coincide. Meter 
perception is then the ability to hearing beats on multiple time scales, with some beats heard as 
more accented (stronger) than others, on the basis of the metric hierarchy imposed by the 
temporal structure of the rhythm. General questions on ‘beat’ and ‘meter’ concern the metric 
coding of rhythms.
266
 Psychologists interested in perception of beat and meter, and in the metric 
coding of rhythm, generally focus on contributions of different types of accents to perception of 
metrical structure, the role of tempo, and the role of listener knowledge. On the other hand, 
general questions on grouping concern the figural coding of rhythms; and questions on 
perception of grouping concern how (much) sound characteristics, such as duration, frequency, 
and intensity, affect listeners in his perceiving the grouping of notes in musical patterns, and 
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why listeners tend to impose grouping structure in the case of absence of acoustic cues in the 
signal. Fraisse
267
 noted that listeners tend to simplify rhythms as they tend to spontaneously tap 
two different intervals, one of which is twice the length of the other. Subjects asked to 
memorize and reproduce rhythms tend to simplify the intervals in the original temporal 
sequence into two interval sizes, one twice the length of the other. The shorter interval lends 
itself to separation between notes and the longer to separation between groups of notes. In the 
recent years, various models proposed to study musical abilities (i.e. music recognition) not as 
the product of a general cognitive architecture, but rather as part of a distinct mental module 
with its own procedures and knowledge bases that are associated with dedicated neuronal 
substrates.
268
 Accordingly, listeners develop stable representations of auditory events on the 
basis of a specific processing system for music recognition, which works in parallel to a specific 
processing system for the temporal aspects of music perception. Generally, temporal patterning 
of sound involves two fundamental aspects of musical communication, tempo and rhythm.
269
 
Given the variety of temporal patterning of acoustic energy received by the ears, the internal 
representation of time organization is necessary to organization of rhythmic, a time module 
responsible for the processing of temporal patterning of sound is then supposed to work in 
parallel to the music module. In the light of the high degree of functional similarity and 
interactive working between music processing and time processing, we can justifiably suppose 
that the part of mental architecture containing time processing should be referred as modular. 
 
13. 4 Fraisse’s account of time processing: Perception and Estimation of Time  
Here I suggest that there is an independent processing-system specific to the information of 
duration and succession of events. I argue that the modular functional architecture for time 
processing comprises two neurobiological isolable processing components, each having the 
potential to be specialized for time. The proposed time module is based on a general theory of 
perception drown by Fraisse in Perception and Estimation of Time, thus, before discussing my 
hypothesis I examine the argument proposed by Fraisse in that paper. I begin with an examination 
of the assumption that time processing provides causal relations by which the mind organizes the 
perceived objects coming from the external world. As James wrote:  
“empty our minds as we may, some form of changing process remains for us to feel, and 
cannot be expelled. And along with the sense of the process and its rhythm goes the sense of 
the length of time it lasts. Awareness of change is thus the condition on which our 
perception of time's flow depends; but there exists no reason to suppose that empty time's 
own changes are sufficient for the awareness of change to be aroused. The change must be 
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of some concrete sort -- an outward or inward sensible series, or a process of attention or 
volition.”270 
Time perception is nothing more than perception of changes between physical objects or events that 
stand in causal relations to each other.
271
 Fraisse referred to two fundamental concepts that can be 
extrapolated from our experience of changes, our possession of them would depend upon changes 
conceived or perceived by each of us. Thus, Fraisse focused on the fundamental aspect of 
experiencing temporal reality that lays the foundation for abstract representations in relation to the 
concepts recognizable from our experience of change: 
 Succession: which corresponds to the fact that two or more events can be perceived as different 
and organized sequentially; it is based on our experience of the continuous changing through 
which the present becomes the past.  
 Duration: which applies to the interval between two successive events. 
The distinction between these concepts is made on the basis of phenomenological and experimental 
data concerning the phenomenal particularities of our perceptions: 
“Succession may be distinguished from simultaneous occurence, and duration distinguished 
from instantaneous…succession must be distinguished from discontinuity, which is most 
evident perceptually when two or more stimuli excite the same peripheral sense organs.”272 
What emerges from the series of experiments reported by Fraisse for explaining the transition from 
simultaneity to succession is that no specialized sensory receptor is available for time processing, 
but final time judgments are subjected to all sorts of stimulation bias as well as to the type of task. 
Fraisse observed that in multisensory perception time ties all the stimuli involved in the cognitive or 
neurological processes; but regardless of sensory modality the succession order threshold is 
constant: approximately 20ms.
273
 It has been shown that reaction time to an auditory stimulation is 
approximately 40ms less than for a visual stimulation, giving a general idea of the size of respective 
latencies, despite the values obtained in a reaction time task are not directly related to the 
succession threshold.
274
 To confirm the role of latencies, Fraisse
275
 conducted an experiment 
focusing on synchronization, or simultaneity, between hand tapping and the sound of a simple 
repetitive auditory rhythm. Data furnished by the mentioned experiment demonstrated that on the 
average, hand tapping, as a tactile measure, anticipates the sound by about 30ms, and this 
anticipation is approximately 20ms longer when made by the foot. If a subject tries to tap 
simultaneously with his hand and with his foot at his own spontaneous rhythm, the foot tap will 
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precede the hand tap by about 20ms. From his and other experiments
276
 Fraisse concluded that those 
anticipations should be attributed to the fact that the tactile stimulus must precede the sound in order 
to be perceived as simultaneous by the brain. This means that there must be a notable disparity 
between two stimuli if there is to be perception of succession and order. Fraisse said that this 
variability can be explained by the subjective criteria for simultaneity, this evidence was reached in 
a large variety of experiments: 
“A perception threshold equal to or greater than 20ms thus cannot simply be attributed to 
disparity between the arrival of two impulses on the brain. A decision mechanism having its 
own duration must be postulated. A very complex model that incorporates the largest 
amount of data and hypotheses has been proposed by Sternberg & Knoll (1973). A value of 
Δt possessing its own variability must be added to the possible differences in arrival of 
impulses from the different stimulations.”277 
Fraisse explained this decision function by a variety of mechanisms relating to the attention-
switching processing. It is thought that a length of time involved in this kind of processing is 
necessary to focus attention on each of the stimuli that are perceived as successive.
278
 The decision 
mechanism hypothesis is compatible with the discrete moment hypothesis,
279
 which postulates that 
perception of moments is not continuous, but rather intermittent and discrete since the elements of 
information flow are integrated at distinct moments, whose order is distinguished only if each 
element is treated at a different moment from the other. Each perceptive moment can be thought as 
a window that is in continuous movement, Fraisse defined the perception of these moments with the 
term of perceptual moment.
280
 Accordingly, instantaneous events must be distinguished from 
durable events on the basis of experiments of stimuli perception; when very brief stimuli are used, 
then perception of instantaneity can be obtained, because the ‘on’ moment cannot be distinguished 
from the ‘off’ moment. Therefore, perception of succession and duration are linked to the 
identification of the ‘on’ and ‘off’ effects.281 More specifically, perception of instantaneity 
corresponds to the non-separation of the ‘on’ and ‘off’ components of evoked potentials, namely, 
event-related brain potentials (ERP); as it was confirmed by a series of experimental studies
282
 
using evoked potential recording techniques that compare measured apparent perceived duration to 
measured stimulus duration. In all those studies, a minimal duration of 130ms for apparent 
perceived duration is indicated. Fraisse argued that the organization of stimuli within and across 
sensory modalities creates both the perception of succession and the perception of simultaneity: 
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“This objective difficulty in perceiving simultaneity relates to the fact that there is no actual 
impression of simultaneity for stimuli pertaining to different sense modalities.”283 
Fraisse believed that this organization occurs in the perceptual present (or specious present), in 
which events and stimuli are perceived as durable and continuous, in contrast to the perceptual 
moment, in which they are perceived as discrete. For example, the syllables bit and ter, when 
spoken such that the time interval between the two syllables is less than about 1.5–2 seconds, are 
heard as the single word the word bitter; in contrast, when the same syllables are spoken such that 
the time interval between them is greater than 1.5–2 seconds, two isolated words are perceived.284 
This interval of time has been identified with the perceptual present, as opposed to the past, or 
long–term memory.285 For Fraisse, duration is a construct of human mind that occurs in the 
perceptual present, it has no existence of itself but is the intrinsic characteristic of what endures. 
Having introduced the concepts of succession and duration, and specified the different kinds of 
perception they involve (perceptual moment and perceptual, or specious, present), Fraisse 
introduced the fundamental distinction between the mental procedures of estimation and perception. 
According to him, what people can know about time is something that is manifested through 
perception and estimation of succession or duration: 
“Estimation of duration takes place when memory is used either to associate a moment in 
the past with a moment in the present or to link two past events, whereas perception of 
duration involves the psychological present.”286 
This specification is drafted on the empirical basis of the three orders of duration identified in the 
physical continuum: 
 a) less than 100ms, at which the perception is of instantaneity; 
 b) 100 ms-5sec, perception of duration in the perceived present; 
 c) above 5sec, estimation of duration involving memory. 
On Fraisse’s view, these orders of duration do not hold the same epistemological status. Basically, 
durations shorter than about 100ms are not perceived as such, whereas, the perception of a 
succession appears beyond the level of 20ms. At this level, human eyes perceive successions which 
represent the raw material of the physical world, namely, the changes that can engrave their date on 
physical objects. Conversely, at the level above 100ms perception of duration occurs, which refers 
to the ability to apprehend sets of successive events and perceived objects as simultaneous. Fraisse 
said that this ability is situated within the limits of the psychological present
287
 as first identified by 
William James: 
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“[T]he practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain 
breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into 
time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a 
stern, as it were –a rearward– and a forward-looking end… We do not first feel one end and 
then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time 
between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends embodied in 
it”288 
It should be reminded that the specious present has no fixed duration but includes a unity among the 
perceptive events it reveals, for example, as in the case of perception of rhythmic patterns. This 
means that the specious present should be identified to the duration of a experiential process, and 
not to the period of duration itself. Generally, we recur to this ability for perception of a sentence 
simple enough to be repeated, where the elements of a rhythmic pattern identified as a rhythm are 
perceived as linked to each other to form a unified group. In turn, perception of rhythm is 
disintegrated if the stimuli are spaced too far apart; in this case there is nothing more than 
perception of their regular successions. The capacity of perceiving duration has been sometimes 
defined as "capacity of apprehension," "short-term memory," or "very short-term memory;" 
however, according to Fraisse, it can hardly extend beyond 5 sec, having an average value of 2 to 
3sec. Within these limits we can speak of the perception of duration, which thereby becomes a 
quantity whose beginning has not yet been stored in memory.
289
 
Beyond the limits of the perceived present, there is ‘estimation’ of duration. Fraisse thought that at 
this level of the processing duration can only be estimated by the subject’s construct, which brings 
to bear short- and long-term memory.
290
 Estimation of duration is involved when the subject judges 
durations which are not presently perceived, at this level of the processing memory intervenes in the 
making of global judgments about the duration that has already passed. The estimation of time in 
passing (the temporal flow) may concern either a duration between the present moment and the 
beginning of an event that has just terminated, or a duration which ran over a period of time 
between two events that recede into the (ever more) distant past. Long-term memory is fundamental 
to estimation of duration, as opposed to perception of duration which uses only short-term memory: 
“Having studied up to now the estimation of time between the present moment and the 
beginning of an event that has just terminated, i. e. according to some, the estimation of time in 
passing, it is time to study the estimation of a duration which ran over a period of past time, i.e. 
between two past events. The role of long-term memory is going to be vital here whereas the 
durations studied previously often called upon the intervention of short-term memory.”291 
However, despite the fact that in estimation of duration the length of time becomes a quantity 
whose beginning has just been stored in memory, there is a certain natural continuity in the results 
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of perception and estimation of time. Concerning durations that go beyond perception, Fraisse 
argued that expectations and attention play an important role, generally by producing an 
overestimation of the perceived duration. In one study
292
 he observed that duration depends on the 
number of perceived changes, and when stimulus complexity is too great, individualized changes 
are not perceived. This hypothesis echoed that of Ornstein
293
 on the role of memory in estimation of 
durations, according to which, the estimated duration at a given moment is proportional to the 
storage size. On this view, time estimation is a hypothetical variable that depends on the number of 
events stored and retrieved, as well as on the complexity of the coding of the events. In another 
study
294
 conducted by Fraisse, the focus was on the comparison between temporal judgments in a 
duration production task and temporal judgments in a non-temporal information processing task 
(that is, a task in which participants divide attentional resources between two sources of stimuli: 
non-temporal and temporal information). Fraisse demonstrated that if a task is easy, generally the 
subject is able to pay more attention to the duration itself. The easier the task or processing is, the 
more overestimated the duration would be, because the subject would be more attentive to the 
duration itself. This finding was a confirm of an earlier model elaborated by Thomas and Weaver, 
in which attention was studied in relation to two processes: estimation of duration and information 
processing. The study conducted by Thomas and Weaver demonstrated that the more one pays 
attention to time, the longer it seems; conversely, duration seems short when the task is difficult 
and/or interesting.
295
 
 
13. 5 The Time Module: the First Processor Component 
The mechanisms theorized by Fraisse for time perception and time estimation are consistent with 
the view of the modularity of time processing. Here I introduce descriptions of a presumable mental 
architecture in which the operations of an information processing are specific to succession and 
duration of events. The proposed module is composed of two smaller processing components, each 
concerned with a specific information-processing operation that contributes to the overall system. 
The results of these operations will give the cognitive basis for our ‘sense’ of time, or as Fraisse 
called it, the specious present. 
The first processing component of the time module, is a temporal processing system that takes as 
input any stimulus that can be attributed to an unique source, including auditory, visual, tactile 
stimuli, and so further. It should be said that auditory, visual or tactile segregation of sound, as well 
as, vision, and tactile mixtures into the respective sources, occur within their respective and 
independent analysis modules, whose domain is specific to auditory, visual, and tactile information. 
As the outputs of these information domains are processed in parallel, then it is supposed that all the 
information contained in such outputs (i.e. auditory, visual, tactile, speech) are sent to the first time 
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processing module. This means that we have no gatekeeper mechanism that decides which part of 
the auditory, visual, tactile, or linguistic pattern should be sent to the time processing system, and 
which part should be not. Rather, activation of the first processing module is determined by the 
temporal aspects of the inputs to which such module is tuned. The temporal module operates at 
short time durations expressed in millisecond, and more specifically between 20ms and 100ms 
(according to the temporal frame identified by Fraisse, at which the perception is only of 
instantaneity). Consequently, the first timing module will be specialized to extract temporal 
information contained in the outputs of other modules only if such information is sent within this 
range of time. If the information is processed and sent outside the temporal range of approximately 
20ms-100ms, the first timing module will not respond to the process of information-extrapolation; 
in the same kind of way the retina does not respond when a sound wave passes through it, nor the 
cochlea responds when light shines upon it. This restriction depends on the modular nature of the 
first time processor, which is domain-specific only to perception of succession (or temporal order) 
of events and physical objects that falls into this temporal frame. As perception of a succession 
appears up the level of 20ms,
296
 at which human mind is able to perceive successions of events 
representing changes in physical objects, then the activity of the first time processor concerns the 
first pole of temporal order identified by Fraisse. Beyond the limit of 100ms we can speak of the 
perception of duration, whose domain pertains to a second timing processor.  
However, the first timing processor takes incoming inputs of sensory, or multisensory, modalities, 
to which the subject’s perception is exposed during a very short length of time. Once processed the 
information contained in those inputs, it generates outputs which contain representations of the rate 
of change of objects and events. Such representations are supposed to be given in terms of stings of 
temporal relations between successive moments so-defined: “the event x is earlier or later than the 
event y”. The philosophers of time define the kind of temporal relations among temporal points, or 
moments, with the term of B-series relations (for a more detailed discussion of the topic of time 
perception in the context of philosophy of mind I invite the reader to view my earlier work
297
). 
Generally, within the B-series relations an event/stimulus might be earlier or later than another one; 
whereas, within the A-series relations an event/stimulus might be now present, past, or future. B-
series relations are accepted by science as the time-series representing reality, and this is because 
they endorse a high degree of objectivity (i.e., if ‘x is earlier than y’ in the present, then it will in 
future, as well as it always did in the past). Conversely, A-series relations are less objective since 
are directly implicated to the perspective of the specious present, in which a length of time might 
vary considerable for two identical individuals. Although B-series relations operate under causal 
laws when represent temporal change (if x is earlier than y, and y is earlier than z, then x is earlier 
than z), those relations do not embody change by themselves (there is no change in the claim that an 
event, or stimulus, is earlier than another one, this matter of fact will run the same in the future and 
so did in the past), so the recourse of A-series is necessary to describe temporal change because A-
series embody temporal change (even if A-series relations might not exist as McTaggart argued in 
The Unreality of Time). The problem posed by the philosophers of time is that objective time-order 
is determined by the causal order of facts and events, but when we make our judgments about 
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objective time-order we do it on the basis of the self-intimating time-order of our perceptions. The 
idea of time-order itself derives from the perspective of time’s observer, that is, the specious 
present, or one’s ‘seeing’ an event precede another, and one can only see something like this by 
virtue of the apparent causal relation between the perceptions involved: “memory’s main job” is to 
let “a perception cause its content to be embodied at another time in another state of mind.”298  
But returning to our timing processor, how does it work? I propose that the first modular 
subcomponent might be thought as an internal “clock” used to measure time succession. The 
functional basis for this timing mechanism is the pacemaker-based internal clock, with functional 
characteristics similar to the internal clock described by Matell and Meck.
299
 This processor is 
designed to perceive and reproduce the distribution of time successions in this way. Basically, this 
timing mechanism includes three components (these are the typical components of the pacemaker-
counter device model): an internal timer (or pacemaker); an accumulator; and a decision 
mechanism. The timer starts the beginning of the information flow in response to incoming stimuli 
(the outputs of other perceptual modules): given two stimuli (or events), x and y, which occur at a 
time range defined between 20ms and 100ms, the timer explicitly times the order between them. 
This timing mechanism is made to process information in a manner that, when the stimulus appears, 
the counter is started; and as soon as the stimulus disappears, the value of the counter is read out 
and stored in memory. Then, a decision mechanism establishes which stimulus became for first and 
which for second, and generates an output expressed in terms of B-series relations: “x is earlier than 
y”, or “x is later than y”. To reproduce a time succession is therefore: starting the timer, waiting 
until the accumulator has reached the stored value, and then making a response as output. This 
general kind of processing reproduces exactly the working of a peacemaker-counter device.
300
 
 
13. 6 The Time Module: the Oscillator Processor Component 
Fraisse argued that perception of duration is situated at a level above 100ms and under 5sec, into the 
limits of the psychological present. Here I consider that a second time processor component is 
responsible for perception of duration, occurring at a temporal range between 100ms and 5sec. As I 
described it, the first processor component is supposed to generate as outputs temporal 
representations (defined in terms of B-series relations) which can be thought as ‘raw’ material of 
the physical world, these representations lay the ground for perception of duration, which occurs 
into the second timing processor. The second timing processor takes the first processor’s outputs as 
inputs and, after it processes the information contained in them, generates an output that reproduces 
the duration of an amount of time that is presently passing. This information (the second processor’s 
output) will be available to the central system and the other perceptual modules. I suggest to 
describe the second processor component in terms of a timing mechanism that resembles the 
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working of a self-sustaining oscillatory processing.
301
 The inbuilt modular oscillator can be thought 
to act like a metronome that starts ticking time progresses.  
Imagine to have a metronome, the ‘clack’ that sounds each time the arm hits the side is an onset, or 
event. Within the brain’s neural circuits, the simplest sort of event is the ‘impulse’, that is, an 
instantaneous burst of neuronal activity surrounded before and after by intervals of no activity. 
Basically, a sequence of impulses might have an organization in time of the most pure forms, this 
organization is determined by the relationship of the intervals between those impulses. The term 
‘period’ denotes the times between onsets, as the metronome’s arm travels to the other side; 
whereas, the term ‘phase’ denotes the relationship between these successive events. The temporal 
expectancies for each successive onset form the ‘beat’. The beat is the perception of a regular, 
periodic series of events that can be of any duration. This perception is in line with the rate of 
change of physical event onsets, from the smallest interval in the temporal sequence, up to the full 
duration of the repeating sequence. Thus, the second timing processor can be thought as a neuronal 
oscillator, whose working is like that of a metronome. The increasing number of ticks produced by 
a metronome generates temporal unit intervals, which represent physical time accurately within the 
clock mechanism. When we perceive the rate of change in physical phenomena we have the feeling 
that physical time is a continuous flow that can be divided indefinitely into smaller units. A 
temporal unit interval is therefore the representational reference of relative or absolute duration, 
since encodes the sequence of changes that occur in the physical time. Analogously, the sequence of 
changes perceived in physical phenomena, to which we associated the name of temporal passage, is 
imported into neuronal circuits in form of neuronal temporal units via activation of neurons placed 
into the second timing processor. Into this oscillator module, a temporal unit interval is taken as the 
interval between two adjacent spikes, or bursts of spikes, that result from the regular activity of the 
neuronal oscillator. 
To describe how the oscillator-module functions, we might isolate two steps, or levels of 
processing, that control its behavior. The first step is originates by the start-pulse, which 
corresponds to the event of the transfer of information contained in the first time processor’s output 
within the neural circuits of the oscillator processor. The transfer of information (defined in strings 
of B-series relations) generates changes in temporally regular activities of firing neurons which are 
in the oscillator’s module. The frequency, or the rate of change in frequency, resulting from 
modulation in activities of those neurons provides a codification of different “time intervals”. So the 
‘start pulse’ initiates the activity of the oscillator-module by resetting the internal timer (that is, the 
cortical neurons) and setting the integer to ‘zero’. When the succession of two or more pulses 
(which are related to each other in terms of “x’s is earlier/later than y”) is set to the start value t0, 
then perception of duration takes place. The duration of the set of pulses x-y increases when the 
time interval between them is not perceived, as for example when the time interval between the two 
syllables bit and ter is too short to be perceived (less than  1.5–2 sec), with the result that they are 
heard as a single word: bitter.
302
 Hence, the value t0 indicates the temporal limits of the 
psychological present. At t0 the set of pulses x-y is perceived as present and, then, as separated 
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from a previous set of pulses that were perceived before t0 and are currently stored in memory. 
Beyond t0 stimuli are not perceived but are estimated, to use Fraisse’s words. Once the internal 
timer sets the integer to ‘zero’, the sets of perceived stimuli, whose components occur at different 
moments, are synchronized via activity of neurons wired in the oscillator circuit (Gupta
303
 identified 
these neurons with frequency modulator (FM) neurons). On the ground of the synchronization 
activity carried out by those neurons into the oscillator module, perception of succession flows into 
perception of duration, giving us the feeling of presentness. 
The synchronization hypothesis would be proved by several studies of stimuli latencies. In 
distinguishing between succession and simultaneity, Fraisse focused on the transition from 
succession to simultaneity when two pulses of more or less variable duration of intensity are 
presented.
304
 Fraisse
305
 and others
306
 observed that, despite no specialized sensory receptor is 
available and our time judgments are subjected to all sorts of stimulation bias as well as to various 
types of tasks, the succession order threshold is constant: approximately 20ms. Fraisse
307
 studied 
the role of latencies in cases of synchronization, that is, simultaneity between hand tapping and the 
sound of a simple repetitive auditory rhythm (he found that hand tapping, as a tactile measure, 
anticipates the sound by about 30ms, and this anticipation is approximately 20ms longer when made 
by the foot). On the basis of his and other studies, he concluded that a perception threshold equal to 
or greater than 20ms cannot simply be attributed to disparity between the arrival of two impulses on 
the brain, but there must be a notable disparity between the two stimuli if there is to be perception 
of succession and order.
308
 According to him, the forms of anticipations in reaction time should be 
attributed to the fact that the tactile stimulus must precede the sound in order to be perceived as 
simultaneous by the brain; hence a decision time mechanism having its own duration has to be 
postulated.
309
 Kristofferson
310
 and Allan
311
 explained this sort of ‘decision time’ mechanism on the 
ground of the attention-switching hypothesis, according to which, the time involved in this process 
corresponds to the length of time necessary to focus attention on each of the stimuli successively. 
Fraisse believed that the decision time mechanism is also compatible with a hypothesis known as 
discrete moment hypothesis,
312
 because there would also be a time quantum involved that would 
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impose a minimum duration for this operation. The "discrete moment" hypothesis postulates that 
the perception of time is not continuous but intermittent and discrete, elements of information are 
thus integrated at distinct moments, but their order can be distinguished only if each element is 
perceived at a different moment from the other. 
Therefore, I argue that into the oscillator module, the separation between perceptual moments, that 
is, the temporal interval between a set of pulses x-y, is not perceived. Conversely, what here is 
perceived is the separation, or temporal interval, between two sets of stimuli, x–y and x’–y’. The set 
x–y gives an amount of time of perceived duration, whereas the set x’–y’ gives an amount of time of 
estimated duration, that is, a duration that has already passed and that is currently stored in memory. 
Within our proposed model, the interval of time between perceived durations and estimated 
durations is called the a-time. The a-time is the second step, or level of processing, that controls the 
oscillator-processor’s behavior; it can be referred as the interval of time between two sets of pulses 
(whose one set is already passed and the other is presently passing), and occurs when the inbuilt 
timer of the oscillator-module is started again. Once the counter reaches the stored value (for 
example, when the metronome’s arm has traveled to the other side to start ticking time progresses; 
or when the cortical neurons of the neural circuit are synchronized to produce their own particular 
pattern of activation in time), then the oscillator processor takes another set of incoming sensory, or 
multisensory, stimuli (which stand in B-relations to each other, that is, in terms of “stimulus x is 
earlier/later than stimulus y”) and synchronizes them as if they occurred simultaneously.  
To conclude, Fraisse individuation of estimation of duration involves memory up the threshold of 5 
sec, therefore, we might think that the a-time provides the temporal limit between perception and 
estimation of durations. Beyond 5sec estimation of duration takes place, this timing mechanism has 
not to be thought as a timing module itself, but rather as the result of the activities of the central 
system. Central to the timing mechanism of time estimation are also non-temporal parameters, such 
as expectations, attention, emotions, or mental states, play an important role.
313
 Since there is a 
certain natural continuity in the results carried out by perception and estimation of duration (since 
both orders of duration contribute to the extrapolation of time information from the physical 
continuum), and given the interaction between these different kinds of processing, then it is 
presumable to think that the oscillator processor responsible for time perception is partially ‘open’ 
and therefore not totally informationally-encapsulated. In contrast to the oscillator processor, the 
first timing processor is more closed and so impenetrable from the higher-level processes of the 
central system. From this it follows that the human mental architecture has a module domain-
specific to time which includes two component processing systems: one is more basic, totally 
encapsulated, working at subconscious level and a very short temporal range, this is the first 
modular component engaged with perception of temporal succession; conversely, the other one is 
more open, partially encapsulated, operates at long time scales and might be present at either 
conscious or unconscious level, this is the oscillator module engaged with perception of temporal 
duration. One reason to think that these are distinct and independent mechanisms is provided by 
empirical evidence, as Fraisse reported: 
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“The concepts of succession and duration which specify our notion of time are quite 
naturally empirical in their origins. This does not necessarily imply that their development is 
empirical. Research in this field shows that perception of both duration and succession are 
present very early in life, but that their joint functioning is not acquired until age 7 or 8, 
when the child first becomes capable of logical thinking. An abstract notion of time is 
gradually elaborated from that age forward (Friedman: 1982). The objective sought in 
presenting these generalities has been to provide a framework for the present review of 
contemporary research in the field of the psychology of time, rather than to end the 
philosophical debate on the notion of time, outlined in the introduction to the Psychology of 
Time (Fraisse 1963), which in any case will never find a satisfactory conclusion.”314 
To use the language of the philosophers of time, the first time processor provides representations of 
time successions in term of B-series relations, that is, in terms of relations that the event x, 
occurring at moment m, is earlier or later than the event y, occurring at moment n. Whereas, the 
oscillator processor provides representations of time durations in terms of the specious present, 
namely, the ‘sense’ of presentness creatures possess. The temporal reference (the now) provided by 
the framework of specious present is necessary to the successive estimation of duration in 
retrospect. Based on the reference of now, the subject is able to construct complex representations 
of time defined in terms of A-series relations, that is, in terms of “x is now past (memory),” or “x is 
now future (expectations). 
 
13.  7 The Modularity of Timing Mechanisms 
To reassume. Above I drafted a possible mental architecture for time processing which may be 
sketched up by this very simple scheme, whose scope is just purely exemplificative: 
 a) First Timing Module: between 20ms and 100ms: very-short term memory; inputs = 
incoming stimuli from transducers and other modules; outputs = perception of 
instantaneity or succession expressible in terms of B-series relations (being earlier/later 
than). 
 
 b) Oscillator-Module: between 100ms and 5sec: short-term memory; inputs = B-series 
relations (First Time Module), and stimuli from transducers and other modules; outputs 
= perception of simultaneity or duration expressible in terms of (A-series) perceived 
present (being present). 
 
 c) Central System: above 5 sec: long-term memory; inputs = whatever; outputs = 
estimation of duration expressible in terms of A-series relations (being past/future). 
Each of the two distinct modular mechanisms carries out own distinct functions and operates at 
specific time range, providing necessary prerequisite for extracting time information from the 
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external environment. Findings available in the literature for the hypothesis of the time module deal 
with the processing of intervals lasting a few milliseconds to several seconds. Covering 
psychological studies and behavioral observations, as well as neurophysiologic studies, Pöppel
315
 
suggested a temporal segmentation model on two different time scales. There is one segmentation 
mechanism which derives from neural oscillations with periods of approximately 20–40 ms, which 
are necessary for the temporal binding of spatially distributed brain activities, and explaining 
detection thresholds of temporal order perception. On the other hand, there is a different temporal 
integration mechanism that functions with a range of approximately 2–3s, this perceptual 
mechanism is supposed to potentially form a temporal platform for conscious awareness. Pöppel 
assumes that a similar perceptual mechanism, applied to a large scale perspective, integrates 
separate successive events into a unit or perceptual gestalt. According to this view, the mind does 
not perceive individual events in isolation, but automatically integrates them into perceptual units 
with a duration of approximately 2–3s.316 The duration of this temporal integration mechanism can 
be referred to as the specious present. The idea of temporal integration of time units, resulting from 
fusing successive events into a unitary experience of time (in which perception is processed in 
discrete windows or processing epochs) is also present in other authors.
317
 These findings provide 
evidence for the existence of two independent, and highly specialized processors for time 
perception. 
 
13. 8 Time Processing and the possession of Fodor’s features 
Now I argue that time processing captures the typical properties of modular organization in Fodor’s 
sense.
318
 Thus far we have seen that Fodor indicated that mental activity has an involved modular 
basis, recognizing the presence of highly specialized functions which are characteristic of the part 
of cognitive architecture opposed to upper-level cognition. According to Fodor’s formulation of the 
notion of module, the highly specialized modules can do only one thing but do it very reliably and 
fast, and it is practically impossible to modify their output, also the cognitive central system will not 
even be aware of the activity of the modules. Fodor’s characterization of modular systems describes 
them as being: 
(1) localized: modules are realized in dedicated neural architecture; 
(2) subject to characteristic breakdowns: modules can be selectively impaired; 
(3) mandatory: modules operate in an automatic way; 
(4) fast: modules generate outputs quickly; 
(5) shallow: modules have relatively simple outputs (not judgments); 
(6) ontogenetically determined: modules develop in a characteristic pace and sequence; 
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(7) domain specific: modules cope with a restricted class of inputs; 
(8) inaccessible: higher levels of processing have limited access to the representations within a 
module; 
(9) informationally encapsulated: modules cannot be guided by information at higher levels of 
processing. 
On Fodor’s view, an input-system is modular to the extent that exhibits the properties on this list. 
Furthermore, a module can be composed of smaller processing subsystems that can themselves be 
referred as modules. For example, the module for the visual system described by Marr is composed 
of three-level computational tasks; as well as the language module contains components lexical and 
phonetic-processor modules. However, a module does not need to possess all the features of 
modular systems, it might exhibit some of them which will result more essential to its functional 
organization, while others might be merely diagnostic. This allows us to regard these features as 
‘typical’ or ‘characteristic’ to modularity. This condition is generally satisfied for any of the 
listened features, except for informational encapsulation and domain-specificity, which according to 
Fodor are ‘essential’ to modularity. For example, the module for visual sense is domain-specific 
only to the class of visual stimuli (as it receives from the input systems only visual stimuli); and it is 
also informationally encapsulated because when executes its job it is not guided by the information 
of higher-level processing. The module for auditory sense (and so the other modules) does exactly 
the same: it takes only auditory stimuli and carries out its job without the supervision of the central 
system. As cognitive systems have at their disposal a variety of modules, then it is reasonable to 
think that the mind also has a modular part for coping with specific, bio-psychologically meaningful 
classes of temporal information. If we admit the possibility of a module for time processing, this 
module will be required to have (at least) the two necessary features of informational encapsulation 
and domain-specificity. Conversely, it might lack the properties of innateness, or mandatoriness, or 
neuronal specificity. For example, the neural substrate for time processing might overlap with that 
used in for processing other complex patterns, such as sound, vision, or speech. However, the time 
module could never lack informational encapsulation and domain-specificity. Since the objects of 
time perception cannot be compared to any physical objects, and the time-module processes a 
variety of stimuli coming from other modules (especially from auditory and visual modules), the 
only way for a module to be domain-specific is to be restricted to temporal information. The mind 
encodes the temporal organization of physical phenomena that fall within perception, which have a 
rhythmic structure composed by different successions and durations. The mental representations 
expressed in terms of temporal relations of succession (B-series relations) and duration (A-series 
relations) of events contain the necessary information to guide the behavior of humans and other 
creatures. In extrapolating this information, the behavior of the time module is not guided by the 
central system. However, the time module is supposed to be organized in two parallel and largely 
(but not equally) independent subsystems, specific respectively to the ‘succession’ content and the 
‘duration’ content. Despite equally specific to time information, these modular processor 
components do not have the same degree of informational-encapsulation. The oscillator-module 
will result partially ‘open’ to the information furnished by the part of cognition dedicated to 
estimation of duration, whilst the processor component dealing with the ‘succession’ content is 
presumably more closed and impenetrable. We can describe the mental architecture of the timing 
processors components as follows.  
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY AND TIME 
Michele Gentile 
 
140 
 
The ‘succession’ analysis component deals with the segmentation of the ongoing sequence of 
(perceived) change into temporal groups on the basis of ‘successional’ values without regard to 
periodicity (providing the rhythmic analysis). The temporal ‘succession’ pathway sends its 
respective outputs to the ‘duration’ analysis component, that deals with the segmentation of the 
ongoing sequence of (perceived) change into temporal groups on the basis of ‘durational’ values. 
The ‘duration’ analysis component extracts an underlying temporal regularity corresponding to 
periodic alternation between the beats of the inbuilt neuronal oscillator (providing the meter 
analysis). In parallel and independently, these timing modular components will feed their output 
into the central system via the ‘time estimation’ mechanism. Both the succession and the duration 
pathways send their respective outputs to this part of central system, which extracts time 
information from either rhythmic, or meter analysis, to give estimation of retrospective time. The 
processing for time estimation in the central system constitutes a system of representations of 
specific temporal patterns to which one has been exposed during a period of time. The same system 
for time estimation also keeps a record of any incoming input useful to process its outputs, which 
might feed different kinds of other modular components, depending on task requirements. The time 
information processed at this level can be taken from any source; if the task required retrieving non-
temporal information (attention, emotions, expectations, mental states, reasoning, etc.) about a 
temporal selection, then the associate knowledge stored in the memory will be invoked. Hence, the 
sub-system components that form the time module reach a sufficient degree of domain-specificity 
and informational encapsulation. What is more, they also share with the other perceptual systems 
the residual ‘typical’ or ‘characteristic’ features indicated by Fodor. 
The proposed temporal modules are mandatory since they operate in an automatic way. The 
attribution of mandatoriness is plausible for either the subcomponent system that deals with the 
succession content (which operates in the millisecond range between 20ms and 100ms), or the 
second subcomponent system, both processors fix automatically temporal relations in response to a 
given input. These perceptual systems are also fast. Fodor said that a cognitive process count as fast 
if it takes place in approximately less of half second, and once activated a module would usually 
produce its output well under a quarter of a second. Speech shadowing, for example, is very fast, 
with typical lag times on the order of about 250ms. Having defined the range of action of the first 
timing subsystem between 20ms and 100ms; and of the second one between 100ms and 5sec, we 
can suppose that they generate outputs very quickly. These two important aspects of modules, speed 
and mandatoriness, are in contrast to the slowness of the central system.
319
 Furthermore, the time 
module is shallow since its subcomponent systems generate relatively simple outputs, and on the 
basis of this source the central system provides representations of temporal information at higher 
cognitive levels, involving the making of judgments about time durations, intervals, or successions. 
 
13. 9 Evidence from Neuroscience 
The plausibility of a modular architecture for time processing may be entertained in the context of 
neuroscience. Among neuroscientists interested in the neurobiological structure of time perception 
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someone endorses the view of dedicated neural centers or circuits for the internal clock, as opposed 
to the view that there is no specialized system to represent temporal information in the brain, 
because time is inherent in neural dynamics (that is, in the firing of neural populations).
320
 Different 
networks of brain have been found to be active in different interval timing tasks depending on 
nature, motor vs. perceptual, or the duration sub-second vs. supra-second.
321
 Neuroscientists 
generally opt for an integrative processing of multiple modules distributed across the brain in 
relation to the duration involved. The mechanistic neurological basis of the interval timing by the 
brain in the sub- and supra-second range involves the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, the insula, the 
right posterior parietal lobe and the prefrontal lobe.
322
 Then, we might suppose that different areas 
of the neural system contribute to the functionality of the time module. Basically, two important 
circuits might likely form the neural platform for the first-level temporal module: the cerebro-
cerebellar loops responsible for motor and non-motor functions such as working memory, executive 
tasks, and emotion,
323
 and the dorsal stream responsible for sensorimotor tasks, connecting the 
posterior parietal cortex and the motor, premotor and prefrontal areas of frontal cortex.
324
 Whereas, 
the oscillator module might be presumably inbuilt into the basal ganglia. These neuronal regions 
provide different mechanisms for the interval timing by the brain in both the sub- and supra-second 
range.
325
 
Recent models suggest that timing in the millisecond and second range may be dissociated 
behaviorally
326
 and neurally.
327
 Behaviorally, timing in the millisecond range is achieved relatively 
automatically through direct read-out from an internal timing system. At ranges exceeding the 
neural limitations of this system, the contributions of other processes, such as those associated with 
counting and memory, may become relatively more important. It is believed that timing involved in 
the sub-second range plays role in the motor control and the speech production.
328
 Intervals of time 
processed in motor activities in the milliseconds range are necessary to determining speed of 
various motor movements for the execution of motor tasks, they are processed automatically and 
subconsciously. Conversely, timing in the supra-second interval range are processed at conscious 
level, as in the case of decision making and time estimation.
329
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Neurally, timing in the range of milliseconds engaged with motor control is associated with the 
cerebellum. If cerebellar neocortex primarily subserves basic clock functions in the temporal range 
useful for motor control; on the other hand, prefrontal cortex modulates time perception through 
supportive functions related to sustained attention, working memory and strategic organization. 
Both regions contribute to time perception by managing temporal representations and actively 
maintaining them in working memory.
330
 However, some findings suggest that the most suitable 
candidate for producing this primary temporal representation are the interval timers within the 
cerebellar neocortex.
331
 Neuroscientists argue that timing intervals for motor and sensory tasks are 
calibrated by feedback mechanisms.
332
 The feedback processes exercise a role in the control precise 
movements: the feedback mechanisms maintain the normal range of a function by transferring 
information about the external time into the neuronal circuits in the brain, when this transfer does 
not occur, a failure in control of motor movement produces an increase in the range of a given 
movement. The involvement of the cerebellum in the feedback processes controlling motor 
movements tasks is necessary to transfer information of “physical time intervals” into the neuronal 
circuits in the brain. For example, the act of catching a ball is a task that includes a transfer of 
temporal information regarding the speed of external objects. Therefore, to execute a complex set of 
temporally precise motor movements, these movements recruit feedback mechanisms in the 
cerebellum. The feedback processes must tightly couple the motor actions to the requirements of the 
task parameters, such as the speed through which the object moves along its trajectory. The changes 
needed for the smooth control of motor movements occur over sub-second durations; and this 
condition awards centrality to the cerebellum because of its representing short time durations. 
Evidence here indicates the cerebellum as the best candidate for the first-level time module, because 
of its involvement in the timing of intervals in the sub-second range. 
There are several studies that confirm the brain uses networks of the cerebellum for tasks involving 
sub-second intervals.
333
 Evidence for the engagement of the cerebellum with the calibration of 
neuronal clocks in timing intervals at sub-second range comes from clinical studies. A recent 
study
334
 on lesions of the cerebellum conducted by Gooch has shown that lesions of the cerebellum 
increase variability on various timing tasks, including temporal estimation, reproduction, and 
production tasks. In individuals with the lesions in the cerebellum, other calibration mechanisms, 
such as sensory mechanisms, take over the function of calibrating neuronal clocks. Mechanisms 
based on sensory processing calibrate time intervals of longer durations in comparison to the shorter 
time of motor processing of the cerebellum. The result of this research is that cerebellar lesions 
result in greater variations during the processing of temporal intervals. Further finding for the 
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modular nature of the cerebellum in the neuronal clock comes from a study showing that the 
cerebellar lesions disrupted the precise timing, indicating an increase of variations.
335
 
In addition to the cerebellum, sensory-representations in the parietal cortex were found to contribute 
to the feedback mechanisms that serve to calibrate the clock-module. Someone has focused on the 
interconnection between the cerebellum and cortical areas in the feedback processes that control 
motor movements. It is believed that the posterior parietal cortex has a job alongside with the 
cerebellum to transfer temporal information of physical time from the cerebellar circuits to the 
cortex circuits.
336
 Other studies focusing on the brain networks engaged with the cognitive 
measurements of temporal intervals revealed the co-activity of the posterior parietal cortex with the 
cerebellum in cognitive timing tasks.
337
 It has been argued that the multisensory processing in the 
parietal cortex also contributes to transfer external time information into the nervous system, 
resulting involved in the calibration of the timing circuits that control multimodal tasks.
338
 The role 
of the parietal cortex as interface between sensory and motor processes, necessary to translate 
temporal information into action, would be confirmed by either studies using either rTMS
339
 or 
studies using fMRI.
340
 The right posterior parietal cortex has been demonstrated to be active in the 
timing of short intervals less than 1sec marked by either auditory or visual signals;
341
 but also in the 
timing of longer intervals.
342
 
Conversely, other studies indicate the neural structures of the neostriatum and substantia nigra as 
potential key components of a dopamine-regulated internal clock.
343
 Drawing upon 
neuropharmacology and ablation studies with rats, Meck
344
 argues that the dorsal striatum serves as 
a counter mechanism that accumulates the clock-pacemaker pulses generated in the substantia 
nigra. As a confirm of the role of nigrostriatal circuits in timing intervals, clinical studies indicate 
that Parkinson’s disease, a neurodegenerative disorder affecting neostriatal regions via 
dopaminergic cell loss in the substantia nigra pars compacta, results in deficits in the reproduction 
of temporal intervals suggestive of an impaired clock mechanism. In one study
345
 subjects suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease were found to overestimate a target interval when instructed to reproduce 
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a time interval by counting out intervals at a prescribed rate. Basically, the magnitude of the 
patients’ deficits was largest when the rate of counting was faster (i.e., 5 vs. 1.6 Hz) but the actual 
duration to be timed was shorter (i.e., 3 s vs. 9 s.). This study suggested that the locus of the deficit 
was an impaired counting mechanism. The role of the dopamine and nigrostriatal circuit in the 
timing mechanisms was emphasized also in animal studies.
346
 
However, Meck
347
 and Gibbon
348
 argued that the representation of temporal information up to the 
minutes range is subserved not by the cerebellum, but by a network involving the basal ganglia and 
frontal cortex. It might seem that basal ganglia and cerebellar contributions to time perception can 
be distinguished on the basis of interval range; as the cerebellum maintains temporal representations 
in the millisecond range, while the basal ganglia serves as neural counter engaged at longer 
durations.
349
 Nevertheless, a recent positron emission tomography (PET) study
350
 suggested that 
both the cerebellum and basal ganglia contribute to a network underlying perception of durations 
less than 1s. Although the cortical and subcortical regions activated in the PET study conducted by 
Jueptner seem to be both involved in a network for time perception, it is thought that the prefrontal 
and the neocerebellar regions perform dissociable functions within this network. A comparative 
approach was proposed to investigate the relative contributions of the basal ganglia and the 
cerebellum to the processes involved in time perception, with the aim of integrating functions of the 
frontal lobe, basal ganglia and cerebellar neocortex into a complete neural model of complex 
cognitive processing. By comparing neuropsychological populations with circumscribed lesions 
across a range of temporal and non-temporal tasks, this study suggested that the prefrontal and 
neocerebellar regions perform dissociable functions for time perception.
351
 These findings clearly 
indicate that different neural circuits might play role in the neural substrate of time processing. The 
posterior parietal and pre-motor areas, along which the cerebellum, might provide the mechanistic 
basis of the first time module responsible for the interval timing by the brain in the sub-second 
range;
352
 on the other hand, the oscillator module might be inbuilt in the basal ganglia, a neuronal 
region that provides different mechanisms for the interval timing by the brain, especially in supra-
second range.
353
 The view that the basal ganglia forms the neural basis for an oscillator timing 
module, helping in the calibration of the modular clock, is also defended by Gupta.
354
 Despite the 
neural circuit of the basal ganglia provides no direct representations of physical time, its role is 
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engaged with the beat-based timing relative to rhythms. This view is also consistent with the 
presumed activation of the basal ganglia during beat-based timing tasks.
355
 Further evidence for the 
existence of two separated neural timing systems operating at different time ranges is offered by 
neuroimaging data. Lewis and Miall
356
 indicated the existence of two distinct neural timing 
systems: an automatic timing system was proposed to time shorter intervals up to approximately 1s, 
it recruits the motor systems of the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, and SMA; whereas, a cognitively 
controlled system for timing supra-second intervals was associated with the right prefrontal and 
parietal cortical areas. Other neuroimaging studies
357
 found that similar brain areas are activated in 
time perception tasks employing different durations. The separation between distinct time 
perception systems is also present in other motor-timing studies. Madison,
358
 for example, 
demonstrated that qualitative change in tapping performance basically occur with inter-tap intervals 
whose duration is approximately between 1s and 1.5s; in contrast, time intervals between 0.45 and 
1.5s seem to be automatically processed and not affected by attentional demands. It was also shown 
that intervals in the range between 1.8s and 3.6s are affected by attention and working memory 
processes stimulated by secondary tasks.
359
 
 
13. 10 A brief reassume 
In this chapter I proposed a modular view of the mental architecture of time perception, analogously 
to that proposed for audition, vision, speech, or other kinds of perception. First I reported some 
potential difficulties to endorse a modular perspective for time processing. As I said, one difficulty 
is related to the fact that the objects of time perception cannot be compared to the physical objects 
that fall into the three-dimension space; while another general problem is to identify the organs for 
temporal processing, and thus their localization within the brain. However, I argued that these 
difficulties do not threaten the possibility to develop a general account of temporal perception based 
on the theory of modularity of mind. Despite time cannot be perceived as we perceive a physical 
object, it is profoundly rooted in our mental architecture as well as the spatial dimension. In fact, 
time has a critical role in perception since the perception of structure in time is fundamental to the 
perception of changes in physical objects, whose temporal organization based on succession (order) 
and duration (simultaneity). Then, I suggested that there is an independent processing-system 
specific to the information of duration and succession of events. The proposed time module is based 
on a general theory of perception drown by Fraisse in Perception and Estimation of Time. As I 
argued, the mechanisms theorized by Fraisse for time perception and time estimation are consistent 
with the view of the modularity of time processing, I therefore introduced descriptions of a 
presumable mental architecture in which the operations of an information processing are specific to 
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succession and duration of events. I proposed a modular functional architecture for time processing 
which comprises two neurobiological isolable processing components, each having the potential to 
be specialized for time. Each processing component is concerned with a specific information-
processing operation that contributes to the overall system. The results of these operations will give 
the cognitive basis for our ‘sense’ of time, that is the specious present. 
So far we have seen that the first processing component of the time-module is a temporal processing 
system that operates at short time durations expressed in millisecond, and more specifically between 
20ms and 100ms (according to the temporal frame identified by Fraisse, at which the perception is 
only of succession or instantaneity). This processing component is specialized to extract temporal 
information contained in the outputs of other modules within this range of time. Once processed the 
information contained in those inputs, it generates outputs which contain representations of the rate 
of change of objects and events. Such representations (which can be thought as ‘raw’ material of the 
physical world) are supposed to be given in terms of stings of temporal relations between 
successive moments so-defined: “the event x is earlier or later than the event y”, and lay the ground 
for perception of duration, which occurs into a second timing processor. I considered this second 
time processor component to be responsible for perception of duration, occurring at a temporal 
range between 100ms and 5sec. The second timing processor takes the first processor’s outputs as 
inputs and, after it processes the information contained in them, generates an output that reproduces 
the duration of an amount of time that is presently passing. This timing processor provides 
representations of time durations in terms of the specious present, namely, the ‘sense’ of 
presentness creatures possess. The temporal reference of now is necessary to the successive 
estimation of duration in retrospect. Beyond 5sec estimation of duration takes place, this timing 
mechanism has not to be thought as a timing module itself, but rather as the result of the activities 
of the central system. Based on the temporal reference of now, the subject is able to construct 
complex representations of time defined in terms of “x is now past (memory),” or “x is now future 
(expectations). 
To give support to the modularity view of time processing, I reported a number of functional, 
biological, and neuropsychological studies that confirm this view. We saw that findings available in 
the literature for the hypothesis of the time-module deal with the processing of intervals lasting a 
few milliseconds to several seconds. Several psychological studies and behavioral observations, as 
well as neurophysiologic studies, suggest a temporal segmentation model based on two different 
time scales. To conclude, I argued that time processing captures the typical properties of modular 
organization in Fodor’s sense, and entertained the plausibility of a modular architecture for time 
processing in the context of neuroscience, by suggesting that different areas of the neural system 
contribute to the functionality of the time module. Basically, I indicated two important circuits as 
possible candidate for the first-level temporal module: the cerebro-cerebellar loops responsible for 
motor and non-motor functions such as working memory, executive tasks, and emotion; and the 
dorsal stream responsible for sensorimotor tasks, connecting the posterior parietal cortex and the 
motor, premotor and prefrontal areas of frontal cortex. On the other hand, I suggested that the 
oscillator module might be presumably inbuilt into the basal ganglia.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation I discussed the topics of intentionality, modularity and time in relation to a 
number of different issues, problems, theories and explanations concerned with the view that 
individuals (and at least animals) have an internal ‘mind’ that processes information coming from 
the external environment, and that such information guides the behaviour of those creatures. Having 
introduced the idea of the ‘internal mind’ as regards the intentionality of mental states and 
processes, I turned to the concept of ‘modularity’, and in particular to the modularity theory 
advanced by Jerry Fodor, which claims that the way this information is processed in the mind 
depends on the way the mind is functionally structured within the brain. I thus focused on the 
possibility that the modularity theory applies to time perception. In considering this possibility, I 
explained how experimental psychologists have been tempted to identify a variety of phenomena on 
a temporal continuum that reflect fundamental transitions in the way the brain captures information, 
arguing that the range of temporal experiences reveal an underlying structure that might be 
characterized as modular. To suppose that a functional architecture for time processing captures the 
typical properties of modular organization is to claim that an independent module specific to our 
‘sense’ of time (understood from an internal subjectively-real experience type) exists. To 
summarize the steps of the argument presented thus far: 
 There is a modular functional architecture for time processing that comprises two 
component modules: the first modular subcomponent might be thought as an internal 
“clock” used to measure time succession, and the functional basis for this timing mechanism 
is the pacemaker-counter device model; whereas, the second processor component can be 
thought as an internal timing mechanism that resembles the working of a self-sustaining 
oscillatory processing. 
 One modular processor is more basic, totally encapsulated, working at subconscious level 
and a very short temporal range, this is the modular component engaged with perception of 
temporal succession; conversely, the other one is more open, partially encapsulated, operates 
at long time scales and might be present at either conscious or unconscious level, this is the 
modular component engaged with perception of temporal duration. 
 Each of the two distinct modular mechanisms carries out own distinct functions and operates 
at specific time range, providing necessary prerequisite for extracting time information from 
the external environment. 
 Our ‘sense’ of time is the cognitive result of the functions and processing carried out by 
those modular components (in the same way that vision results from three complex 
information processing types of visual representation); descriptions of how the pathways of 
information flow between these component modules can be useful for explaining how the 
mind captures and represents the rate of change it perceives from the external environment. 
 The entire processing of the time module forms a representational basis for higher level 
processing, which occurs at the level of the central system. 
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 There is empirical evidence for the modularity of time processing which comes from many 
fields of study, more particularly, a number of covering functional, biological, and 
neuropsychological studies suggest the existence of such module for temporal processing. 
 Hence, this allows us to regard time perception in terms of modularity, as we do with many 
other kinds of perception. 
 
I hope the proposed modular architecture for time perception can provide plausible and valid 
foundations for future research on the psychological and neuronal mechanisms of time processing. 
To conclude, I wish to make a couple of suggestions concerning my hypothesis which might be 
examined in future enquiries. The first suggestion concerns the idea that the psychological 
mechanisms by which the mind elaborates and organizes temporal information have a fundamental 
role in the mental architecture. Temporal processing is an important part of perception; if we accept 
that a range of possible types of cognitive architecture might exist among animal species, then we 
can conclude that different kinds of cognitive architecture involve different types of perception and 
temporal processing. For example, like dogs, humans perceive sounds, but dogs can nevertheless 
perceive very high-pitched sounds that humans are unable to perceive, and in turn dogs have a more 
restricted visual spectrum. Differences between auditory or visual processing in humans and dogs 
must therefore depend on differences between their respective cognitive architecture. Naturally, 
such differences among different sensory-perceptive systems are also reflected in timing processing, 
so a dog's internal clock will differ from ours in many important respects. It seems that animal 
behaviour is in general pre-programmed by time, whereas human behaviour (despite being 
regulated by time as well) appears more flexible and less bound than the former. We often refer to 
animal behaviour as “instinctive” and to human behaviour as “conscious.” When a organism has a 
particular experience like seeing a water spring or hunting prey, its memory recalls every past 
occasion when it had a similar experience, so that organism, having already experienced similar 
environmental conditions, will be prepared to deal with the new circumstances. Obviously, this 
situation occurs in humans as well as other species; nonetheless, unlike humans, animals tend to 
reinforce their behaviour from incoming stimuli in an automatic and often unconscious way (as 
Pavlov and the early behaviourist experiments demonstrated). At first glance, it seems that the 
mental architecture of animal species has a higher degree of modularity compared to the 
architecture of the human mind. On the other hand, in humans time information (along with other 
kinds of processing) appears more differentiated between temporal perception and temporal 
cognition (therefore, between the modularity of perceptual processes and the intentionality of 
representational processes). This is not to say that animals have no timing mechanisms at the level 
of the central system at their disposal, rather, it means that the mental architecture of animal species 
is more centered on aspects of perception and instinct than on aspects of cognition. 
For instance, we know that some animals hibernate, going into a deep sleep so they can survive the 
cold season when the weather is freezing and food sources are difficult to find. When wood frogs 
hibernate during the winter they actually stop breathing, their hearts stop and ice crystals form in 
their blood; conversely, when the winter is over and the temperature rises, they defrost and their 
lungs and hearts restart. Hibernation is a clever survival mechanism and it is evident that this 
mechanism is regulated by a series of internal biological clocks. There are numerous physiological 
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internal mechanisms that govern this and other similar physiological and biological functions, and 
these reactive processes form part of the biological structure of an organism following a hierarchical 
order. From chemical reactions to communication times between cells, to the vital cycles of singular 
organisms that operate at behavioural level, inner mechanisms are hierarchically interconnected by 
constant timing regulation; respiration, blood circulation, digestion and other similar vital functions 
are mechanically involved in a process of continuous adaptation to the changes identified in the 
external environment. In virtue of this adaptation internal mechanisms are constantly regulated by 
timing organization, since they have a specific duration, occur at specific moments with adequate 
speed, and maintain relationships with other local times which perfectly harmonised and 
rhythmically adapted to achieve the organism’s vital functions. 
However, despite the fact that the coexistence of local natural times regulates biological and 
physiological structures, a wood frog does not decide whether to go into hibernation or to 
reproduce. These behaviours are instinctive in the sense that they are pre-programmed and 
presumably inbuilt in its mind. When executing those behaviours animals do not exhibit what we 
call free will, given that these acts are evidently completed due to specific circadian rhythms. 
However, it is not clear where the borderline between conscious and automatic, or instinctive, 
behaviour lies. In the study of time processing in humans, for example, some research reveals that 
our ability to judge duration is a consequence of physiological mechanisms, which vary in inter-
subjectively predictable ways. Evidence shows that if vital functioning is accelerated by the 
consumption of stimulants such as amphetamines, or due to increased body temperature, this results 
in an overestimation of time amongst subjects.
360
 Conversely, it has been shown that reduced body 
temperature generally leads to an underestimation of time.
361
 In general, an increase or decrease in 
vital function consistently leads to the perception of duration elapsing more quickly or more slowly 
respectively.
362
 In any case, what appears clear here is that from the lower molecular or cellular 
levels to the ever-higher levels of cognitive processes, animal species (and especially humans) 
exhibit a certain ability to manage temporal information. 
We might ask whether this timing ability is a sort of ‘adaptation’ in the sense intended by 
evolutionary psychologists. In this sense, we may consider the timing module as the product of the 
natural selection of evolutional cycles, something that is inbuilt in the genetic code of species that 
inhabit the various ecosystems. Besides the critique applied by Fodor to the general understanding 
of evolutionary psychology (according to which a mechanism, or function, has evolutionary 
purpose only if it was selected to enhance the organism's survival), it is evident that a time module 
would play a decisive role in enhancing the survival of the organisms. 
A second suggestion concerns the interrelationship between temporal perception and temporal 
cognition. Being interdisciplinary in nature, the study of time has been approached from various 
perspectives; specifically, research in philosophy, cognitive linguistics and AI is committed to 
exploring how time manifests itself in language and thought. Time statements qualify external 
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representations of beliefs, desires, or intentions, and using these external representations, 
anticipatory reasoning about intentional dynamics can be performed. In the general formalization 
approach presented in Jonker and Treur,
363
 the temporal aspect of the dynamics of interaction with 
the environment is made explicit and related to the dynamics of belief, desire and intention; in this 
approach, mental states are grounded in interaction histories on the one hand, and related to future 
interactions on the other hand. A principal issue is the conceptual dependence between time and 
space (I have already dealt with this issue in my earlier paper).
364
 In linguistics the conceptual 
metaphor theory has provided much of the impetus for exploring this issue. As Lakoff and Johnson 
argued:  
“…what we call the domain of time appears to be a conceptual domain that we use for 
asking certain questions about events through their comparison to other events…very little 
of our understanding of time is purely temporal. Most of our understanding of time is a 
metaphorical version of our understanding of motion in space.”365 
This position argues that time arises from the abstraction of relations between events that we 
perceive and experience in the world “out there”, and that once these relations have been abstracted, 
they are structured in terms of spatial correlates allowing us to conceptualize time: 
“our concept of time is cognitively constructed…events and motion are more basic than 
time.”366 
According to the view of Lakoff and Johnson,
367
 at the representational level, time and space are 
asymmetrically structured: time is supported by, and arguably parasitic on spatial representation, so 
mappings recruited from the domain of space provide structure for the domain of time, but not vice 
versa. In focusing on this evidence Lakoff and Johnson posited a “passage” conceptual metaphor, in 
which time recruits structure from motion through space on the basis of experiential correlations. 
They argued that time inevitably and ubiquitously correlates with salient aspects of spatial 
experience: duration, for example, correlates with spatial length.  
On the other hand, focusing on lexical concepts for time, rather than conceptual metaphors, 
Evans
368
 has argued that time is in some ways more fundamental than space, at least at the 
neurological level: it facilitates and underpins our ability to perceive and interact in the world, to 
anticipate, and to predict. Based on neurological evidence, he considered the distributed nature of 
temporal processing to be critical to our ability to perceive events, assuming that event-perception is 
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facilitated by temporal processing. Somewhat along the same line, Crick and Koch
369
 claimed that 
temporal processes have a critical role in facilitating our perception of sensory-motor experience. In 
approaching the so-called binding problem, that is, the problem of how percepts are formed in the 
absence of a central association area for the integration of perceptual information in the brain, they 
suggested that perceptual binding is achieved via the coordinated oscillation of neurons. 
Accordingly, binding may result from the temporally coordinated activities of neurons that bind 
perceptual information, rather than from the integration of information at a specific “association” 
site in the brain. Perception of temporally structured events facilitates perception of our world of 
sensory experience, so that spatial awareness would be favoured by the temporal mechanisms that 
control perception. Not only temporal structuring of our experience of time occurs alongside, or in 
parallel to, spatial perception, but it also facilitates the perceptual processes of the spatio-sensory 
world around us. 
As I said, time itself is not the object of our perception (for the reasons I detailed in the last 
chapter), but is the manner whereby perception is facilitated. Conversely, the representation of time 
in the conceptual system is accomplished by spatial correlates, therefore we could conclude that 
there is an asymmetrical dependence between time and space at the perceptual and representational 
levels. While our experience of time and space are distinct and distinguishable at the perceptual and 
neurological level, on the other hand, at the representational level they appear to be largely 
asymmetrically organized. 
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